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This thesis is a study of the revelation theologies and theological 
epistemologies of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Karl Barth. 
The first of the three parts discusses the presuppositions behind Baithasar's 
theological aesthetics. Balthasar's vision is to reinstate the beautiful in theology and 
to understand both theology and culture from the Gestalt of God in the world which 
is the Incarnation. This Christocentric vision implies that Christ as the Gestalt der 
Gestalten fulfils as well as transforms all human conceptions of the divine found in 
mythology, philosophy and religion. It leads to a trinitarian revelation theology in 
which the work of the Spirit in providing the sensorium needed for theological 
knowledge is not neglected. 
In the second part, our attention is focused on Karl Barth. The Reformed 
theologian's battle with anthropocentric theology has resulted in a profound revelation 
theology and epistemology that is centred solely on Christ and faith in him. This is 
the basis for his total rejection of natural theology. Barth's theology of revelation 
argues therefore for a radical discontinuity between all human concepts of the divine 
and the God revealed in Jesus Christ. 
The final part discusses the fundamental dissonance between the approaches 
of the two theologians, their agreement in important matters notwithstanding. This 
difference can be studied from various angles, but it is here approached from their 
concepts of analogy. Balthasar's catalogical-analogy, it will be argued, has provided 
a way forward by bringing the analogia fidel and the analogia entis into a 
christological and trinitarian framework thereby surmounting the impasse which comes 
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from the fruitless alternative between the two. This has opened a way of articulating 
a theology of continuity within the context of a more radical discontinuity without 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis seeks to interpret and appraise the fundamental and revelation 
theologies of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Karl Barth. It seeks to address the question 
of the relationship between revelation and theology from the standpoint of their 
theological epistemologies. By so placing them in juxtaposition we hope not only to 
highlight and clarify the fundamental differences in their theological epistemologies 
and methodologies, but also to bring to light the significant areas of similarities and 
convergence. The latter stem from the fact that both the theologies of Barth and 
Balthasar can be understood as responses to the incipient monism, immanentism and 
anthropocentrism that are so pervasive in both Catholic and Protestant theologies. The 
theologies of Barth and Balthasar can therefore be seen as attempts to reinstate 
theology in its proper status and vision by reflecting on the revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ. However differently this is understood and unfolded in their respective 
theologies, the call for a Christocentric and theocentric theology can be understood 
to be the most fundamental impulse in both theologians. 
Balthasar seeks to understand theology and culture from the standpoint of the 
Incarnation, that is to say, from the standpoint of the Gestalt of God revealed in the 
flesh. For Balthasar, Christ is form because he is content. Therefore theology receives 
its form entirely from this content which moulds it and gives it shape. Theology is not 
only indissolubly united to the supreme form of the Incarnation but is also measured 
by it. Therefore theology must be a catalogically/analogically mediated integration. 
Here Balthasar is launching his fierce attack against the grandiose subjectivism of the 
avant-garde Catholicism for which Teilhard de Chard in, Martin Heidegger and Alfred 
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North Whitehead are philosophical mentors. For the same reason Balthasar finds it 
necessary to maintain his distance from the pansacramentalism of Karl Rahner, even 
though they were both profoundly influenced by the philosophical innovations of 
Maurice Blonde] and Joseph Marechal, and to take his stand among the theologians 
of the so-called Christological renaissance - Erich Przywara, Romano Guardini and 
Michael Schmaus. 
Karl Barth's battle with the anthropological-immanentist theologies of liberal 
Protestantism since Schleiermacher is well-known. Barth seeks to free Neo- 
Protestantism from the chains of this methodological error, associated with Ritschl, 
Herrmann and Troeltsch, by his Copernican Revolution in theological method which 
sees Christ at the centre of theology and faith as indispensable to the knowledge of 
God. By emphasising the ontological difference between God and the world, Barth 
hopes to repair the damage caused by neo-Protestantism, namely, the acculturation 
and domestication of faith which resulted in the transmutation of Christianity into a 
culture religion. In the light of this Barth distances himself from his contemporaries, 
Bultmann and Tillich, in whose approaches he sees the resuscitation of the 
immanentalism of liberal Protestantism. 
These common concerns notwithstanding, the revelation theologies and 
theological epistemologies of the two Swiss-German theologians differ at a very 
fundamental level. This means that all similarities and agreement must be viewed and 
assessed in the light of this difference, and only after the latter is fully appreciated. 
Several reasons may be attributed to the disjunction between the thoughts of the two 
theologians. Firstly, though it has been rightly said that Barth's theology is the via 
media between liberal Protestantism and Catholicism, his desire to recapture and 
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revive those fundamental theological concerns of the great Reformers has placed him 
at a cautious distance from the theology of Rome, even the theologies of those 
thinkers, one of whom is Balthasar, in which he has found some promise. Similarly 
though Balthasar's openness to and admiration for Barth has the consequence of 
approximating him closer to Protestant theology, yet, the presuppositions, structure 
and content of his theology shows him to be a faithful son of the Church of Rome and 
her theology. The second reason is related to the first. Balthasar's theology bears that 
characteristic feature of those theologies which, having been impacted by the theology 
of Karl Barth, now seek to venture beyond it. Balthasar seeks to integrate the Barthian 
Christological focus into the nature-grace schema of Catholic theology whereby the 
analogia entis is subsumed under the analogiafidei without controverting the former's 
important role. This has resulted in a Christocentrism that is quite different from the 
one proposed by Barth, one which accommodates the natural theology of the Vatican. 
This study is based primarily on Balthasar's work on theological aesthetics The 
Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics (Vols. 1-7) and his study on Karl Barth's 
theology. Our study of Barth will be based on the Swiss theologian's monumental 
Church Dogmatics (Vols I- IV). The study is divided into three parts, the first of 
which discusses the theology of Balthasar. Chapter l explores the theological and 
philosophical presuppositions behind Balthasar's theological aesthetics. Chapters 2& 
3 analyse his theology of revelation and understanding of theological knowledge. This 
first part ends with a brief assessment of Balthasar's theology. Part Two is devoted 
to the exposition and interpretation of Barth's concept of revelation and theory of 
theological knowledge. Chapter 4 examines Barth's thesis that God can only be known 
by God, and that theological epistemology must be understood from the doctrine of 
13 
God. Chapter 5 is a study of Barth's Christocentrism, while Chapter 6 examines the 
implications of Barth's doctrine of creation on his theological epistemology. This 
chapter also studies the significance of Anselm on Barth's theological epistemology 
and methodology, picking up once again Barth's main thesis. The final part, which 
comprises 'two chapters, offers a discussion of the fundamental differences between 
the approaches of the two theologians. Chapter 7 is an analysis of the problem of the 
analogy of being, a concept rejected by Barth but considered by Balthasar as 
indispensable for theology. Here, in the concept of analogy, is where the problematic 
relationship between ontology and epistemology can be appreciated in all its acuity. 
It shall be argued that although Catholic analogy, and ipso facto Balthasar's concept 
of analogy, presupposes an ontology, epistemology and theological methodology that 
are rather different from Barth's, the two are not as irreconcilable as is generally 
assumed. The final chapter delineates Balthasar's attempt to surmount the impasse 
which the unfruitful alternative between the analogia fidel and analogia entis has 
yielded. This he does by his catalogical analogy, which while embracing the 
Christological emphasis of Barth on the one hand, refuses on the other to stop short 
as Barth does of working out the implications of the Christological vision to the full. 
Here, then, is to be found a way of articulating a theology of continuity within the 
context of a more radical discontinuity, which has as its presupposition the centrality 
of the theology of the cross, without marginalising what has been traditionally called 
a theology of glory. In it is also found a way of conceiving the relationship between 
the centre and the periphery of man's knowledge of God. 
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PART ONE 
THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY 
OF 
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR 
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CHAPTER I 
A THEOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the fundamental premises and 
principles that are involved in the construction of Balthasar's theological aesthetics. 
We shall look firstly at the significance of beauty or the idea of the. beautiful in 
Balthasar's thought to see how the concept of beauty as a transcendental enables him 
properly to formulate a theological aesthetics. Next, we shall examine the principle 
of analogy, paying particular attention to the way in which Balthasar adopts and 
applies this important concept which pre-supposes a theology of nature. The principle 
of analogy, as we shall see, constitutes the basic governing principle and structure of 
Balthasar's theology, orchestrating his system into one coherent unity. Thirdly, we 
shall see how Balthasar uses the principle of analogy to establish a correlation between 
aesthetics, metaphysics and theology. And fourthly, we shall see how Balthasar 
himself struggles to achieve his theological aesthetics. We shall examine closely the 
route he takes, travelling with him as it were, to see how he carefully and resolutely 
avoids the dangers and pitfalls that await not only the theological dilettante, but even 
those who rank among its most matured and sophisticated exponents. 
2. Theology and Beauty 
a. Baltlrasar's Understanding of Beauty 
Balthasar invites us to look at the whole of Christian theology under the sign 
of Beauty. `Beauty is the word that shall be our first', he writes with such startling 
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simplicity in the first volume of The Glory of the Lord. ' He goes on to describe what 
constitutes Beauty. The many words that describe Beauty gravitate towards the 
mystery of form (Gestalt) or figure (Gebilde). The two words that describe Beauty, 
fonnosus ('beautiful') and speciosus ('comely'), come from the words forma ('shape') 
and species ('likeness') respectively. Thus Beauty is the radiance from within, a 
radiance which transforms the fonna into the fonnosus and the species into the 
speciosus, making the outward form into something love-worthy. '- 
Here are Balthasar's own words as he explains his concept of the beautiful: 
The beautiful is above all a form, and the light does not fall on this 
form from above and from outside, rather it breaks forth from the 
form's interior ... The content (Gehalt) does not 
lie outside the form 
(Gestalt) but within it ... In the luminous form of the beautiful the 
being of the existent becomes perceivable as nowhere else, and this is 
why an aesthetic element must be associated with all spiritual 
perception as with all spiritual striving. ' 
Balthasar sees Beauty as a transcendental, a fundamental determination of 
Being. Beauty is not simply the property of certain objects. Rather `all things partake 
in some degree or another in beauty'. ' That which manifested in the beauty of created 
and finite forms is the glory of Being, der Glanz des Seins. 
b. 77ieology's Rejection of the Aesthetic 
According to Balthasar, religion in general no longer loves or fosters Beauty. 
IGLI: 18. 
2 GL 1: 19-20. 
' GL I: 151,153. 
John Riches, `The Theology of Hans Ur von Balthasar, I', Theology, 45 (1972), 
565. 
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Beauty is treated superficially so that it might be easily ousted. ' Theology has also 
forsaken Beauty and the aesthetic. By thus neglecting the gestalt of the Incarnation, 
theology has failed to do justice to the very revelation which Christians have 
concretely received. 
From the very start of the Reformation, Protestant theology has embarked on 
this operation of excluding aesthetics from theology. Luther started by making the 
doctrine of justification, as it is portrayed in Romans and Galatians, the axis of his 
theology. Luther's polemic against Catholicism's dulling of the sharp cutting edge of 
the Word of God springs from this theological axis. He saw how the neo-Platonic 
non-dialectic schemata of Catholicism had in fact replaced the Death-and-Resurrection 
dialectic of the Christ event. This neo-Platonic non-dialecticism has portrayed the 
world as the `appearing' of the 'non-appearing' God. Such `aesthetic' theologising, 
according to Luther, becomes a series of stages through which the creation can 
approach the Deity ontologically, ethically and mystically. ' 
Luther wanted to recover the central pronouncements of the Bible, namely the 
sovereign and mysterious God whose unfathomable decision to create the world 
cannot be deduced from any theory of Ideas or appropriated by any connecting 
analogies; the even less penetrable work of salvation through Jesus Christ which can 
be grasped only by an act of a totally blind surrender of trust; and finally the 
absconditas Dei sub conirario, the absolute veiledness of God, which makes any form 
of human appreciation which is independent of God's own self-disclosure impossible. ' 
I GL 1: 18. 
6 GL 1: 45. 
GL 1: 47. 
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In the light of these three fundamental statements, it is not difficult to understand 
Luther's attack on the `whore' of reason 'which aesthetically attempts to achieve a 
harmony between divinity and humanity'. There can therefore be no harmonising, no 
skill, no comprehension. Any attempt by man to impose his own ideas on the divine 
revelation is futile: the very form will disintegrate in the face of the `contradiction'. 
Balthasar is of the opinion that this negation by Luther first began as an admonition, 
the warning of a correctiofraterna, but later it became a fundamental rejection of the 
other in schism. ' 
This separation of the aesthetics from theology continues to advance after 
Luther. In his second volume of Either/Or, Kierkegaard can no longer envisage a 
meeting between religion and aesthetics. In fact he was impelled to use the term 
`aesthetic' to describe a basic attitude which to him is unacceptable for the Christian. 
Kierkegaard in his writings delineates all the more clearly the total difference between 
the agape of Christ and his followers on the one hand, and human eros on the other, 
resulting in a situation where man is robbed of all joy of the aesthetic. ' Living in an 
age in which aesthetics was sharply distinguished from logic and ethics and was given 
its own particular value, Kierkegaard passed judgement in advance on the aesthetic 
element in liberal theology which was renewed and was heavily dependent on 
Schleiermacher and Hegel. Consequently, the determining factor of those who 
consciously or unconsciously followed Kierkegaard is the opposition they sense 
" Balthasar suggests that this negation has resulted in a double curse: first the 
splintering of Protestantism, and, second, the sects having to oscillate between 
irreconcilable extremes since the dialectic has become a method that can be 
manipulated (GL 1: 48). 
I GL 1: 49-50. 
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between the two realms. Somehow the word `aesthetics' is used to describe an attitude 
which is frivolous, curious and self-indulgent. 10 
The renewed interest in the thought of Kierkegaard has had an anti-aesthetic 
effect on theology. Balthasar cites Brunner as a good instance of this. Brunner 
`develops Kierkegaard's polemical schema of opposites into a methodological 
theological opposition between contemplative "mysticism" and prophetic and Biblical 
faith in the Word'. " In Bultmann we see the dissolution of any and every form of 
revelation that is objectivised and historically perceivable. What we have in its place 
is the subjective and inward decision of faith which comes through an awareness of 
the existential pro me of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; a real awareness 
of having been, as it were, gripped by Christ. Balthasar describes this as an approach 
full of anguish because of its lack of imagery and form, and calls it a `real dead-end 
for Protestantism. 12 
Baithasar, however, appears to be very appreciative of the efforts of Karl 
Barth who sought to preserve the element of the aesthetics in theology. `Here we must 
acknowledge the great service rendered by the theology of Karl Barth of having 
recognised the imminent danger of shipwreck and having, unaided, put the helm hard 
over'. " Barth succeeded in overcoming the either/or between Hegel and 
Kierkegaard. In following Hegel, he saw the need for an `objectively normed' and 
`objectively formed' dogmatics, and proceeded to construct it. In following 
10 CL I: 51. 
GL 1: 52. 
12 CL 1: 52. 
11 CL 1: 53. 
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Kierkegaard, he saw the importance of the personal faith-relationship between God 
and man, a relationship made possible by the mediation of the God-man Jesus Christ, 
and gave much weight to it in his theology. 
Contrary to Kierkegaard's concept of aesthetics, Barth arrives at the content 
of Beauty in a purely theological manner. This is done through the contemplation of 
the data of scriptures and the glory of God. Thus Barth can say that God is beautiful: . 
`beautiful in a manner proper to him and to him alone, beautiful as the unattainable 
Primal Beauty, but ... precisely 
for this reason, beautiful not only as a fact, not only 
as a force, but rather: as a fact and as a force in the manner in which he asserts 
himself as the one who arouses pleasure (Wohlgefallen), creates desire (Begehren) for 
himself, and rewards with delight (Genuss) ..., the one who as 
God is both lovely and 
love-worthy'. " The beauty of God is evidenced in the unity of his humiliation and 
exaltation. It is through the Cross of Christ that the beauty and glory of God is 
known: 
... To the unity of his humiliation and exaltation, 
God brings his own 
form , and proper beauty. Isaiah's phrase, `He has neither form nor 
beauty' determines the precise locus from which God's unique beauty 
radiates: `If we seek Christ's beauty in a glory which is not that of the 
Crucified we are doomed to seek in vain'. `In this self-realisation, 
God's beauty embraces death as well as life, fear as well as joy, what 
we call `ugly' as well as what we call 'beautiful'. " 
In following Anselm, Barth considers theology as the most beautiful of the 
sciences because of its object. And it is. precisely in this regard that the dogmatics of 
Karl Barth, according to Balthasar, represents a decisive breakthrough: 
If his call to return to pre-Reformation theology inspires such trust, it 
" GL 1: 53-54. 
11 GL 1: 55-56. 
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is because he claims for his theology only those elements of Patristic 
and Scholastic thought which can be justified from revelation itself and 
which, accordingly, are not suspect of undue Platonising. In any event, 
we must not fail to note that Barth was aware that the delineations of 
an authentic theological aesthetics which he offered has no roots within 
the realm of Protestant theology, and that, in order to give such a 
theological aesthetics a home within his own theology, Barth himself 
had to cut his actualism back sufficiently to make room alongside it for 
the concept of objective form. 16 
However, in Balthasar's estimation, Barth has not succeeded in transforming 
Protestant theology. Instead, Protestant theology has submitted to Bultmann's dualism 
of criticism on the one hand, and existential, imageless inwardness on the other. " 
The elimination of aesthetics from theology is not only a phenomenon to be 
found in Protestantism. Catholic theology has developed a sharp contradistinction 
between philosophy and theology. This contradistinction is a late development and, 
according to Balthasar, is wholly without basis. We are faced today with the question 
as to how far human reason can come to the knowledge of God without positive 
revelation. This question is totally abstract and ahistorical and is a problematic only 
for modern rationalism. Balthasar mentions Anselm, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa, 
all of whom saw an interpenetration of philosophy and theology. He attributes the 
modern distinction as having its genesis from Descartes: 
Only with Descartes does philosophy become dependent on the 
scientific ideal of the rising of natural sciences, thereby beginning its 
rift from theology. And only from this point onwards do philosophers 
become eager to experiment with the question of what reason can 
accomplish without the aid of revelation and what the possibilities are 
for a pure nature without grace. '8 
" GL 1: 56. 
11 GL 1: 56. 
11 GL 1: 72. 
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Balthasar ends with this observation: `The middle of the last century then saw 
the end of all those great theological systems which still followed the great examples 
we have cited and clung in spite of all to the model of the ancient unity between 
philosophy and theology, by-passing the modem understanding of "faith" and 
"knowledge"'. " Alongside this we see the trend of `specialisation' in which theology 
is both declared and declares itself to be a `specialisation' among others. Furthermore, 
we see also the present pre-occupation to make the science of theology subservient to 
the methods of the exact sciences. This means that Christianity may be subsumed 
under the historical sciences. It also means that theology has become ,a science of 
`accidental historical truths' (Lessing). 
All these influences have prevented aesthetics from taking its proper place in 
theology; they have emptied theology of all aesthetic elements. Theology has 
consequently moved in the opposite direction, and has satisfied itself with a rational 
interpretation of scripture (exegesis), of nature and history (fundamental theology), 
and of the ecclesiastical tradition (dogmatic theology). Louis Dupre has rightly 
observed that the whole theological project of Balthasar is to `reintegrate grace and 
nature, thought and feeling, body and mind, culture and theology within a synthetic, 
comprehensive, theological reflection on form'. 2° 
c. The Place of Aesthetics in Theology 
For Balthasar, theology is the only science that can have transcendental beauty 
' GL 1: 73-74. 
2" Louis Duprc, `The Glory of the Lord: Hans Urs von Balthasar's Theological 
Aesthetics', Comnutio, Vol 16 (1989), 386. 
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as its object. Philosophy alone, without theology, cannot do this. Philosophy can 
envisage the absolute only as the principium et finis ntundi, the `limiting concept of 
a worldly ontology'. 2' Therefore without theology, philosophy can only make formal 
statements about beauty. Only theology can perceive beauty as a transcendental which 
belongs to and is the primary manifestation of Being itself. 22 
As a transcendental, beauty is also seen in visible and finite things. 
Bonaventura measures the beauty in visible and temporal things by their ability to 
manifest `an archetypal reality that transcends all forms'. 23 The transcendentality of 
beauty, however, does not destroy or dull the finite's own expressiveness, `for the 
form constitutes no attempt to copy its divine source, but to manifest a God who 
remains hidden, and precisely in its ability to do so lies its formal (i. e. aesthetic) 
perfection'. 24 
This ontological nature of beauty is lost to modern aestheticians whose 
subjectivist attitude has caused them to turn away from the `sure light of Being' (St 
Thomas), resulting in the reduction of poetry and art to formalist exercises that are 
marginal to the deeper concerns of human existence. 
Balthasar asserts emphatically that a theology which does not give the 
aesthetics a primary place is unable to make an impact in the world. `Only beautiful 
theology, that is, only theology which, grasped by the glory of God is able to transmit 
its rays, has the chance of making any impact in human history by conviction and 
21 GL 1: 70. 





This conviction radiates throughout the history of the Christian church and is 
the hallmark of both patristic and medieval theologians. In Irenaeus we find the idea 
that God as the creative artist who created the world to bear his image as its 
creator. 26 In Bonaventura we discover how beautiful things are really the expressions 
of God Himself and that these have beauty because they achieve or bear the 
resemblance of God. Thus beauty points to God who for Bonaventura is the `beauty 
past all hope' (anelpiston kalos), and this beauty is to be `received in man in the 
aesthetical-mystical ecstasy of wonderment and inflamed adoration'. 27 
d. A Warning 
Balthasar is however not so naive as to be unaware of the dangers of the 
aesthetics, and in his writings, he issues a clear warning to his readers. Beauty can 
shine so magnificently, so brilliantly that the witness of God in the beautiful is 
overlooked. Beauty then becomes `a mouse trap, for beauty of the creature allures 
men; so beauty directly satisfies the lust which strives "to know what is concealed, 
to look at what is beautiful, to possess what is lovely and valuable"' . 
2' Theology 
must never be so blinded by the glare of earthly beauty that it falls into the 
entrapment of what BalthasarcalIs the `current view-points in an inner-worldly theory 
of beauty'. To do this is surely to cause `theological aesthetics' (i. e. the attempt to do 
'` GL 11: 13. 
26 GL 11: 71. 
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aesthetics at the level and with the methods of theology) to deteriorate into an 
`aesthetic theology' (i. e. aesthetics understood in the worldly, limited and therefore 
pejorative sense). This for Balthasar is nothing less than a betrayal, a `selling out' of 
the theological substance to a this-worldly aestheticism. 29 
In the following pages, we shall see how Balthasar has in practice avoided 
these snares in the construction of his own theological aesthetics. But first we need 
to look at a very important principle that dominates his thought, the principle of 
analogy or what is sometimes called the analogia entis. 
3. The Principle of Analogy 
a. Nature and Grace 
The theological aesthetics of Balthasar presupposes a theology of nature and 
uses the principle of analogy as its fundamental principle. Balthasar stands alongside 
Przywara and Marechal in their criticism of the so-called `extrincism' of Neo- 
scholasticism, which is particularly evident in the doctrine of grace. This doctrine 
portrays man with a self-contained human `nature' equipped with its own natural goal. 
Grace is then added as an undeserved `supplement' which consequently endows the 
human person with an additional `supernatural' goal. This understanding of nature and 
grace with the awkward external ising of the latter is unacceptable to Balthasar. 3o 
It was the French philosopher Blonde! who first offered a sharp critique of this 
`two-storey thinking'. In his method of immanence, Blonde] sought to posit a 
29 GL 1: 38. 
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continuity between nature and grace by arguing against the externalising of grace and 
by describing the `inner demand for the supernatural as a necessary part of the human 
spirit'. 3' His thinking brought the birth of a new era in the Catholic theology of his 
century with its affirmation of the inner unity of history and revelation, experience 
and faith, nature and grace without denying their distinction. 
Two significant developments issue from this. The first is the `transcendental 
theology' of Karl Rahner which attempts to mediate classic Thomistic metaphysics 
with the philosophy of spirit characteristic of German Idealism. Following the 
Blondelian paradigm of the mystical uniting of God with the human being, Rahner 
sought to find the real place of that union in the spirit of the human subject. The 
result of this is the notion that since man is a spiritual subject, he always has an 
orientation to God and that in every concrete intellectual knowing and doing, he has 
something of the `transcendental' experience of God. 32 
Balthasar represents another line of approach. He begins not with the 
subjectivity of the human being, nor with the intellectual self-realisation of the human 
subject, but `more objectively' with the whole of reality which man encounters. It is 
from this reality that he tried to find the locus of the unity between God and the 
world. Nature, for Balthasar, is not the natura pura of neo-scholasticism but the 
whole human condition in its given objective worldly reality. James Zeitz is right in 




where nature means the whole of the human condition'. 33 Thus the concept of nature 
is already analogous since man cannot stand outside his given concrete nature. 
b. Erich Przywara 
Balthasar's concept of the analogia entis is deeply influenced by the teaching 
of Erich Przywara. Przywara's direct influence on Balthasar can be traced back to the 
summers of 1935 - 1938 when the latter worked at the former's house for the 
periodical Stinunen der Zeit. 
In his major work entitled Analogia Entis: Metaphysik, Ur-Struktur und All- 
Rhythmus, Przywara carefully sets out his understanding of the principle of analogy. 
For him the objective worldly reality is characterised by a two-fold polarity: an inner- 
worldly reality which comprises the tension between Dasein (existence) and Sosein 
('whatness or essence'); and a supra-worldly reality, the tension between creature- 
Creator. Przywara sums up this tension in the formula analogia enris. 
Medard Kehl has provided us with a succinct description of Przywara's 
concept of the analogy of being: 
... finite reality is profoundly analogous in its being, that is, 
simultaneously similar and dissimilar to the being of God. It is similar 
in so far as it really `is', and thus it forms a union between Sein and 
Wesen (Being and nature) and between Dasein and Sosein (existence 
and essence); yet it is dissimilar in so far as it does not mean any full 
identity or any unity consequent upon an inner essential necessity, but 
only an external, factually posited `unity of tension'. " 
Though the concept of the analogia entis does have epistemological 
3' James Zeitz, `Przywara and von Balthasar on Analogy', 7homist, Vol 52 (1988), 
No. 3,474. 
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implication, the integration is primarily ontology. Przywara explains: `Metaphysics, 
not epistemology is the prima philosophia, and within the staring point of the whole 
philosophy there is already a religious relationship ... Metaphysics at its very 
foundation cannot be purely theoretical and uninterested, but already has an ethical 
"decision" character without becoming alogical'. 35 
On account of its similarity, the finite is to be affirmed and loved because it 
is a reflection of God. But the concept of analogy grounds the necessity of 
transcending the finite. There must be a breaking out, as it were, into the absolute 
transcendent reality of God. In fact, the two sides of the analogy are not of equal 
importance. The dissimilarity is unequally greater than the similarity. James Zeitz 
gives us a clear summary of this aspect of Przywara's understanding of the Analogia 
Entis: 
... analogy with 
its ground in the creature maintains a relationship to 
God as mystery or God `ever greater'. The God whose `greater 
dissimilarity is always beyond every similarity that can be noted 
between creature and Creator'. It is indeed analogy, but analogy with 
moments - including the creaturely moment of `being measured out' in 
a final analogia artributionis. 36 
Thus while the concept of analogy helps Przywara to spell our his formal 
principle, Sosein in-above Dasein, it nevertheless portrays a contradiction that is not 
at all peaceful because it `always cuts right through the centre of every approximation 
and similarity ... The dynamic principle of analogy demolishes any merely possible 
identification of God and the world and points to their continually-increasing 
's Qouted by Zeitz, `Przywara', 480. 
36 Ibid. 
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differentiation'. 37 Analogy points to the incomprehensibility of God. 
d. Accents 
From this fundamental infrastructure of Przywara's teaching of the analogia 
entis, Balthasar was able to construct a superstructure, which in principle is very 
similar to the idea of Przywara, but in application is significantly different, nuanced 
by the younger Jesuit's own aesthetic theology. 
Three salient features mark Balthasar's own development of the analogy of 
being. The first is his emphasis that every possible relationship between the world and 
God is founded on the gift of God's relationship as creator to the world. Hence, all 
movements from the human being to God rest on this relationship. Balthasar 
untiringly stresses that God's relationship as Creator to his creatures is prior to all 
relationships. `Every comparison and relatedness of the creature has therefore its 
measure in a converse relatedness of God to the creature'. 38 
Secondly, Balthasar is adamant to defend the value of the creature. Przywara's 
analogy stresses the `ever greater' difference between God and creature to the point 
that it almost cancels out any kind of similarity. By underlining the creature's 
creational relationship with its Creator, Balthasar wishes to affirm the positivity which 
the reality of the world has received through this relationship. 
Created being must be by definition created, dependent, relative, 
nondivine, but as something created it cannot be utterly dissimilar to 
its Creator. And if this creature is a spiritual and intellectual being, 
both its ontic as well as its noetic nature must bear some relation to its 
Creator. In its thinking, however blinded and rebellious that thinking 
" Kehl, `Introduction', 20. 
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might be, it must be touched by God the Creator, for it has God's 
cogito as the form of its cogito. Otherwise it would not even be a 
creature. 39 
For Balthasar, `Adam's loss of the possession of grace does not mean that he has 
thereby lost the order of grace (as the supernatural vocation of nature to be redirected 
to the heights of God). '4° He warns against equating `fallen human nature with some 
"pure nature" that stands outside the order of grace'. 41 
Thus the artificial externalising of grace from nature is removed. Balthasar has 
given the old dictum of Thomas Aquinas that `grace presupposes nature; it does not 
destroy it but completes it', a new interpretation. He writes, 
What the formal concept of nature tells us is that everything touched 
by grace retains its natural side: grace is always a grace in a nature 
and for a nature. It remains modal to nature and is never substantial. 
But while this is all true, so is the converse: grace so radically 
transforms, exults and irradiates nature with the divine reality that no 
aspect or corner of nature can escape its impact. Yes, even the most 
god-forsaken realm - where sin took hold and reigned - was chosen as 
the site for God revelation's of grace in Christ! 
This already means that nature de facto has only one, single, 
supernatural end. It means that not only its individual `acts' but the 
very seat and centre of these acts - nature itself and its entelechy - 
must defacto be radically transformed, raised up and realigned. There 
is ißt fact no slice of `pure nature' in this world. 42 
Even Karl Barth could not escape or get round this paradox. Here Balthasar 
points out the apparent contradiction in Barth's thoughts: `On the one hand, he locked 
nature up in itself, to the point where it becomes impossible to derive a truly 
39 KB, 285. 
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transcendent concept of it. On the other hand, he opened up nature to grace, to the 
our 
point where he almost deduced Wnatural capacities 
from the event of revelation and 
the act of faith (Church Dogmatics, 6)'. 43 
Balthasar's eagerness to emphasise the correspondence between nature and 
grace, and to uphold the positivity of the finite must not however lead us to conclude 
that he has swung to the other extreme, that of allowing the similarity between God 
and the world to swallow up the dissimilarity. That he is careful to avoid this 
tendency is seen in the third feature of Balthasar's development of the concept of the 
analogia entis: that in every analogous correspondence between nature and grace both 
the uniqueness and the incomparability of the definitive self-revelation of God in 
Christ must be acknowledged. 
For Balthasar, Christ is the ground and goal of creation. Therefore the most 
fundamental reason for the world's aesthetic structure lies in Jesus Christ. He makes 
this point succinctly in his book Prayer. 
The whole of creation, surely, and man in particular, was brought into 
being and ordered in view of Christ. And since Christ is the fulfilment 
of the cosmos, and the plenitude of the divinity sent into the world, 
since, too, he fills heaven and earth and gathers them together in 
himself as Head, surely he is more than the redeemer from sin. It is he 
who was to take flesh in the middle of time - and not the disincarnate 
Logos - who is the first born in the mind of God and the `beginning of 
the creation of God' (Aoc 111.14); and it was in him and in view of 
him that man was brought into being, compounded of spirit and 
body. ' 
Hence, while the positive content of the correspondence between the created 
order of nature and the historical order of salvation means that the order of the 
" KB, 301. 
I Prayer (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 209. 
32 
aesthetic in creation is the vessel within which God unfolds his final revelation to us, 
this revelation itself cannot be calculated from nature. It is received as a pure gift. 
The analogy between the two orders leads to an openness for the `totally other' 
completion of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. `The revelation of God in Christ 
remains - despite every possible demand for it and in every real fulfilment - still the 
absolutely unimaginable new and other which is already given in no "transcendental 
experience"'. 4S 
e. Encounter With Barth 
Before we leave our discussion of the principle of analogy, we must pause to 
examine the significant influence of yet another theologian on Balthasar: Karl Barth. 
The influence of this Reformed theologian on Balthasar is felt in three important areas 
of the latter's thinking. The first is his Christocentric theology. The second area is the 
theology of history. Barth's `doctrine of universalistic predestination' made a deep 
impression on Balthasar and acted as a catalyst to his own sketch of the `theology of 
history'. Finally, Balthasar was also deeply influenced by Barth's doctrine of the 
analogy of faith, which seeks to replace the Catholic doctrine of the analogia ends. 
For Karl Barth, the formula analogia entis is the `invention of the anti-christ' 
and the single, most convincing reason for not becoming a Catholic. For Balthasar, 
as we have already seen, this principle is absolutely indispensable, and is the only 
solution that would enable Christian theology to work responsibly between a 
philosophy of identity on the one extreme, and an absolute dialectic on the other. 
Balthasar argues that over against the `dialectical' Barth of the Epistle to the 
11 Kehl, `Introduction', 22. 
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Romans there is a necessity for a creature-grounded common ground between God 
and the creature. It is only within this that the contradiction of the sin of the creature 
can have meaning. Balthasar wrote, `Every contra presupposes relationship, thus a 
minimum of common ground in order to be truly contra and not simply unrelated 
other. Also, only on the basis of analogy is sin possible'. " 
The dialogue with the Barth of Church Dogmatics led Balthasar to agree on 
the analogia fidel without controverting the important role of the analogia entis. The 
analogy of faith for Barth means that only through the incarnation of God in Jesus 
Christ can there be a communion between God and the world. Only in believing in 
this message does the human being attain a relationship of having something in 
common with God. Balthasar concurs with Barth's definition of the analogy of faith 
in the context of the salvation-historical order of redemption in Jesus Christ, and is 
ready to recognise this form of analogy to be the final form. But he firmly maintains 
that this relationship presupposes a relationship of creation which is elevated and 
brought to perfection. 
Balthasar was careful to take Barth's claims seriously. He goes beyond 
Przywara by pointing out not only the weaknesses of Barth's position, but also its 
strengths. He saw a possible common ground between Barth and Catholic analogy. 
The excesses of Barth serve as helpful warnings, while Barth's analogy of faith 
serves as a corrective to the Catholic notion of the natura pura which was prevalent 
in the nineteenth century. ' Balthasar's dependence on the principle of analogy does 
not blind him to the possible dangers of the misuse of the principle which would be 
16 Zeitz, `Przywara', 188. 
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epistemologically and theologically disastrous: 
Misuse of the analogy consists in simply subjugating and subordinating 
God's revelation with its own form, to the laws not only of 
metaphysics and of private, social and sociological ethics but also of 
this-worldly aesthetics, instead of respecting the sovereignty which is 
amplified clearly enough in God's work. 48 
4. Aesthetics, Metaphysics and Theology 
a. Aesthetics and Metaphysics 
Balthasar maintains that aesthetics was always seen as an aspect of metaphysics 
before it was reduced to a science which is confined to a particular area of 
knowledge. This reduction of aesthetics was the result of the rise of rationalism, seem 
primarily in the Baumgartenian aesthetics, 49 and also the rise of Kantian idealism. 
By metaphysics, Baithasar means the `science concerned with the being of what 
exists'. " 
`Being' is defined as `that which finally establishes the multiplicity of the 
world'. The transitory truth and goodness of the world, perceived only in a limited 
and fragmentary manner, are, according to this view, `anchored' in the truth and 
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goodness that do not pass away. The beauty that shines forth from the this-worldly 
and temporal objects is anchored in an absolute beauty that is non transient. 
According to antiquity, this beauty dwells in the &pXaL of being - with the 'gods' . 
51 
This intuition is called `transcendental aesthetics' where the KA 6P is seen as one of 
the transcendental determinations of being qua being. The man of antiquity would 
never separate the transcendentally beautiful and the transcendentally true and good. 
Between these there is a circumincessio. The beautiful therefore never lacks `that 
which is morally sound or the radiance of truth in its work of reconciliation and 
healing by grace'. Similarly, the medieval thinkers were able, in principle, to hold on 
to this indwelling, and are able to see simultaneously the unity of the beautiful with 
the good and true and its distinctiveness. 52 
Balthasar maintains that biblical revelation can and must enter into dialogue 
with transcendental aesthetics; 53 and though it must criticise all metaphysics, 
mythical, philosophical and religious, 54 it nevertheless does not declare it worthless 
but rather, this metaphysics is `confirmed in such a way that man sees all his 
preliminary sketches of systems included and far transcended in the definitive systems 
of God'. 55 
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b. The Importance of the Concept of Form 
No metaphysics of being qua being is separable from concrete experience. This 
experience is always sensuous in nature. Hence, the `truth and openness of being as 
a whole will be seen only where a judgement is made about some precise thing that 
is true; the goodness of being will be experienced only where something that is good 
meets one, something that simultaneously brings near the good and (through its 
finitude, fragility and lack of goodness) takes it away again'. sb 
The concept of form is appropriate to express the reality in which the totality 
of being presents itself in various degrees of clarity in the individual (temporal) things 
that exist. The totality of parts requires for its existence, not only a surrounding world 
but ultimately, being as a whole. Nicholas of Cusa calls this a `contracted' 
representation of the absolute. `And so the absolute being makes use of the form of 
the world with its duality of language (inalienable finitude of the individual form and 
unconditional, transcending reference to this individual form to being as a whole) in 
order to make itself known in its unfathomable personal depths'. 57 
The light that shines forth from the form, the light that reveals it to the 
understanding, is inseparable from the light of the form itself, the splendor fonnae, 
and the I ight of being as a whole. In this sense then, the transcendence increases along 
with the immanence. To put this in the language of aesthetics, one could say that the 
higher and purer the form, the more will light shine forth from its depths and the 
more it will point to the light of being. Seen in the perspective of religion, one could 
say that the more spiritual a being is, the more it is aware in itself of God, the more 
`& GL IV: 28. 
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it will point to God. This, Balthasar explains, is the fundamental law of metaphysics 
with which Biblical revelation concurs. S8 
Balthasar frowns on the modem tendency towards the destruction of form. He 
names the various strands of thought that push in this direction: Bultmann's 
existentialism, Rahner's anthropocentric transcendentalism, Teiihard's evolutionism, 
and those who emphasises rhythm alone (here Balthasar parts company with 
Przywara). Against this, Balthasar maintains, we must preserve the form of revelation 
- `for only when we accept the unique incarnation of the Logos can the infinite 
dimensions of the Pneuma be understood as his glorification (Jn 16: 14) and not his 
dissolution'. 59 
c. Metaphysics and Theology 
It can be seen from the above discussion that Balthasar is totally opposed to 
the separation of metaphysics from theology. Theology, as a reflection on the glory 
of Christian revelation, cannot be undertaken successfully without constant reflection 
on the subject of metaphysics. Metaphysics here must be seen in the broadest terms. 
If it narrows its scope, it destroys itself. 60 Thus the task of metaphysics includes 
what the Greeks called the 'holy knowledge about the origins of the world' (mythos) 
and the definition and description of what is &X Oý ('clear', `true'), &yaOöv 
('good') and KcaXöv ('sound', `healthy', `beautiful'). 
It is from this conviction that Balthasar raises his polemic against Luther, 
11 GL IV: 31. 
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modern Protestantism, and modern Catholicism. Luther, by limiting himself only to 
what is biblical, overlooks the beauty of the creation (though it is attested to in the 
Bible), making it impossible for the glory of grace to overflow into the world of 
creation because of his disruptive dialectic. b' In the same way, modern Protestantism 
obscures the whole dimension of the. ruxX6V of the world: `Christianity can indeed 
fasten on to catastrophe and bankruptcies, in order to make visible what is distinctive 
in Christianity itself, but it can never take comfort from such things, imagining that 
it could occupy painlessly a fortress abandoned by the enemy'. ' 
This is also true for modern Catholicism, with the exception of a remnant: 
And this remains true at a time when for Catholics the period of 
humanism (understood in the sense of Antiquity), and thereby also the 
period of metaphysics in the senses in which this has come down to 
them, appears to have come to an end; when `the beautiful' seems to 
belong only to bourgeois comfort which it seems almost indecent to 
cultivate any longer; when the figures who leave their imprint on the 
Church for today - Therese of Lisettx, Charles de Fou . auld, the 
worker-priests, many communities living in the world - live the 
example of Christianity of poverty and of utter exposure to a cold 
heartless world of technology, a world that at best understands the 
machines but discards all the other uses of the word as comical or 
rotten glamour. 63 
S. Towards a Theological Aesthetics 
The task of this section is to examine the formulation of Balthasar's theological 
aesthetics. Two possible approaches are open to him. The first is to go the way of 
Karl Barth, that is, to discover the inner beauty of revelation and theology itself. The 
" GLIV: 21. 
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second is to probe the possibility of a relationship between theological beauty and the 
beauty of the world, and to establish a genuine encounter between divine revelation 
and antiquity' From the epistemological and theological presuppositions already 
examined, the choice for Balthasar is clear. But first he examines the approaches of 
those before him who have attempted such an undertaking. 
a. Examination of Some Approaches & Paradigms 
The first to come under his consideration is Johann Georg Hamann, who he 
describes as a tragic figure; tragic because he remains a figure out of joint with his 
times. Nevertheless it was Hamann who tried to `construct a theory of beauty 
(Aesthetica in puce) in such a way that, in it, the total aspiration of worldly and pagan 
beauty is fulfilled while all glory is at the same time given to God in Jesus Christ'. 65 
Standing at the beginning of Idealism, Hamann struggles to ward off the 
synthesis that entrapped his friends, who later became his intellectual enemies: 
Shaftesbury and Hume, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Kant, Starck and Herder. This is the 
synthesis that resulted from the Enlightenment where `the beautiful could be regarded 
as being the primal nature of the world itself, in its sensualness and even in all its 
sensuousness and eroticism'. ` Hamann breaks away from this. To him nature has 
been alienated from its origin. The `aesthetic' and even enlightened reason are both 
tinged with original sin. `Only Christ and God's Word in him in the form of suffering 
(the hiddenness sub contrario), the historical word of Scripture reveals anew God's 
I GL 1: 80. 
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glory'. 67 Hamann sees the glory as kenosis which occurred not only in the 
incarnation of the Son, but also in the creative activities of the Father, and in the 
work of the Holy Spirit. He speaks of the `aesthetic obedience of the Cross'. The 
folly of the cross is manifested vicariously, and it is in this that he finds access to the 
primal beauty of man's existence. Balthasar explains: 
Now, it is in the folly of the cross that Hamann finds access to the 
primal beauty of our existence, to the archetypal power of the genuine, 
creating Word, and, finally, access to the innermost, mysterious core 
of all reality: the bridal unity of Christ, the God-Logos, with his fallen 
and dismembered Body, which, in death, he again takes home to 
himself: `The unity of the Head, as well as the disjunction of the Body 
... is the mystery of the Kingdom of Heaven from its genesis to the 
apocalypse. It is the focal point of all parables and types in the entire 
universe - the histoire generale and the chronique scandaleuse of all 
ages' . 
63 
But Hamann did not make an impact with his aesthetics because of the 
prevailing influence of the Enlightenment. Balthasar describes vividly this tragic 
failure: 
But to whom could Hamann have sold such an aesthetics at that later 
hour? Everyone respected him; no one understood his concerns. His 
light was extinguished, not only by being outshone by the brilliance of 
Weimar, then entering its own noonday - the Weimar for which his 
only disciple, Herder, has deserted him; his light was extinguished in 
himself, in the smothering darkness of his own expression, which 
became increasingly more compressed and compacted to the point of 
incomprehensibility. The times abandoned him, and another century 
and a half was required until Ebner, Buber and Haecker rediscovered 
his theology of language. 69 
Balthasar then examines the thoughts of Johann Gottfried Herder, poet, 
theologian and philosopher, who attempted to construct the indispensable bridge 
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between poetry and theology, or the philosophy of nature and history and a religious 
psychology. 
Herder declares himself an enemy of the Enlightenment whose arid reason and 
concepts kill the soul. The soul is described as consisting of feeling, sensibility, the 
will and deed; and is defined as a unity of a surging `force' and the `image' that it 
pours forth. This was later named as the `power of the imagination' by Idealism and 
Romanticism. It is with this `power of the imagination' that Herder approaches the 
Bible. 
Two fundamental principles guided Herder's study of the Bible. The first is 
that the Bible is as a whole, poetry, and can therefore be reconstructed only as a 
world of images. The second is that the Bible is the most ancient and purest document 
of mankind, and, as such, stands in the sharpest contrast with all other forms of 
literature. The language that expresses the simplicity and truth of the Bible can be 
characterised as being the `origin of all myth', and as being both primal myth and 
super myth. 
According to Herder, if the Bible is read correctly, it is the manifestation of 
all beauty and truth which is scattered throughout humanity. Balthasar, however, 
unravels a serious reductionism in the thought of Herder: 
Not only is the Bible this - for Herder: it is also nothing but this. 
When Herder reads the Bible, even the miracle and Resurrection 
narratives in the NT, he refuses to see in it anything but the highest 
possibilities of man as such. 7° 
Balthasar's comments on Herder's late work God provides us with some telling 
and perceptive insights on Herder's theological position: 
"' GL 1: 88-89. 
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The amphibolies of the later work God are well-known, a work in 
which Herder turns his back on Jacobi and declares himself for 
Spinoza -a Spinoza, of course, that he has brought into harmony with 
his own understanding of Christianity. Herder's ambiguities in this 
work are but one expression of the great amphiboly between pantheism 
and Christianity that pervades the whole age, from Fichte and Schelling 
to Hegel: the fluid identification of the natural and the supernatural 
which both `humanised' Christianity and failed to hear its true 
message. And we must ask ourselves at this point whether, instead of 
these aesthetic harmonies, we would not prefer to hear the trenchant 
antitheses of a Schiller and, later, of a Marx and a Kierkegaard ... 
" 
We have seen that Herder, and certainly the German classical and Romantic 
idealism after him, posited an identity between aesthetic humanism and Christianity. 
The unfortunate result of this, as Balthasar has correctly described, is the 
humanisation of Christianity, which in turn resulted in an inability to hear its true 
message. The aesthetic apologetics of Rene de Chateaubriand however is significantly 
different. As a Catholic, Chateaubriand `must preserve the difference in levels 
(Gefalle) between Christian revelation and beauty'. ''- Geniality, according to 
Chateaubriand, is the worldly expression through which Christianity makes its 
appearance in culture. It is possible and even desirable for one to find one's way from 
this expression back to the heart or essence of Christianity. 
The criterion for all truth, that is, both divine and human truth, as well as 
natural and supernatural truth, for Chateaubriand, is beauty. It is this beauty that 
produces and develops harmony in man. In his writings, he traces the thoughts of 
those who have anticipated his method: from Justin, Arnobius, Lactantius, Origen, 
and Augustine to Pascal, Francois de Sales, and Fenelon. 73 
" GL 1: 90. 
72 GL 1: 91. 
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The problem with Chateaubriand's method, as Balthasar saw it, was his 
standard of beauty. 
The `beauty' which is supposed to serve as criterion for the latter is set 
too low by Chateaubriand. In his work, the world of revelation does 
not bring with itself its own criterion, and its beauty, a criterion and 
a beauty by which man, the world and culture could measure 
themselves. The point of reference lies, at best, in the harmony 
between nature and supernature, but for the most part is to be found 
in nature, in its own satisfaction and development. Chateaubriand's 
points of view are correct and possible in the Christian sense, but they 
are not sufficient. " 
We move on to the next model, the aesthetics of Alois Gügler, whom 
Balthasar credited with having brought `romantic aesthetic theology to its 
perfection'. 75 For Gügler, the revelation of God in his creation is `natural as to its 
depth'. To the sensorium that perceives this depth, the work appears as God's 
`impassioning and enrapturing work of art'. All peoples bear witness to this primal 
experience in their art. 76 
Herein lies the decisive feature of Gügler's theology: the relationship between 
Biblical revelation and extra-biblical art. This relationship is described by Balthasar 
as the relationship `between what is original and what is already in decline, between 
the proper order of reality and the progressive alienation from that reality'. " 
Several advantages can be gleaned from this conception of the continuity 
between revelation and art. The first is the `redeemability' of that which is outside the 
Bible as it is drawn and taken into the reality of the revelation in Jesus Christ. The 
" GL 1: 94. 
75 GL 1: 94. 
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second is the applicability of the universal phenomena of life, nature and history to 
the interpretation of Christian revelation. And, finally, the isolationist historical 
`positivism' of Biblical revelation is avoided. 
But these advantages do not mean that Gügler's system was successful in 
presenting a theological aesthetics. Gügler's ambiguity, his failure to achieve a clear 
definition of his underlying concept of art was the reason for his failure. Though 
Gügler's work represents the most significant achievements of Catholic Romanticism 
and announces powerfully the aesthetic concerns of theology, it failed because it did 
not provide an adequate account of his analogical method, nor was he able to on the 
basis of his schema of Romantic categories. Balthasar concludes: 
Romantic theology ultimately failed because of a deep theological 
inadequacy, namely, that it did not sufficiently distinguish between 
creation and revelation, or, to formulate it in terms of our enquiry, we 
can say that Romantic theology foundered on a kind of aesthetic and 
religious monism. " 
It was in the theology of Matthias Joseph Scheeben that Balthasar found the 
true signs of the replacing of the `aesthetic theology' of Romanticism `with the 
outlines of a methodically founded "Theological aesthetics"'. 79 Scheeben's 
theological methodology signals a decisive turning away from the Idealist aesthetic 
theology to the theology that is significantly more positive and `scientific' on the one 
hand, and on the other, because of his strong aesthetic inclinations is able to give this 
`scientific' theology an aesthetic shape. 
An important feature of Scheeben's aesthetic theology is its understanding of 
the relationship between nature and grace. Against the pantheism of Romantic 
11 GL I: 104. 
79 GL I: 105. 
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theology, Scheeben was adamant that the separation between nature and supernature 
should be maintained. Supernature is not `a moment in nature by which God brings 
it (nature) to perfection'. 80 Neither can nature claim to strive positively after 
supernature and to assert certain rights to it. In a single, penetrating motion of his 
thought, Scheeben has successfully severed `all connecting lines that naturally lead 
from below into the Realm above ... '$` 
The world of grace is the world of God, who through the revelation of himself 
has created nature has granted it a share of his own substance and nature. Thus 
revelation, for Scheeben, is salvific: it means `the transporting of man from his own 
immanent and finite sphere into the divine, transcendental, and infinite sphere'. 82 
God's plan for the world then is the `glorification' and `transfiguration' of nature. 
`For every creature this is the supernatural, freely given "ideal", an ideal which is 
necessary because it is really conferred, an ideal which is the `principle and goal" of 
all participation in God'. 83 
Perhaps the main weaknesses in Scheeben's theological design is its ahistoricity 
and its trivialisation of the fallenness of man: 
The only thing that we can take exception to in Scheeben is a certain 
ahistoricity in his theological design. This trait is intimately connected 
with the polemical and negative impulse with which he began. His 
standpoint is grace, which means that the sin and fallenness of worldly 
existence are seen to be realities only very indirectly ... How could 
we, however, understand the `beauty' of the Cross without the abysmal 
" GL I: 105. 
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darkness into which the Crucified plunges? ' 
b. Theological Aesthetics: Its Tasks and Structure 
The above study serves the dual purpose of providing guidance and warning. 
From it Balthasar is now able to determine the task and structure of a theological 
aesthetics, which he defines as a theology `which does not primarily work with the 
extra-theological categories of a worldly philosophical aesthetics (above all poetry), 
but which develops its theory of beauty from the data of revelation itself with genuine 
theological methods'. 85 
The two elements that traditionally control every aesthetics, species and lumen 
provide the basic infrastructure to Balthasar's own theological aesthetics. As form, the 
beautiful can be materially grasped. But the form is the appearing `of a depth and a 
fullness that, in themselves and in an abstract sense, remain beyond both our reach 
and our'vision'. 1 As revelation, the appearance of the form is the union of two 
things: (a) the real appearance of the depths, and (b) a pointing beyond itself to these 
depths. 
The person who truly beholds the form is transported to the depths to which 
the form points: 
We `behold' the form; but, if we really behold it, it is not as a 
detached form, rather in its unity with the depths that make their 
appearance in it. We see form as the splendour, as the glory of Being. 
We are `enraptured' by our contemplation of these depths and are 
being transported to them. But so long as we are dealing with the 
' GL I: 116-117. 
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beautiful, this never happens in such a way that we leave the 
(horizontal) form behind us in order to plunge (vertically) into the 
naked depths. " 
The formulation that is of vital importance to Balthasar's theological aesthetics 
and theological epistemology is Quia per incarnati Verbi mysterium nova mentis 
nostrae oculis lux tuae claritatis infulsit: ut dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per 
hunc in invisibiliuni amorem rapianwr. SS 
Two things are implicit in this formulation. Firstly, the `eyes of our mind' are 
struck by a `new light'. This enables us to know visibly, i. e., contemplatively 
(visibiliter). And secondly, the object of that knowledge is God, but God as he is 
mediated (per) by the mystery of the Incarnation (incarnati Verbi mysterium). A 
`mediating vision' occasions a `rapture' and a `transport' (rapianzur) to a love (amor) 
of the things that are invisible (1n1'isibilia). These `unseen things' however have 
already been announced by the visibleness and revelation of the Incarnation. 89 
From this text Balthasar's theological epistemology and the structure of his 
theological aesthetics can be summarily outlined. First, there is an emphasis on sight, 
that is, on the `beholding'. Hearing and believing, Balthasar maintains, are implied 
in the text. Balthasar uses the word `perception' (Wahrnehmung) to give expression 
to this `beholding'. The word perception here is used in a `strong sense of a "taking 
to oneself" (nehmen) of something true (Wahres) which is offering itself'. ' 
R' GL I: 119. 
" See GL I: 119-120. `Because through the mystery of the incarnate Word the new 
light of your brightness has shone onto eyes of our mind; that knowing God visibily, 
we might be snatched up by this into the love of invisible things'. 
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Secondly, a `new light' is expressly required. This light illumines the form. 
`In this way, the "new light" will at the same time make seeing the form possible and 
be itself seen along with the form'. 91 
Thirdly, man is not addressed in a total mystery. Though the splendour of 
mystery cannot be equated with the aesthetic radiance of the world, it is at the same 
time not beyond any and every comparison. Something is offered to man by God, `in 
such a way that man can see it, understand it, make it his own, and live from it in 
keeping with his human nature'. ' Man, under such a condition, comes to a true 
realisation. But there is yet another sense in which man is active in this movement. 
Man responds to the movement through his Christian Eros, a concept which he 
borrowed from Denys the Areopagite: 
But the whole truth of this mystery is that the movement which God 
(who is the object that is seen in Christ and who enraptures man) 
effects in man (even in his unwillingness and recalcitrance, due to sin) 
is co-effected willingly by man through his Christian eros and, indeed, 
on account of the fact that the divine Spirit enthuses and in-spires man 
to collaboration. 93 
c. Some Conclusions 
From the above summary, some important conclusions can be reached. The 
first concerns the indispensability of God's revelation in Jesus Christ in any 
theological epistemology. Balthasar takes care to emphasise this point: `just as we can 
never attain to the living God in any way except through his Son become man, so, 
91 GL I: 120. 
GL I: 121. 
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too, we ought never to speak of God's beauty without reference to the form and 
manner of appearing which he exhibits in salvation-history'. " 
Secondly, since we are to be transported per hunc (Deum visibilem) in 
invisibilium amorem, we are not to equate God's own beauty and glory with the 
beauty of his epiphany. Neither are we to try to discover God's beauty by a mere 
causal inference from the beauty of his epiphany, as this would mean that eventually 
we will leave this epiphany behind. 95 
Thirdly, it follows that our excessus to God must involve a Theologica 
negativa without ever detaching itself from a theologica positiva. A theological 
aesthetic must be both apophatic and cataphatic in its approaches. 
Thus, a theological aesthetics must be developed in two phases: 
1. The Theory of Vision (fundamental theology), which Balthasar defines 
as "'aesthetics" in the Kantian sense as a theory of perception of the form of God's 
revelation'. 
2. The Theory of Rapture (dogmatic theology), which Balthasar defines 
as "'aesthetics", a theory about the Incarnation of God's glory and the consequent 
elevation of man to participate in that glory'. ' 
There can be no separation between fundamental theology and dogmatic 
theology, or between the theory of vision and the theory of, rapture. Let us listen to 
Balthasar's own words as he explains the dynamism of this union: 
To be sure, there is a road which the human spirit takes as it seeks for 
' GL I: 124. 




the Christian truth (intellectus quaerens frdem), and this search may be 
fostered by variously showing and making visible in an appropriate 
way the form of God's revelation, which conceals itself from the eyes 
of the world and of salvation history sub contrario, as Luther has it. 
As we have said, however, this road itself already stands in the rays 
of the divine light, a light which, in an objective sense, makes the form 
visible and which, in a subjective sense, clarifies and illumines the 
searching spirit, thus training it in an act and a habitus which will 
become perfect faith once the vision has itself been perfected. In 
`dogmatics', moreover, this developing (wachsende) and now adult 
(erwachsene) faith continues to grow (wächst) as a fides quaerens 
intellectunt. 97 
The vision behind Balthasar's theological aesthetics, as we have seen, is the 
re-integration of grace and nature, culture and theology within a comprehensive 
theological reflection on form. The analogia entis is the dominant principle that 
motivates and guides his vision. In a key passage on his approach we read these 
words: `The fundamental principle of a theological aesthetics, rather, is the fact that, 
just as this Christian revelation is absolute truth and goodness, so also is it absolute 
beauty; but this assertion would be meaningless if every transposition and application 
to revelation of human categories from the realms of logic, ethics ('pragmatics') and 
aesthetics, if every analogical application of these categories were simply 
forbidden'. 93 He concludes the passage by asserting that `the categories of aesthetics 
are not simply annihilated, but rather raised above themselves in an incomprehensibly 
positive way ... in order to contain something which is infinitely greater than 
themselves'. " The task of the next two chapters is Baithasar's revelation theology 
and theological epistemology in the light of the presuppositions discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVELATION AND EXPERIENCE I: THE UNFOLDING OF THE FORM 
1. Man's Need Of Revelation 
Our study of Balthasar's theological methodology and epistemology so far 
should enable us to at least anticipate his standpoint regarding man's longing and 
search for the divine, and the free, unique and complete self-disclosure of God in 
Jesus Christ. His is the standpoint which sees God at work outside the boundaries of 
positive historical revelation, in the world of mythology and the philosophical and 
religious aspirations of mankind, without annulling the positive character of revelation 
and the work of the church which bears witness to this revelation, nor resulting in a 
unified history of the revelation of God in the world as is often the case with German 
Idealism and Romanticism. ' It is a standpoint that allows the Christian requirement 
of penitence and conversion and obedient listening to the word a central place without 
overlooking the Catholic and Orthodox requirement of `giving glory in 
2 
contemplation'. 2 It is a standpoint that sees the revelation of Christ as something f 
which simultaneously takes on `form' and radically destroys all `beauty and form' in 
him. The concept of `glory', so fundamental in the Bible, must, for Balthasar, have 
an analogy in the general intellectual sphere of mankind. This intuition, fostered by 
his Catholic roots, is no doubt confirmed again and again through his study of 
literature and philosophy in Feldkirch and his doctoral research which brought him 
to Vienna, Berlin and Zurich, and which resulted in his dissertation Apocalypse der 
' GL IV: 15. 
2 GL IV: 15. 
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deutschen Seele, Volumes 1-111 (1929). 3 
a. Man's Longing For God: Mythological 
The world of myth is that `bright sphere of existence that opens up in its light 
the distinction between heaven and earth, between gods and men'. 4 Myth rests on 
tradition and is received in faith; it is this faith that issues forth prayer and results in 
the formation of cultic rituals which are understood as acts of faith. ' In his study of 
the Greek classics, Baithasar first examines the poems of Homer whose writings 
effervesce with the thoughts about God in an intensity and frequency which is hitherto 
unmatched by an other poetry of world literature. God's presence, power and 
benevolence capture.. the author's thought and imagination and is the sole inspiration 
behind his work. Also in no other poetry is there so much prayer, thanksgiving, 
sacrifice and vow. ' His thoughts portray a high level of sophistication in that on the 
one hand he insists on the irremovable separation between God and man, thereby 
purifying the traditional notions of the divine, purging it of an unhealthy 
preoccupation with the demonic and the magical and giving it `a pure and shining 
form that corresponds to his inner vision of God and man'. ' And on the other, he 
spoke of man's transcendence by which he enters, as it were, into the sphere of God, 
' See Peter Henrici, `Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Sketch of his life', Connnunio, 
Vol 16 (3), 1989,309. 
' Erplorations in Theology 111: Creator Spirit (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1993), 391. Henceforth refered to as ET. 
I GL IV: 155. 
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where he finds salvation and his original greatness and glory. 8 Amidst the plethora 
of gods in the Greek pantheon stands Zeus, the father of men and gods, who is 
worshipped as the absolute and almighty lord. ' Man is in need of God because he is 
`ephemeral': he is bound to the contrariety and exigencies of the temporal world and 
is subjected to these ambiguities to the point that he can no longer trust himself. " 
Only the indwelling of God in man could raise him from his mortal lowliness and 
cause him to be so transfigured that he becomes at once both good and beautiful. " 
Of this man has no control but is subjected to the sovereignty of the gods; `for it 
belongs to the gods to elevate the ephemeral man into the form of gods or to humble 
him into the form of a servant'. '2 
The writings of Pindar correspond remarkably to the Homeric world-view in 
which the divine and human are so opposed that there can be no possibility of 
confusion, and of man's surge towards transcendence, a striving to reach beyond 
himself into the divine light. 13 As a lyric poet who understands his art almost entirely 
as a form of glory, Pindar sees total glory as the glory of `that which transfigures and 
that which is transfigured' - the glory of God and that of the world. " His poetry is 
the celebration of the noble man, a man who `hunger(s) for that which is highest, 
GL IV: 45. 
GL IV: 64. 
10 GL IV: 53. 
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though within reach, in accordance with the measure of his own status'. " In his 
relationship with the gods, man should always possess the `humility' to resign himself 
to the `immeasurability' and `ephemerality' of human existence, an attitude which will 
not only give honour to the god but also ensure man his abiding aid and support. 
Victory is seen as divine grace, a gift of the gods. 16 We see in Pindar's writings a 
world which is aptly described as `an aristocracy of spirit' where all that is noble and 
precious, including all contest nand daring, is triumphantly arrayed in `the immense 
complex of cosmic celebration'. " This world can indeed be deepened `into the God- 
man who contains in his triumph both death and life, victory and defeat: anointed not 
for an earthly but for an eternal contest and celebration'. 18 But Pindar's pre- 
occupation with nobility and glory has caused him to censor all reflections about the 
reality of suffering and death and that which is deemed as commonplace and mean: 
`... not suffering and death. Nor common everyday existence with its philistinism ... 
Insignificance, baseness and ugliness might catch a gleam from it but then there is the 
discriminating, excluding act of the poet'. 19 
Into this already complex and often scintillating world, the world of Homer, 
enters a movement so ominous that Grecian art is said to culminate in it and collapse 
after it, a movement which saw a proliferation of attempts made to define it, but has, 
15 GL IV: 94. 
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in the final analysis, defied all verbal definitions: the Greek Tragedy. 2° Tragedy 
emerged from the world of religious rituals, and its origins, however impenetrable 
they may be, can be said to lie in the worship of Dionysus. What is central to our 
present concern is that the tragedy portrays human existence in the zone where its 
finitude, beauty and ambivalences are affirmed, a zone in which he is not understood 
as a god but stands in the `light of the gods and is interpreted from this sphere 
alone'. '' It is surprising that even in this season of change, the tragedians' world- 
view is, in the main, akin to that of Homer, and the Homeric doctrines of the aseity 
of God, and man's devotion to the divine continue to receive attention and creative 
elaboration. 22 The remoteness of God causes man to depend more and more on 
signs, oracles and prophetic dreams which, for the tragedians, `possess the power of 
history and are humbly and hungrily believed'. 23 The predicament of man is riddled 
by the same ambivalence and precariousness seen in Homer. `Man can turn and twist 
whichever way he will, still he suffers, and the fact of his accusing the gods in his 
suffering is itself part of that suffering'. =4 
Three central themes seem to stand out in Balthasar's study of the Greek 
classics. (1) Existence is tragic because what Balthasar calls the `essential lines' 
20 GL IV: 101. 
2' ET 111: 392. 
22 GL IV: 102. 
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cannot be met. ' (2) The essential lines are not only unfulfillable, but they often turn 
human existence into a contradiction. In this contradictoriness, human existence 
becomes absolute pain. 26 (3) At the very soul of this contradiction lies a deep 
impenetrable sense of guilt. This sense of guilt can neither be easily described or 
located. Without exonerating the individual, this guilt stretches beyond into a 
collective doom. But for rooting out his entire existence, there seem to be no way out 
of this dilemma. Many solutions - asceticism, divination, stoic submission and 
dependence on divine intervention, are offered, but none of them appears to be final. 
b. Man's Longing For God. Philosophical 
The realm of philosophy is related to the realm of myth because philosophy 
too is that act in which man reaches out after the whole of being which is an act of 
transcendence. 2' The question as to how far knowledge extends could no longer be 
suppressed. Knowledge is `that for which man possesses the criteria for verification 
I `The love between man and woman exists, yet Admetus is called away from the 
wedding feast into death: his loving wife, Alcestis, places herself freely and 
vicariously at death's disposal in order to save her beloved, but now it is Admetus 
who has been robbed, and, since his beloved has died and left him, life has lost in 
splendour for him too. Dignity exists, but it is humbled, trampled into the dust and 
stamped down until the last depth of indignity is reached: thus Queen Hecuba with her 
daughters is distributed like merchandise among the victors before the burning Troy. 
Faithfulness exists, but it is outmaneuvered by Sophocles' Deinaneira, who send her 
husband Hercules the shirt of Nessus, and, indeed, it is made a fool by a demon of 
madness in Euripides' Hercules, precisely when the hero comes to set his oppressed 
family free, so that in madness he himself kills his family'. ET 111: 393. 
'' `Orestes explicitly obeys the god Apollo when he kills his mother Clytemnestra 
because she has murdered her husband, but for this he is handed over to the Furies. 
Antigone obeys the unwritten law of love for one's relations when she buries her dead 
brother, but for this she is buried alive by the one who watches over the law of the 
city, who had forbidden this - yet no god intervenes'. ET 111: 394. 
'' GL IV: 155. 
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in himself, in his reason', and since the time of Plato `that undertaking that plots the 
limits to what reason can achieve in its investigations' is called philosophy. 28 
The central question of all philosophy is this: `Has the act of transcendence 
already found the transcendent object? ' Is it, as act, therefore one with the object or 
not? Is the light in which we accomplish the act of transcendence identical with the 
illumination of transcendence? " The answer to this question is in the negative. This 
is because reason which inquires about being is a `monological' act: the dialogical act 
of prayer is excluded. 30 Reason, which wants to assert the validity of its own 
transcendence into being, must `methodically suspend the act of glorifying God'. ` 
Thus in the hands of philosophy, the essence of the divine is interpreted in 
three stages. Firstly, that it is unconditioned and ungrounded and only as such related 
to the world. We see this in Plato: though the absolute is seen as the `idea of the 
good' and the radiant sun, it cannot be presented as personal love. Love always falls 
on the side of the person yearning for God and never the reciprocal act that proceeds 
from the divine itself. Secondly, that the absolute can have no antithesis. The world 
is full of conflict and antithesis, and in its existence in finitude, it is antithetical to 
God. But God himself knows no antithesis. Thus Xenophanes sought to strip the early 
notions of God from all human fabrications, 3' while Parmenides transposed, in a 
single sweep, his doctrine of the One God `into the philosophical doctrine of the one 
2ß GL IV: 155. 
29 GL IV: 155. 
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being'. 33 For Heraclitus, God was `that which rests in change', a notion which at 
once embraces and transcends the antitheses so that for him the renunciation of myth 
is complete' Plotinus presses this to its completion by asserting that the `One' is 
the fount of all love and insight, but is itself not a loving `Thou'. This leads to the last 
stage when the absolute, which continues to be the object of all human striving and 
goal, disappears into the inexpressible. The absolute becomes the `Thou-less' so that 
those who wish to obtain it must also leave their personal being behind them and press 
forward into that which is without antithesis. Barth is surely right when he said that 
philosophical mysticism is the true reversal to atheism. `The countless absolute 
becomes a logical form (Hegel), a law of process (Marx), and the whole centre of 
gravity slips back to a quasi-divine interhuman love (Feuerbach)'. " 
c. The Inconclusiveness of Man's Search for God 
The attempt to bring about a synthesis between philosophy and myth, an 
attempt that can be summarised under the by-word `religion', 36 is another expression 
of humanity's openness to the Other, an openness quintessential to the mythical 
consciousness of man. Religion is always something more than pure philosophy, and 
its attempt to grasp this led it to make its own borrowings from myth. But this 
dialectic is ever-present and never fully resolved in the religious aspirations of man. 
It follows that one can start from the foundation of human personal 
" GL IV: 157. 
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existence in the call made by love and the answer made to love to 
formulate something like an a priori postulate for the form of religion. 
This postulate, however, cannot generate of itself a concrete sketch of 
this form, because a dialectic (between `heart' and `reason') seems 
necessarily to dissolve continually every form that is given :4 
definite 
shape: the heart (Pascal) demands a God as `Thou' and an absolute 
love between both; but the reason forbids us to conceive of God as 
such a `thou', since he must be absolute (and therefore without needs) 
and transcends a priori every tension between opposite terms, so that 
he is to be understood at best as the anonymous totality of goodness 
that pours itself out without jealousy, but not as that which addresses 
us in personal terms and awakens us to personhood. 37 
The idea of God remains uncompleted for humanity. It cannot do without 
either of the two points of departure, and yet it cannot successfully construct a bridge 
between the two pillars. Balthasar concludes, 
The God of Israel, with his first historical act of salvation, lays the 
basis of that unity of the idea of God that man seeks in vain to grasp - 
indeed, man seeks in vain to grasp it even as a possible idea. God 
shows himself here to be mighty and gracious one, by `going to seek' 
a people (Dt 4: 34) and `choosing' it (Dt 7: 6); and in the act of 
addressing it and choosing and saving it (out of Egypt), he first of all 
creates, and establishes this people as subject and partner. On the side 
of Israel, there is no merit, no excellence (Dt 7: 7,8: 17), and it 
becomes what it is through God's address: the `people for Yahweh'. 
The reason for the election is unfathomable love (Dt 7: 7,9), which can 
be answered only by total, unlimited love (Dt 6: 5). The core of the `I' 
becomes the core of the `Thou'. The event is unique, as David 
expresses it in astonishment: `What other nation on earth is like your 
people Israel, whom God went to redeem to be his people ... by driving out before his people a nation and its gods? ' (2 Sam 7: 23). On 
the basis of the uniqueness of the event, the event of a total love 
without any preconditions, which as such reveals omnipotence (since 
God could just as well have chosen another people, for all `belong to 
him' and are `as nothing before him' (Is 40: 17), the one who makes 
election shows himself to be the only one (Is 43: 10-12): the 
absoluteness being. 38 
" ET 111: 28. 
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d. Theological A Priori of the Philosophical Beauty 
The Christian event, then, `ushers in a completely new experience of the 
divine glory'. The Christian event is not only an `additional dimension to what 
mankind already know of glory; it completely transforms it', so that the Christian 
experience is not one of newness but of uniqueness. 39 This does not mean that there 
is no continuity whatsoever with humanity's `seeking after God'. Indeed, once 
Christianity has spent the first century proclaiming and establishing its distinctiveness, 
in its proclamation to the world of antiquity, it introduces itself as the gracious 
fulfilment of all humanity's quest for God: `What therefore you worship as unknown, 
this I proclaim to you' (Acts 17: 23). `So the new, without renouncing its demands for 
penitence and conversion, was first seen predominantly in terms of fulfilment (a 
tendency which in the Middle Ages even increased) ... '40 
Three great themes from antiquity pass over into the Christian almost 
unbroken: the first is the theme of procession and return of creatures from God and 
back to God. The second theme is that of eros understood as `the fundamental 
yearning of the finite creature for transcendence in God as the primordial unity, the 
primordial beauty ... ' This theme is applied by Philo in his exposition of the lives of 
the men in the Old Testament, by Gregory of Nyssa in his commentary on the Song 
of Songs, by Augustine in his exposition of the deep and restless desiderium of the 
11 GL IV: 317. 
°" GL IV: 319. Balthasar opines that from opposite directions the Renaissance and 
the Reformation destroyed this configuration. The Renaissance, with its zeal for 
antiquity. `dissolved the Christian glory into an all-embracing cosmic revelation 
(which was then perfected in the Enlightenment)', while the Reformation, with its 
stress on the distinctiveness of Biblical glory, causes cosmic glory to fade and 
disappear. Cf. GL IV: 323. 
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creature's need for the God of love `and thus extends throughout the Middle Ages in 
the form, shimmering in a multitude of shades in Bernard, William of St Thiery and 
Richard of St Victor, and again in Dante, Petrarch, Ficino and Michaelangelo'. 41 
And thirdly, the theme of the beauty of the soul, a theme which is seen in Plato and 
Plotinus, a theme so courageous and `world affirming', `which does not mourn the 
passing of physical beauty in a melancholy vein, but dares to see it as the reflection 
and sensuous image of a deeper, indestructible glory'. 42 Hence Balthasar can write 
that 
Christians feel themselves to be the legitimate heirs of all revelation of 
God in the world (Homer, Aristotle), of all reference to and exposition 
of God by man (the tragedians), of all loving assent to God and 
attachment to the Absolute (Plato, Stoic), every homecoming of the 
creature to the One (Plotinus), every courageous pilgrimage, full of 
renunciation, through time towards a future civitas (Virgil). " 
2. The Form of God's Revelation 
In this section we shall examine Balthasar's understanding of God's revelation 
. in the world and his particular revelation in the person of Jesus Christ. 
a. The Objective Evidence of Revelation 
In the previous chapter we saw that the concept of form occupies a central 
place in the theological aesthetics of Balthasar. There is no need here to rehearse 
again his reasons for this. The burden of this section is to show how this concept is 
 GL IV: 321-2. 
42 GL IV: 322. 
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related to his understanding of revelation, and how we may then talk of the objectivity 
of God's revelation. 
Balthasar gives three reasons why God's revelation must have an objective 
form. The first has to do with the essential difference between God and the world, 
between Creator and creature. Because of this difference `even the most intimate self- 
disclosure of God in the soul has a "form", even if it is spiritual: the form of 
experience, sensations and illuminations, which are not the self-disclosing God 
Himself'. ' Balthasar goes on to add that even this spiritual form is preceded by our 
`contact with God as we approach him through the worldly and material condition', 
and that we can know `nothing of a pure communication between the two 
interiorities', as 
The time has come to us to take a closer look at Balthasar's understanding of 
revelation in terms of the older classifications of `general' and `special' revelation, or, 
to use Balthasar's own terminologies, the `revelation of creation' and the `revelation 
of grace'. This apparent `excursus' is necessary since it will lead us logically to 
Balthasar's second reason why God's revelation must have an objective form. 
Balthasar sees the two `kinds' of revelation not as a contradiction. The two are 
continuous. The revelation of grace is not the `establishment of a new form within the 
created world', rather it is a new `manner' of God's presence in the `form of the 
world'. " Thus the `revelation of nature' becomes a `cipher-code' of the world's 
&1n9 by wh; ch nat'WaA m Iion aWda .a is 
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God. 47 The distinction between this and what is usually called `special' or 
`supernatural' revelation, Balthasar maintains, is found in intention: `the first word 
was directed to man as creature that had come forth from God, and the second word 
addresses him personally as a child of God's grace and calls him home to the heart 
of God'. 48 There is thus a continuous relationship between the two even though the 
second signals a 'new intimacy' in our union with God, an intimacy that is 
characterised by the fact that the child of God now has access to that in which he 
participates. " In the light of this, Balthasar warns against the careless and flippant 
treatment of general revelation in which one glosses quickly over it in order to focus 
on the revelation of grace, to the extent that the former is even denied'. 50 `It is as 
creature that man first come to know the ever greater and, thus, ever-more-hidden 
God as his Lord'. ` 
Now, if God first revealed himself as Creator and if creation is indeed the 
manifestation of God, it follows that `this manifestation takes its form from the world 
itself . 52 This is Balthasar's second reason for the objective evidence of God's 
revelation. He supports this assertion by citing Romans 1: 19f where the apostle Paul 
wrote with precision: `Whatever can be known about God is manifest in them, for 
God has revealed it to them. For since the creation of the world, what is invisible of 
11 GL 1: 449. 
°x GL 1: 449. 
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I Word and Revelation: Essays in Theology 1,58. 
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God -I mean God's eternal power and divinity - has become intelligible through the 
things he has made'. On account of this Balthasar insists that God in his entirety is 
manifested in creation. This `divinity of the invisible' that radiates in the Being of the 
world is `glory' (Herrlichkeit) or `sublimeness' (Herrlichkeit, Schlier) and Soýa, 
`God's intransitoriness'. Though Balthasar repeatedly stresses that this is the glory of 
God and not of the world, he maintains that this should in no way preclude `God's 
8oEcx from radiating and "being seen" (KaüopaTaL) in and through the form of the 
world'. " 
From the form of the revelation in the world, Balthasar moves on to the form 
of revelation in Christ which is for him the perfection of the former on the one hand, 
and on the other, a revelation which is totally unique. The revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ must therefore neither be seen as a prolongation or an intensification of the 
revelation in creation. Instead it must be considered only from the standpoint of God's 
ultimate plan. So considered the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is the fulfilment or 
culmination of the revelatory forms of the world. `Beyond all creaturely hope and 
expectations ... the revelation in Christ was to bring together in one divine and human 
head everything heavenly and earthly, which is thus endowed by grace with a crown 
the radiance of whose glory, belonging to the Kyrios of the world, was to shed its 
rays over the whole of creation'. " The form of revelation is not the appearance as 
`the limitation (7repaq) of an infinite non-form (ä7reapov), but the appearance of an 
infinitely determined super-form'. 55 We will study Balthasar's exposition of the form 
11 GL 1: 431. 
I GL 1: 432. 
11 GL 1: 432. 
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of Jesus Christ in greater detail in the following pages; for the moment, it is important 
for us to bring this salient point across: that in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, 
the image of God does not stand or present itself as an independent entity over against 
what is imaged. Rather, we have here a `unique, hypostatic union between archetype 
and image': 
In the form of revelation, what is imaged is of no interest in isolation 
and for itself (the man Jesus), but only in so far as in this image 
(Christ! ) God portrays himself - indeed, in sofar as this man himself 
is God. Qualitatively intensified, here again the statement applies to the 
effect that `God's invisibleness has become visible for the rational 
spirit' (Rom 1: 20). 56 
Thus, we have here an argument for the objective evidence of God's revelation in the 
world. This evidence is found in the form of the world, that is, in creation, and 
supremely in the form of Christ in whom the whole `pleroma of the Godhead dwells 
corporeally'. 
b. Jesus Christ as the Gestalt Gottes 
Donald MacKinnon is surely right when he observed that Balthasar's treatment 
of the person of Christ is almost as wide as his entire oeuvres' Balthasar's theology, 
like that of Karl Barth, is Christocentric. It is the result of a faithful and obedient 
contemplation of Christ as the Gestalt der Gestalten and as the Gestalt Gottes. Christ 
is `God's own appearance', `in whom the whole fullness of the divinity is bodily 
present' (Col 1 :19). In the Incarnation the `whole ontology and aesthetics of created 
Being' is perfected. In a majestic passage in his Aesthetics Balthasar gives the 
GL 1: 432. 
57 `Some Reflections on Hans Urs von Balthasar's Christology with Special 
Reference to Theod Ämatik 11/2, III and IV', in The Analogy of Beauty, 164. 
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magnificence and significance of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ its most 
profound and eloquent expression: 
The incarnation uses created Being at a new depth as a language and 
means of expression for the divine Being and essence. Although ever 
since Luther we have become accustomed to call the Bible `God's 
Word', it is not Sacred Scripture which is God's original language and 
self-expression, but rather Jesus Christ. As One and Unique, and yet 
as one who is to be understood only in the context of man's entire 
history and in the context of the whole created cosmos, Jesus is the 
Word, the Image, the Expression and the Exegesis of God. Jesus bears 
witness to God as man, by using the whole expressional apparatus of 
human existence from birth to death, including all the stages of life, all 
the states in life, the solitary and social situations. He is what he 
expresses - namely God - but he is not whom he expresses - namely, 
the Father. This incomparable paradox stands as the fountainhead of 
the Christian aesthetic, and therefore all aesthetic! 58 
The fundamental assertion that stands out unmistakably in this explosive 
passage is that the Incarnation is the supreme form of God's self-disclosure - it is the 
one unique self-expression of God. The Incarnation thus isolates `Christianity from 
all other philosophies and confessions'. S9 The form of the Incarnation is `God's 
SR GL 1: 29. 
11 This exclusivism which flows from Balthasar's theology of the Incarnation is 
expressed clearly and unmistakably in his book entitled Elucidations in which he 
writes: `... the point is not simply that God who has all names and yet is without 
name, who is wholly other and (beyond this indeed) not other, because without 
opposites, that such a God at particular points and in particular people in the world 
and its history becomes `transparent'. That is indeed an all too fashionable word today 
and with its help, it may appear possible to reduce to a common denominator with the 
basic Christian message Indian avatars and prophetic or mystical personalities - for 
example Judaism or Islam, or even in other religions. Rather, what sets Christianity 
apart from all other religions is the offensive claim that the one who bears all names 
and yet is without name, who as the scripture says `is everything' (Ecclus 43: 27), has 
once and for all declared himself identical with a tiny something or someone who then 
can make countless millions of swarming humanity - identical with someone who then 
can make monstrously exclusive statements about himself as `I am the door ... all who have come before me are thieves and robbers' (John 10: 70 and `No one knows the 
Father but the Son and him to whom the Son will reveal it' (Matt 11: 17). Cf. 
Elucidations, (London: SPCK, 1975), 35. 
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greatest work of art', a work which gives expression to `God's absolute divinity and 
sovereignty and of the perfect creature', the eternal two-and-one, `the Father and Son 
in the unity of the Holy Spirit'. 60 It is not difficult to see why Balthasar is sometimes 
called a `Christologian'. 6' Hence, for Balthasar the Incarnation is the objective 
evidence of God's revelation. But what does this mean, and what are its implications? 
By `objective evidence' Balthasar is referring to that evidence `that emerges 
and sheds its light from the phenomenon itself. b'- As such it is different from the 
sort of evidence `that is recognised in the process of satisfying the subject's needs'. 
The illuminating factor lies in the Christ-form in two senses. Firstly, the form of 
Christ has its own `interior rightness' and `evidential power'. Balthasar likens this to 
the evidential power that we see in a work of art or a mathematical principle. The 
form of Christ is not attested to from the outside but from within. It is this attestation 
by the Father which establishes it as it is in the first place - `as the manifestation of 
God, as the Word of God, as God's testimony about himself . 63 Secondly, this 
`rightness' possesses the power not only to illuminate but transform the perceiving 
subject. Jesus Christ is the form which in-forms and trans-forms the Christian. 
Balthasar speaks of the image unfolding into the one contemplating it, resulting in the 
transformation of the beholder. He speaks of the metamorphosis that Paul talks about 
I Word and Revelation, 151. 
6' Pedro Escobar defines a Christologian as a `theologian whose entire knowledge 
of God is from, by, with and in Christ'. He traces Balthasar's `conversion' to the 
influence of St Ignatius, applying Ignatian Christocentrism throughout his theology. 
See `Hans Urs von Balthasar: Christologian', Co, n, nu tio, Vol 3,1975,3: 306. 
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(2 Cor 3: 18) in which the beholder is changed into the image he beholds: `The 
metamorphosis of which Paul speaks (Rom 12: 2; 2 Cor 3: 18; Phil 3: 21) is above all 
an assumption of form, the receiving of Christ's form in us (Gal 4: 19), the character 
and the impress in us of the only valid image of God'. 6; 
This however does not mean that the form will enlighten anyone. Because what 
is at stake here is nothing short of the `correspondence of the human existence as a 
whole to the form of Christ' and not just as intellectual or technical adaptation to 
certain thought patterns and concepts, certain pre-requisites are needed. The evidential 
power demands a theological act of seeing the form. 
This explains the annoyance which Balthasar displays over what he calls the 
methodic schizophrenia of the `historical Jesus' versus the `Christ of Faith' 
approaches, and the blind prejudice of the historical-critical method. The first leads 
to a `two-storey' theory where, on the first (and lower) level is the Jesus of history 
exhaustively analysed by the science of philology and psychology, while on the 
second (higher) level stands the word of Christ who is the object of both communal 
and individual faith. This methodology is totally inadmissible since it has as its object 
the ambivalences of the inquirer instead of Christ. 65 It exposes the fundamental lack 
of understanding on the part of the inquirer regarding the object that he is 
investigating, an object which cannot be classified in the categories of `the history of 
religions, nor of psychology, nor of history'. ' `The "historical-critical" destruction 
of the form put forward by the Evangelists ... only makes sense as an exercise if one 
' GL 1: 485. 
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supposes that faith ... as such can be subjective and cannot correspond to any 
objective evidence'. 67 Since Balthasar is of the opinion that the contrary is true, the 
pre-requisite for seeing and understanding the form is 
to accept what is given as it offers itself. If certain excisions are 
practised on the Gospels from the outset, the integrity of the 
phenomenon is lost and it has already become incomprehensible. The 
Gospel presents Christ's form in such a way that `flesh' and `spirit', 
Incarnation to the point of suffering and death, and resurrected life are 
all interrelated down to the smallest details. 68 
We must not conclude that Balthasar is therefore uninterested in history and 
in historical research. On the contrary, like Gerhard Ebeling and other disciples of 
Bultmann, Balthasar is deeply interested in the `New Quest for the Historical Jesus'. 
Henri de Lubac is right to say that Balthasar accords the contribution of scientific 
knowledge its proper place. 69 One should try to know as much as possible about the 
`historical Jesus' in an attempt to perceive the form of Christ as it exists in history. 
Balthasar therefore challenges Bultmann's scheme of demythologising the New 
Testament. 7° However Balthasar is always careful to emphasise that pure historical 
facts alone could not bring us to perceive the inner event. 
A case in point is the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. The purely historical 
narration of the crucifixion is `a priori never capable of laying down the path that 
leads to the inner event that is hidden therein'. Hence the gospels, in their attempt to 
b7 GL 1: 466. 
6x GL 1: 467. 
" `A Witness of Christ in the Church: Hans Urs von Balthasar', in Conu, uinio, 2, 
1975,3: 232. 
70 Jeffrey Kay, `Aesthetic and a posteriori evidence in Baithasar's Theological 
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describe this historical event do so by means of the `concepts and images that lay out 
a wide horizon of Old Testament theology, and thereby open a path for the history 
that leads to the only sphere from which a light of understanding can break in'. " 
The inierpretandum is indispensable; if one detaches it from the narration, one `robs 
oneself of every approach to understanding it'. 72 The contemplative theologian has 
the task of helping the believer see how all the various images are actually aspects of 
a single form which is 
unique, not graspable by worldly vision, evident only to the eyes of 
faith and yet, precisely as such, it is truly form, in spite of the vast 
infinity of the dimensions that are opened up. It is not a vision of the 
form of God himself, but the appearance of this form in the previously 
described identity (of hypostatic union), as an identity of the obedient 
one and of his obedience in both natures. And this is more than merely 
image and likeness; it is the concealed epiphany of the thing itself in 
the medium of the relationship. between God and creature. 73 
c. The Uniqueness of Christ 
Our treatment of the uniqueness of Christ must first take the following three 
perspectives into consideration. (1) The Christ-form is inseparable from the Old 
Testament. Together they constitute `one historical revelation in the diptych of type 
" GL VII: 203. 
72 GL VII: 204. 
" GL 1: 480. It is important to note that Balthasar does not consider the form of 
Christ as the `sign' which points to the thing that it `signifies'. `Jesus the Man, in his 
visibleness, is not a sign pointing beyond himself to an invisible "Christ of faith" - 
whether this view is nuanced more in a Platonising Catholic sense or in a criticistic 
Protestant manner. The image and expression of God, according to the Biblical 
assertion, is the indivisible God-man: man, in so far as God radiates from him; God 
in so far as he appears in the man Jesus. What is seen, heard, and touched is the 
"Word of Life" (I in 1: 1), naturally not in the contradistinction from the man Jesus, 
but precisely in the total structure which is the core and the nodule of all Johanine 
writings'. Cf. GL 1: 437. 
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and anti-type, promise and fulfilment'. 74 As fulfilment the Christform is indeed 
related to the overall order, but, precisely as fulfilment, it is not subordinated to that 
order. Promise has its truth only in the fulfilment, and, because it is not itself the 
fulfilled truth but can only participate in the uniqueness of fulfilment, it is not 
univocal with it. 
(2) As the recapitulation of everything in heaven and earth in himself, Christ 
is the `image of all images in creation and history' and therefore fulfils `the partial 
truth contained in the religious myths of all peoples', which are `taken up' and 
`transcended' in the form that fulfils it. 75 Hence, in a sense, Christ `inherits' the 
gods of paganism, although this does not mean that one can make a cosmic religion 
out of Christianity. " 
(3) Because Jesus was a man in time, and therefore a man of his historical 
epoch, he is at least at a certain level, accessible to the `historical system of categories 
and to the typological manner of approach', though this does not mean that his 
message itself can be relativised, since as the Only Begotten Son, he brings this 
unique message from God. " Furthermore, since the essential categories of the 
religion of Israel are also the categories of its religious environment, Israel's religion 
of promise `brings to Christ the general religious heritage of all mankind', and Christ, 
by fulfilling in himself Israel's message of promise, `makes historical contact, through 
" GL 1: 496. 
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Israel, with mankind's religious forms' thereby fulfilling the longings of all 
peoples. 78 These three perspectives demand a `uniqueness within a general historical 
determinateness, and see this paradox as mediated by salvation-history that moves 
from the universal to the theologically particular and unique'. 79 
The singularity and the uniqueness of Christ is then developed in four ways. 
Firstly, Christ is essentially different from the other founders of religion. The latter 
are but wise men who merely point to the `way' which they have found to have been 
revealed to them, but Jesus from the outset points to himself as the way. The founders 
of religions point to the simple doctrine of dying to the world and rising again to God 
(or to the myth of the dying and rising God) but never identify themselves with the 
myth. Jesus on the other hand draws `the form of his teaching and the form of his life 
together into strict identity, not only to the point of his death ... but even of the 
Resurrection itself'. In Jesus the mythical figure is identified with the historical figure: 
`the uniqueness with which the form of Christ confronts us is the identity between 
myth and historical reality'. 80 
Secondly, the founders of the great religions speak of the moment of their 
conversion, enlightenment or rapture, which is often the pilgrimage of toil and 
reward. This is so even for the prophets of the Old Testament. Only in Christ do we 
have a presentation of an identification of a founder's teaching and his entire existence 
which is impossible if a conversion experience was involved. " Furthermore, all 
11 GL 1: 498. 
" GL 1: 498. 
R" GL 1: 502-3. 
x' Balthasar does not regard the baptism of Jesus by John the Baptist as his 
`conversion' experience. To do this, he says, is to enter into the realm of Gnostic 
Christology and to interpret John's portrayal as the `mythical Gnostic schema 
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other `saviour religions ... preach life out of death; the gospel of the cross proclaims 
salvation in death'. 2 
Thirdly, the `myths' of the `bringers of salvation' are naturalistic and can at 
best be `protological' and `eschatological' whereas the deed of Christ is meant to be 
understood historically. This, as we have already seen, is on the one hand the 
fulfilment of Israel's religion and on the other hand the incorporation and embracing 
of the `myths of cosmic transformation found in other peoples'. Also, what is negated 
by Christ is not the `Being of the world, but its decadent mode of existence in 
alienation from God'. 83 
Fourthly, and turning now to the image of God, Balthasar explains that the 
other founders are always caught up in the dialectic between God and the world. The 
possible solutions to this problematic are a) to steer midway between the One and the 
Many (the way of Mohammed); b) to abolish the Many for the sake of the One (non- 
Christian mysticism); and c) to incorporate the One into the many (polytheism and 
pantheism). Only God's trinitarian nature, that is revealed in the form of Christ, and 
which is otherwise ungraspable, is able to enlighten the relationship between God and 
man. The world can now be seen as the other or the many without its having to 
appear as a necessity for God's unity, and the otherness of creation is justified by the 
otherness that exists within God himself. 'These four approaches properly 
demonstrate the uniqueness of the form of Christ. 
superimposed on the historical Jesus'. GL I: 504. 
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There is one other matter relating to the uniqueness of Christ's form that is of 
import and should be treated at this juncture, namely the measure of the form of 
Christ. If Christ is indeed the `Unique One', then `no universal and external measures 
suffice to measure him; essentially he can only be measured by himself. " Thus in 
order to demonstrate the harmony within, he causes an aspect of himself to be 
measured by another. The concept which Balthasar employs here is taken from the 
vocabulary of music, and, when used christologically it refers to the concordance 
between Christ's mission and his existence. When these two aspects are examined, no 
disharmony can be found. `The mandated task is divine, its execution human, and the 
proportion of perfect `attunement' prevailing between them is both human and 
divine'. 86 The conclusion to this seems to parallel Baithasar's reflection of the 
analogia entis, the relationship between God and the world: 
If Christ is to be the Unique One, then, when we look at his form, 
what must happen is that all other forms, in spite of their qualitative 
difference and even opposition, come more and more to exhibit related 
characteristics, while he, who had seemed to be related to them and 
capable of being classified under the general categories, now appears 
in greater isolation, incapable of being reduced to anything 
whatsoever. 87 
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d. The Hiddenness of the Fonn 
Though the incarnation is God's supreme self-disclosure, `along with the seen 
surface of manifestation there is perceived the non-manifested depth'. This paradox 
is the very thing that gives the phenomenon of the beautiful its `enrapturing and 
overwhelming character'. Balthasar uses the work of art as an analogy to illustrate this 
point. In every work of art there is a dynamism - an interpenetration of the 
phenomenon of interiority (for example the phenomenon of intentionality) and the 
simple subjective disposition. Several approaches can be taken to `discover' the artist's 
intention and disposition. One. is to gather objective information about his intention. 
Another is to rely on the subjective appreciation of the work itself. Still another way 
is to do a sincere study of the artist's whole person, though the real value of this 
exercise is questionable since it may just be true that that particular work of art is not 
intended to be the expression of the artist himself, but a worldview which the artist 
wishes to propose and wants others to accept. In this case, it is the world view and 
not the artist himself that is projected in the work: `the artist will conceal himself in 
his work as much as he will reveal himself'. " 
At this point one may argue that the analogy fails to apply to God. As creator, 
God can only represent himself in the things he creates. He is identical with his 
`world-views'. This is of course true. The created order bears the image and likeness 
of the its creator and in this sense points to its author. But in God, Balthasar reminds 
us, the distance between creature and creator is infinite and cannot be bridged in any 
way. No grammar can be found that can adequately give it expression. It is this 
distance between God and the world that makes the analogy valid for the present 
xR GL 1: 442-3. 
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purpose. 89 
Revelation in concealment reaches its perfection in Jesus Christ who is God 
incarnate. Jesus is the Word that goes beyond the sayable. 40 `The incarnation of the 
Word means the most extreme manifestness within the deepest concealment'. 9' It is 
manifestness because `God explains to man by no means but himself : `man' (and not 
some kind of `super-man') has in the incarnation become the language of God. It is 
concealment because the incarnation as `the transition of God's absolutely unique, 
absolute and infinite being into the ever more dissimilar, almost arbitrary and 
hopelessly relativised reality of one individual man in the crowd from the outset 
appears to be an undertaking condemned to failure'. 9'- Louis Dupre sums up 
Baithasar's reflection on the revealedness and hiddenness of the incarnation as 
follows. 
God is able to express himself in Jesus because he is expressive in his 
divine nature, and Christ's humanity, far from being a concession 
made to human frailty in God's revelation, is the divine reality itself 
as it becomes manifest. What remains concealed in him (his divinity) 
has not been withdrawn from manifestation, but rather manifests the 
inscrutable, divine mystery itself. As in the work of art, no ulterior 
reality hides behind the mystery itself. As in the work of art, no 
ulterior reality hides behind the form: the form totally manifests, 
adduces its own evidential power. 93 
There is yet another aspect of this hiddenness that must be dealt with briefly: 
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9" Maßt in History (London: Compton Printing Limited, 1972), 282. 
" GL 1: 457. 
' GL 1: 457. 
v' `The Glory of the Lord: Hans Urs von Balthasar's theological aesthetics', in 
Co, ninunlo 16(1989), 404. 
77 
the question of hiddenness and guilt. Balthasar maintains that if one has failed to see 
the objective evidence of God's revelation in Jesus Christ, it is not because of the 
insufficiency of the evidence; rather it is due to the `guilt of a "darkness" which does 
not see, recognise and receive the light'. 94 There is a sense in which the guilt of man 
`forces' the Son to reveal himself in the mode of hiddenness. Guilt is not thereby 
excused by the hiddenness, rather the latter becomes the judgement for guilt. `The 
hiddenness is the objective proof that the guilty have not wanted to see'. 95 
3. The Mediation of the Form 
Some preliminary statements about the form of Christ in its interconnectedness 
with the other forms and the context in which he came ought to be made before we 
can proceed with our study of the place and the mediatory functions of the forms of 
scripture and the church. Firstly, it must be said that since Christ's form in the world 
is to impress itself upon it and thereby to continue to shape it, what we are dealing 
with here is by no means a static form but also an event. There can be no separation 
between who Christ is and what he does. In fact Balthasar so emphasises the unity of 
the two that he maintains that `we see what this form is from what it does'. 96 This 
emphasis is made early in his Aesthetics which is the starting point of his trilogy. 
There can therefore be no doubt that he considers revelation to be the Christ-event, 
and even though his first work employs the leitmotif of the visual arts to explain 
revelation, he does realise the fact that this category alone would be insufficient to 
I GL 1: 522. 
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explain the full dynamics of God's revelation in Jesus Christ. He therefore moves 
confidently from theo-phany to theo-praxis, from Herrlichkeit to Theo-dramatik. 
Secondly, it is important to note that Balthasar's understanding of the place of 
the scriptures and the church with respect to their mediatorial functions is closely akin 
to the Alexandrian doctrine of the corpus trifonne, i. e., God's incarnate Word has a 
`body of scripture' (a scriptural form) and a `body of the Church' (an ecclesial 
form). 97 Both scripture and the church share two commonalities: firstly, they are 
both perceptible expressions of the Christ-form, and, secondly, in both these mediums 
man shares in their communication and formation. Both scripture and the church are 
mediated through human beings: scripture is written by men and sinners, while the 
church is populated by men and sinners. The Enlightenment, Balthasar maintains, has 
made a positive impact on our understanding of scripture and the church in that it has 
helped us to see the institution of the church in connection with the institution of 
scripture. Let us consider each in turn. 
a. Scripture 
According to the older theology, scripture is seen as God's Word to the 
Church. In recent theology however, scripture is understood as the expression of 
faith's reflections on historical revelation. Balthasar maintains that both can be seen 
in unity. Divine revelation is received in `the womb of human faith'. Therefore the 
partnership between the revealer and the recipient should not merely be a simple 
encounter of a speaking and listening person. Rather the perfection to that partnership 
is seen before or alongside us; it has truly been implanted into us (Jer 31: 31f; Ez 
I GL 1: 529. 
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36: 26f). 98 There is therefore a continuity between the answering believer and the 
writers of scripture: `the scriptural word that attests (bezeugend) is not external to the 
Word of God that is attested (bezeugt)'. The generative word makes constant use of 
the attesting word in order to make itself present in the believer. " Hence, the form 
of the historical Jesus cannot be discovered through the historical-critical method but 
requires ecclesial faith. " Only this, namely the church's faith in the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ possesses the `eyes of faith' to read accurately the legible 
form. '°' 
Scripture remains the Word of God; it is not the word of the church. Using 
the imagery of a woman carrying a child in her womb, an imagery no doubt inspired 
by the deep Marian spirituality in which Balthasar is entrenched, he describes 
scripture as the Word by which the church, by her mediation in faith, carries the 
Word in her womb and gives birth to it in the world. This then is the relationship 
between the scriptures and the church, a relationship which pre-supposes the latter's 
relationship with Christ who brought her into being. `The purity and clarity with 
which the Word of God presents itself in the world is in direct proportion to the 
transparency and purity of the medium. of faith that receives it and from which it 
creates its own form'. 102 
For Balthasar scripture is not revelation itself but a testimony of revelation: 
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revelation as possible. The question that Balthasar asks himself is `Is not the scripture 
Christ's authentic interpretation of himself by the Holy Spirit? ' His answer: `Scripture 
belongs to the Christ-form itself and is an expression of Christ's fullness and 
glory'. 10d The garment cannot be adequately separated from the form itself. Every 
attempt to grasp the `body' behind the form of the image is therefore futile. In other 
words, scripture belongs unconditionally to the thing it attests to; it has no 
independent form by itself `but properly belongs to the sphere of revelation', yet, that 
which it attests to always transcends the testimony itself. "' 
Following Origen, Balthasar envisages the ontologically different characters 
of the Old and New Testament scripture. The Old Testament scriptures are to him 
always journeying towards the Incarnation of the Word, and despite of their proleptic 
intent there is something `abstract' about them. The Old Testament scripture therefore 
is a `pre-scription', and this is so in the following senses: `it is a written preliminary 
to what will be the concrete existence of the Word; it is a regulation or decree, 
anterior to the possibility of its fulfilment'. " Thus the Old testament scripture can, 
in a sense, only contain small particles of the full reality. Only in the Incarnation of 
the Word are we able to `comprehend what is the breadth and length and height and 
depth' of `the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge' (Eph 3: 18ff). The New 
Testament is governed by Christology, and precisely because of this, Origen was 
moved to designate scripture `as one mode of the enfleshing of the logos'. Once the 
ancient scripture is seen to be a part of the Incarnation in this way, the Old and New 
Testaments form a continuum: `The coming-to-be of the Incarnation is rooted in the 
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faith of Abraham, who looked forward to the day of Christ (Jn 8: 56), in the faith of 
Moses, who "considered abuse suffered for the Christ greater wealth than the 
treasures of Egypt" (Heb 11: 26), and in the faith of the prophets who were inspired 
by the Spirit of Christ (1 Pet 1: 11)'. 107 Thus all scripture has the Christological 
form. 
From all that has been said so far, it is clear that the so-called `spiritual' sense 
in scripture is not some secondary meaning behind the `historical'. Instead, the 
`spiritual' sense is central and is always contained in the `historical'. `This "spiritual" 
christological and pneumatic meaning can inwardly unfold itself as the Good News 
of God-given grace'. 108. The only `really Christian interpretation of scripture is a 
pneumatic one, that is, one reads the (ancient) Scripture (graphe) with a view to the 
Incarnation of the entire divine Word and all subsequent scripture in the light of that 
Incarnation; furthermore it will seek to interpret what it reads by the Pneuma of 
Christ'. 109 For this reason, Balthasar is somewhat unenthusiastic, and perhaps even 
negative towards critical New Testament studies that tear asunder the obvious 
canonical unity with its sub-structures, redactional frameworks, `traditions', and 
pericopai. The New Testament is united because the men who wrote it were all 
enraptured by the same glory of the Lord in the face of Christ. New Testament 
science for Balthasar, is therefore not science at all compared to the exegesis that 
preceded it, because it failed to be a method that is adequate to the object. `Only 
contemplative reading of the New Testament is adequate to the glory of God in Jesus 
1017DII: 112. 
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Christ'. "' Brian McNeil is right when he wrote that Balthasar envisages the exegete 
as an `iconographer' whereby the exegesis is integrated with the entire theological 
enterprise. Balthasar acts as a stringent reminder that the exegete is not allowed or 
justified to dismiss dogmatic questions as irrelevant to his own researches. "' 
b. The Church 
We come now to Balthasar's exposition of the church as the medium of God's 
revelation in the world, From the outset, the Church must be seen as the `outworking' 
of the Risen Christ. 112 Thus, though the church may present itself or be regarded 
as the object of inquiry to the historian or the sociologist or to many other specialists, 
the church, when considered from the viewpoint of the Gospel, cannot be anything 
other than a medium whose function it is to point to the supreme form of God's 
revelation in the world, even Jesus Christ. 113 
The church is `not created from the union of subjective genius with object 
world-spirit;. Rather she receives her being purely from the Lord himself. Balthasar 
uses, in accordance with the theology of the Patristics, various imageries to speak of 
this. The Johannine imagery of the blood and water which flowed from the wound of 
Jesus, symbolising, as it were, the two sacraments of baptism and eucharist which are 
the life-principle of the church is a case in point. Also considered is the Pauline use 
10 Aidan Nichols, `Balthasar and his Christology', New Blackfriars, 66 (1985), 
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of the imagery of Eve's origin from Adam's rib. On this view Balthasar argues that 
if what is obtained from Adam's rib, that is, his corporeal and animated substance 
retains his image, how much more should the church retain the image of Christ since 
she `proceeds from Christ's innermost personal reality' which makes her at once 
`Body' and 'Bride'. 114 
With Christ as hersanctifier, the Church is to be seen as his spotless Bride15 I 
who obeys God by obeying him. "' The church loves Christ, and through him learns 
what it means to be obedient to the will of the Father. "' Therefore, in its 
mediatorial role, the church must realise that she cannot claim for herself an 
autonomous form. The Church must realise that whatever she possesses comes from 
Christ, `whose "fullness" she is because he has poured his own fullness into her, so 
that the Church is nothing other than Christ's own fullness (Eph 1: 23)'. 18 This 
however may not be immediately obvious because the church itself as the work of 
Christ, has its own objective and autonomous form. The analogy of human creation 
shows that if work is truly successful, it should possess an objective, autonomous 
form quite independent, even in meaning, from its creator. "' The Church will be 
a successful medium only when she is transparent to God on the one hand, and 
transparent to the world for God on the other. Therefore, in the Church, 
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as with Christ himself, all historical positivity can and must lose its 
fortuitous character for the world (just as a work of art justifies itself 
in spite of its fortuitous uniqueness by appealing to its aesthetic 
necessity) by virtue of the fact that this positivity is made credible as 
the plausible expression of the God who reveals himself in Christ and, 
in turn, of man who reveals himself by responding to God through the 
church and through Christ. 12' 
The pneumatological element must not be neglected or marginalised as is the 
common tendency in many modem approaches to religious epistemology. ''-' The 
scripture and the church, in their power to express Christ, together constitute the 
work of the Holy Spirit. 
Scripture not only gives a kind of `ideal portrait' of the historical 
Jesus; it revels in a form apprehensible by the world the fact that he is' 
the Word of God. Jesus needs this dimension, prepared by the Spirit, 
in order there to take root and develop his reality, which is both ideal 
and real. Nor is the Church merely an historical effect of Christ; she 
is his "fullness" and his bridal "body"; whatever there is in her of 
Christian reality, he is as he expresses himself to mankind and 
impresses himself upon mankind through the power of the Holy 
Spirit. ''-'- 
120 GL 1: 560. 
1z' The exclusion of the pneumatological element has resulted in disastrous 
consequences to theological epistemology. `The Holy Spirit is a reality which is 
ignored by the philologists and the philosophers of comparative religion, or which is 
at least "provisionally bracketed" by them. The horizon of scientists cannot admit the 
question as to why the wind of world-history blew precisely into this sail, or why it 
did not choose another formula, just as historically insignificant, but that objectively 
and historically perhaps was quite close to it ... it is an accident of history that the favourable constellations, the historical kairos exalted this particular form. But what 
is certain is that whoever excludes the dimension of the Holy Spirit (the real Spirit, 
not the imagined one) from the phenomenon will not be able to understand it as it 
understands itself: as the grain of mustard that has within itself the ability to grow 
taller than all other bushes in the garden. But if one makes this excision, from what 
perspective is it that one intends to understand the phenomenon better than it 
understands itself? From the perspective of the general philosophy of religion? Or 
from the perspective of a (modern? ) self-understanding of our own which cannot 
admit the form stamped upon history because this form "no longer says anything" to 
that self understanding? ' GL 1: 494-5. 
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The Incarnation of the Word confronts man, awakening him to his own 
unfinished constructions of the glory of God and the world and presenting him with 
something totally unique and incomparable, which authenticates, purifies as well as 
destroys. This concrete revelation is mediated through the scripture and the church. 
But how might man perceive this light? This is the concern of our next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
REVELATION AND EXPERIENCE II: PERCEIVING THE FORM 
The central question of fundamental theology is that of perceiving the form, 
which is, as we have already seen, an aesthetic problem. The basic question that 
expresses this central concern is, `How does God's revelation confront man in 
history? How is it perceived? ' This epistemological concern is confused in modern 
times by the re-statement of the question. The re-formulation of the central question, 
an exercise which is heavily influenced by the modern rationalistic concept of science, 
pushes the central concern to the fringe causing it to be marginalised. The question 
is rephrased in the following manner: `Here we encounter a man who claims to be 
God, and who, on the basis of the claim, demands that we should believe many truths 
he utters which cannot be verified by reason. What basis acceptable to reason can we 
give to his authoritative claims? ' When the question is put in this fashion, the enquirer 
plunges into an insoluble dilemma and has already forfeited an answer. Balthasar 
describes the dilemma as follows: `On the one hand, he can believe on the basis of 
insufficient rational certainty; but then he is not believing on the basis of divine 
authority, and his faith is not Christian faith. Or, on the other hand, he can achieve 
faith by renouncing all rational certainty and believing on the basis of mere 
probability; but then his faith is not really rational'. ' The only way to avoid the 
danger of being enmeshed by this dilemma into which the rationalistic school of 
Catholic apologetics and Protestant theology have largely fallen, and one which has 
given birth to the artificial dialectic of `knowing' and `believing', is to restore the 
'CLI: 173. 
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dimension of aesthetic contemplation. ' This is the basic direction which Balthasar's 
reflection on revelation and Christian experience takes. 
1. The Nature of Christian Experience 
Such a theological aesthetics is indeed possible because God, in his own 
initiative and freedom, has in the incarnation taken form and `allowed himself to be 
seen, heard and touched'. Through the incarnation, the revelation of God is at once 
both sensory and objective. ' The imperceivable has become perceivable through his 
free grace, and the perception of God `is realised when God comes to the world and, 
yes, becomes world'. Through the incarnation God has allowed us to participate in 
his Godhead which is always transcendent. Balthasar describes this participation as the 
adrnirabile commercium et connubium. In the last chapter, we discussed at length 
Balthasar's understanding of the objectivity of God's revelation and the central place 
he has given to the facticity of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. There is no 
need to dwell on this again; what is of moment here is Balthasar's main thesis that the 
Incarnation is the locus and starting point of all our reflection on the Christian 
experience. We sense a degree of irascibility here, a temperament that pervades the 
writings of Barth, when Balthasar wrote the following words: `whoever strives to go 
beyond this, whoever deems that the Father is still not visible enough in the Son, has 
not given sufficient thought of the fact that the Father has revealed himself in the Son, 
the "radiance of his glory and expressive image (Ausbild) of his being", the "total 
heir" not only of his historical revelation, but his entire "universe" (Heb 1: 3). Nor has 
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he sufficiently pondered the fact that, after this Word, who is the Alpha and Omega, 
the Father has nothing further to communicate to the world, neither in the present 
aeon nor in the aeon to come'. ' 
Three points should be made here regarding man's perception of God's 
objective revelation through the Incarnation. Firstly, just as man experiences the 
world with his whole being (body and soul), so also he experiences God. Man always 
finds himself in the real; and the most real reality is the `Thou', i. e., his fellowmen 
and God his creator. In the Incarnation, man is confronted by this `Thou'. Secondly, 
in the Incarnation `flesh speaks to flesh', in the sphere of the senses: `... the Word 
chose this unmistakable language in order to overtake and encounter from below the 
sinner who has lost his spirit'. ' And thirdly, through the Incarnation, man encounters 
God in his self-emptying or exinanitio. Indeed the Servant could be understood only 
as the Lord who came down for our sake. Thus it is the senses that perceive what 
God has to do to be visible, what He has to do to make Himself heard by sensual 
ears: the senses perceive the non-sensual sensually. ' Hence for Balthasar, the `senses 
are the exteriorisations of the soul, and Christ is the exteriorisation of God'. ' The 
epistemic value accorded to the senses by Balthasar is echoed through the centuries 
of Christian Tradition: Irenaeus, $ qualifiably in Augustine, ' in Denys, " and in 
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Bonaventure. I 
Like Denys, Balthasar maintains that the revelation of God must meet the 
whole man. ''- In the light of this, Balthasar argues that the criteria for God- 
relationship in the so-called `theology of experience' is too emotionally based and 
therefore inadequate. `Feeling' is thought of as an isolated act alongside the intellect 
and the will. This exclusivistic treatment of the former has prevented the holistic 
perspective of experience from emerging, resulting in too narrow a criterion for man's 
relationship with God, a criterion that is too exclusively based on the emotional states 
and not on man's total constitution and disposition. Furthermore, the verb `to feel' 
and the noun `feeling', even if used to denote the `absolute feeling of dependency' do 
not fully bring out the creature's primary aprioristic structure which revelation beings 
out. Thus Balthasar prefers to us `to apprehend' and `apprehension' as these serve the 
purpose better and `convey more exactly the notion of having been touched from 
outside and above'. 13 
2. Faith and Knowledge 
The pre-requisite for seeing the form is faith in God. Here Balthasar uses the 
word `faith' in its broadest possible definition, namely, `that the person must make 
space for the divine omnipotence'. " He later asserts that the decision of faith is not 
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only necessary for seeing the form correctly, but also for the `act whereby the event 
lets itself be seen correctly'. " Theology is not a matter of excavating the historical 
bruta facta that lie behind the faith of the Church, but encountering the truth that 
discloses itself there. This viewpoint enables Balthasar to make that sharp distinction 
between the theology which `presupposes faith and does its thinking within the nexus 
of the church', which is for him genuine theology, and one which `rejects faith as 
methodically dubious and irresponsible', preferring to subsume the truth of revelation 
under an anthropological truth. Balthasar categorises the latter as `false theology'. 16 
What then does Balthasar understand by `faith'? Again the matter is considered 
from various angles. From the outset, it must be understood that faith for Balthasar 
cannot be disengaged from the context of man's entire life. Such dichotomy would 
only lead to a supernaturalistic rationalism resulting in the purely abstract 
interpretation of faith. This tendency, which springs from a reaction to the simplistic 
notions of faith found in Romanticism and Idealism, resulted in the untenable doctrine 
of the analysis of faith which artificially, `by a process of abstract isolation, 
disengages the Christian act of faith from all elements of insight and understanding 
and then proceeds to analyse it in this purified form'. " 
The act of faith opens the whole man to God, not just an isolated faculty. " 
Surpassing the Catholic notion of the analysis fidel, Balthasar's approach argues for 
a `re-integration of faith into the personal encounter between believers and God 
`S GL IV: 115. 
16 GL VII: 115, fn. 2. 
11 GL I: 139. 
I- 
'R GL 1: 243-4. 
91 
through which they are drawn deeper and deeper into his knowledge through his self- 
disclosure in Jesus Christ'. 19 There is therefore a concrete relationship between the 
human senses and faith. Because God appears in the realm of worldly reality, the 
centre of the encounter must be in the profane senses which make possible the act of 
faith. Thus faith must be sensory in order to be human. 2° This means that faith, far 
from being isolated and abstracted from natural experience, is seen by Balthasar to 
fulfil as well as transform all our natural experiences. `Along with the ontic order that 
orients man and the form of revelation to one another, the grace of the Holy Spirit 
creates a faculty that can apprehend this form, the faculty that can relish it and find 
its joy in it, that can understand it and sense its interior truth and rightness'. 2' 
In accord with the Church Fathers and the Doctors of High Scholasticism, 
Balthasar understands faith as the lumen ftdei, the light of God becoming `luminous' 
in man. God's light as `grace', `life' and `truth', shines not only in our hearts that we 
might know the Son, but also through the Son `who makes the radiance of this light 
possible' by his atoning death. 22 From this, faith can be also understood as the 
`participation' in the free self-disclosure of God's interior life and light: `The created 
spirit does not "deduce" this reality (in which God is included in whatever way) from 
indications and logical premises; as spirit, it is from the very start already set in the 
19 John Riches, `Balthasar and the Analysis of Faith', The Analogy of Beauty, (ed. ) 
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light of this reality, at the same time thinking within it and directing itself towards 
it'. ' There is therefore a theological a priori in man, a sensorium as it were, 
`conferred in revelation itself, which perceives what revelation means, not in the 
general but in the unique sense of God becoming manifest'; ` and this is the 
foundation for all instruction from outside, i. e., from the sphere of church or of 
history. This theological a priori, which is found not only in the Christian but in all 
men because all are called to the vision of God, is different from the concept of the 
religious a priori that is found in liberal theology and in the fields of psychology and 
philosophy of religion, which failed to understand the concept correctly. But, far from 
rejecting the concept altogether, Balthasar maintains that it must be `shot through by 
the elements of grace' and understood from the perspective of grace as the 
`ontological and epistemological elevation and illumination of this a priori by the light 
of the interior fullness of God's life as he reveals himself . 25 
We move on now to Balthasar's treatment of faith and knowledge. The two 
are intimately and inseparably intertwined. This is evident in the entire Biblical 
testimony: the concept of faith includes the concept of knowledge. ' The theology 
'' GL I: 157. 
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26 The people of Israel understood that faith is associated in the most 
unproblematic manner with the concept of knowledge. God who wants to be 
recognised, must be known. Faith as man's response to God, a response which 
listens, yields, trusts and hopes, is founded on the knowledge of God's historical 
leading of his people by grace. The Psalms demand a faith which is portrayed as 
endurance and perseverance, and this is founded on an experiential knowledge of 
God's fidelity and justice. In the New Testament, faith and knowledge are similarly 
conjoined to one another. Paul speaks uninhibitedly about knowing the `mysteries of 
faith'. There is a certainty of knowledge in faith, but this certainty is founded not on 
having grasped, but having been grasped. John asserts that `We believe and know that 
you are the holy One of God! ' (Jn 6: 69). For him, `faith can appear as being the 
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of the great Alexandrians also spoke of this circumencessio: while restoring Biblical 
gnosis, it perfected pistis `to its place of honour'. '-' For Clement and Origen, the 
perfect Christian is the `gnostic' who `understands' his faith interiorly. This 
experience is not reserved only for the intellectually gifted but is an imperative that 
corresponds objectively to the act of faith. The `pistic' and the `gnostic' are 
distinguished from one another by the simple fact that the former is one who by `bare 
faith' relates in an external manner to the content of faith as it is presented in the 
ecclesial kerygma and based on its sole authority. The latter enthusiastically tries to 
appropriate interiorly what he believes and thus sees the essential elements of the faith 
unfold before his vision (Oewpia). 28 Without outgrowing the proclamation of the 
church, the gnostic Christian finds himself drawn evermore closer to the Logos who 
reveals himself: `What is here involved is, therefore, nothing other than the turning 
of faith to its own interior authenticity, as faith in a proposition ("belief that Christ") 
becomes faith in a person ("believing Christ")'. 9 In Clement Christ leads men to the '- 
Father by pistis and also by ý-gTfGLS, i. e., `the efforts of thought, ascesis and love'. " 
Faith then, is the foundation upon which gnosis is built. 
In John and Paul as well as in Origen and Clement, the gnosis of faith can be 
initiation and the way of Christian knowledge ... Or, conversely, faith can- proceed 
from knowledge, which makes just as much sense, since knowledge of Christ's 
divinity engenders an attitude of adoring acceptance of everything that proceeds from 
it ... '(GL I: 134-5). The Biblical testimony therefore teaches the circumincession of 
pistis and gnosis (Cf. GL I: 131 ff. ). 
'' GL 1: 136. 
28 GL 1: 137. 
29 GL I: 137. 
`° GL I: 138. 
94 
understood by the concept of Oc6p !a which means `steadfast, illumining contemplation 
- provided O¬wpia is taken along with its theological prerequisites: incorporation into 
Christ through faith and sacraments; participation in the Holy Spirit, who introduces 
us to the fullness of truth; the revelatory will of the heavenly Father, who through 
Word and Spirit already now, within the veil of faith, wants to grant us a share in his 
own triune truth'. 31 
3. Archetypal Experiences 
The relationship between the experiences of the apostles and that of the Church 
and individual believers is discussed under the concept of archetypal experiences. 
Christ is our archetype who invites man into the highest archetypal experience which 
is his own. 32 The Church and individual believers can share in this archetypal 
experience through participation and imitation. This is done through the ministry of 
the eye-witnesses, as they communicate their archetypal experience. 33 The testimony 
of the eye-witnesses are considered from two perspectives. Firstly it is considered in 
itself; and here Balthasar classifies the experience into six categories which are to be 
considered at different levels: that of the Old Testament prophets, the experience of 
Christ Himself, the experience of the apostles, the experience of the Church, that of 
Mary and, finally, the experience, akin to that of Paul which Balthasar maintains 
constitutes the mystical vocations of the church' Secondly, they must be considered 
" GL I: 139. 
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`from the viewpoint of the inclusion of ecclesial faith, that is, with consideration of 
the manner in which every Christian believer is represented in the situation of 
concrete and fully human encounter'. " 
As the archetype, Jesus' experience of God furnishes and conditions all of the 
Church's experiences. ' This is because of who he is and the direction of his coming 
to the world (John 3: 31-34). Hence only in the context of the christological 
movement, i. e. in the context of the Incarnation, can Jesus' experience of God be 
understood. 37 In the unique hypostatic union of the human and divine in Christ, God 
becomes close to man through his seeing, hearing, living and suffering; in the same 
way man comes close to God. Thus in Jesus something is being affirmed about both 
God and man. The Son allows us to participate in his experience. Balthasar maintains 
that there is a `seeing' common to both Jesus and his disciples, by way of imitation. 
Because Jesus' archetypal vision of God is from the perspective of one who is seen 
(sent) by God, whoever sees him sees the Father; provided of course that he is seen 
in the way he must and intends to be seen, namely, as the Word of the Father. This 
ability to see him as he really is and that everything human in Christ is `a word, an 
image, a representation, and an expression of the Father' is bestowed on man by 
grace. Here we can see how fundamentally important the eye-witness of the disciples 
is since `it involves a human seeing, hearing, and touching of a genuine humanity'. 
Nevertheless this experience remains secondary because even in the experience of the 
eye-witnesses, it is faith which illuminates, and this faith is possessed by the Christian 
11 GL 1: 307. 
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who does not see Christ with the senses but through the testimony of the apostles. 38 
Thus as the Word of God, Jesus Christ bears witness to what he, and only he as Son, 
has seen and heard of the Father. `Jesus' experience of God, therefore, refers even 
believing man, according to his own prolepsis, to the immanent ascent to the Father'; 
this is an experience which is not dynamic and open-ended. 39 
The Apostles are officially chosen and called by the Lord to function as eye- 
witnesses. In their constant association with Jesus in his public life, his passion and 
death, the apostles knew their Master through their senses. But with the death of 
Jesus, `the Apostles' senses, accustomed to his existence, now fall into the void; there 
is no longer anything there to see, to hear, to touch'. 40 It is only with the 
resurrection that this experience is resumed anew, and in the forty days of the 
apostles' association with their Risen Lord, they experienced him with wholly new 
senses. `The eyewitness of the Apostles draws all its force from this last phase, to be 
sure; otherwise they could hardly bear witness to anything more than an extraordinary 
man who was prophetically gifted and who performed miracles'. But this force did 
not come solely from their witness of the Resurrection, but `from the fact that the man 
who appeared to them was the same whom they had known previously from long 
associations and whom they had seen suffer and die'. 41 The difficulty here among 
the Apostles was not sensory experience; they do have natural senses but not yet 
spiritual senses. In other words their difficulty was a faith adequate for this faith- 
3s GL I: 327. 
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object and the capability of perceiving it fully. This came only after the Resurrection 
and after the Spirit was breathed on them by the Resurrected Lord. 42 Thus the faith 
of the apostles began externally and in the material and only later becomes 
interiorised. Balthasar contrasts this with the experience of Mary whose `experience 
of faith began with her innermost being and gradually attained external form'. " 
But how is this experience translated to the Church and the Christian? `In what 
manner is the archetypal Christian experience incorporated into the Church so that 
members who are not graced with it can nevertheless participate in it? '44 Balthasar 
has no straight-forward answer to this question. To him, the total reality of the 
Church is multi-layered and complex. Therefore, in order for us to answer the above 
question, we must first understand this multi-faceted phenomenon and how it operates 
in the dimension of the church. These different levels represent the different types of 
Biblical and archetypal experiences portrayed in the scriptures. 
The first level is that of the eyewitness of the Twelve which is represented by 
the Petrine Tradition. Here the writings show that their eyewitness to the Church 
revolves around two main points: the kerygma, and its realisation in the Christian 
life. 45 It was by the power of the Holy Spirit that Peter proclaims what he has seen; 
12 GL 1: 345. 
GL 1: 346. We however maintain that the Marian experience is similar to that of 
the Apostles. Her faith began exteriorly as well with the appearance of the angel who 
announces God's will for her life to which she obediently surrenders (Luke 1: 26-38). 
This faith, which began externally was later interiorised as she contemplated the 
meaning of the events that surrounded the birth (Luke 1: 16ff) and the life of Jesus 
Christ (Eg. Luke 2: 51-52). 
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the Church participates in his vision by listening intently and by being obedient to the 
proclaimed truth. Through obedience the community becomes a `flock' (1 Pet 5: 3): 
`For this reason, the archetype of Christ in Peter has a certain tendency to become a 
moral example or to be reduced to such (1 Pet 2: 21) ... 
" The sacrament of baptism 
is given a high place because through it the believer receives that which `contains 
within itself Christ's death and redemptive descent into hell' and to realise this means 
a decisive severance from sin. The faith of the Church is portrayed to be slightly 
different from that of the Apostle: compared to the vision of the Apostle, the faith of 
the Church is non-visionary (1 -Pet 1: 8). But it is precisely because of this that 
`inexpressible and glorious joy' is promised to the Church. Balthasar concludes: `This 
is, strictly and exclusively, the perspective of the hierarchical tradition, which through 
kerygma and sacraments incorporates the Apostles' eyewitness into the Church, and 
which for the rest, locates the actuality of Christ as archetype in the moral realisation 
of the proclaimed creed'. 47 
The Pauline Tradition offers a perspectival difference - while the Petrine 
tradition is conveyed to the Church horizontally, namely, through the level of history, 
the Pauline eyewitness proceeds vertically `from heaven' (Acts 22: 6; 26: 13); his 
Gospel came to him through revelation from God and not through the mediation of 
any man. " The Church, for Paul, is portrayed in a vertical structure, i. e., the Head 
who appears (to him) from above articulating and ordering the Mystical Body (Eph 
4: 10f). The Mystical Body grows up towards him, the perfect Man (Eph 4: 13). While 
" GL 1: 353. 
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Peter exhorts his followers to be good shepherds and therefore good examples to the 
flock, Paul understood from the very outset that he is someone who is crucified with 
Christ and daily dies with him. In Paul we see `a living anticipation of the 
eschatological promise'. `He not only shows, he infuses his vision and his certainty 
of salvation into the Church; irresistibly he draws the community into his joy, his 
parrhesia, his zeal, his prayer, his catholic love'. 49 Balthasar maintains that in the 
Pauline tradition we are to see, in the Church, the `great charisms of mission which 
suddenly visit and fructify the Church', as seen in the great conversions from 
Augustine to Newman, and the great visions that are poured into the Church. " 
The Johannine Tradition, which constitutes something like a synthesis between 
the Petrine and Pauline Traditions, is two-pronged depending on whether we speak 
of the Epistles or the Apocalypse. Here we have, merged into a single unified stream, 
the earthly and the prophetic-heavenly tradition. John's direct vision of the Christ is 
not like that of Peter which is purely historical; his is already contemplative in itself. 
There is therefore no need even for `spiritual senses' because in John the opposition 
between corporeal and spiritual senses is unthinkable and superfluous since he 
understood that he has seen, touched and heard the Word of Life with his bodily 
senses. s' The Apocalypse presents John as the prophetic seer who addresses the 
Church not in the name of the Christ in whom Peter greets them, or in the name of 
the Christ whom Paul saw on the way to Damascus, but rather the Christ of the 
Apocalypse - `the Ruler of the kings of the earth, who is preparing to come upon the 
" GL 1: 355. 
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clouds in union with his enthroned Father and the seven spirits who stand before his 
throne (Rev 1: 40.52 `This is what, as apocalyptic prophet, he inserts into the 
experience of the Church'. " 
Balthasar's treatment of Marian spirituality generally parallels that of Catholic 
theology. In his earlier discussion of the Marian experience of God he asserts 
dogmatically that in Mary, `Zion passes over into the Church; in her, the Word passes 
over into flesh; in her, the Head passes over into the body. She is the place of 
superabundant fruitfulness'. 51 He develops this by stating, again rather dogmatically, 
that Mary's simple experience of motherhood has become a function of the archetypal 
experience of faith. 55 His contemplation of the physical-psychological aspects of 
Mary's experience of motherhood led him to spiritualise every aspect of that 
experience. 56 It is therefore not difficult to see how Balthasar is able to exalt the 
archetypal experience of Mary to such a high status. 
The threefold archetypal experience of Christ, which is inferred by the 
Apostles on the Church for its use, remains permanently sustained and 
undergirded by the Marian experience of Christ, which in its depth and 
simplicity is quite beyond the power of words. But the Marian 
experience existed prior to the apostolic experience, and it thus wholly 
conditions it, for Mary, as Mother of the Head, is also Mother of the 
Bodys' 
The Roman Catholic doctrine of the immaculacy of Mary leads Balthasar to the 
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following statement about Mary's archetypal experience. 
Because of her immaculate nature, she always feels and senses that 
which is unsurpassedly truthful, which in the transition from faith into 
vision needs no corrective and which, consequently, even in its earthly 
concealment and constriction already possesses its definitive form. " 
Roman Catholic Mariology is not our primary concern here. What is of 
moment is to see how Balthasar applies this concept of archetypal experience to the 
Church and to the experience of faith in individual believers, i. e. how successfully he 
has answered his own question which was raised earlier. The section on archetypal 
experience, after a lengthy discussion, has a rather disappointing ending. The general 
statement that the. four archetypal experiences converge in the church, and that they 
do not merely hover as unattainable ideas, `but rather each in its own way and by 
means of a real continuity and communication of what is peculiar to it, these 
archetypal experiences are the very foundation of the life-form of believing man' do 
not answer how this all came about in a very adequate way. Even when this matter 
is taken up again, its articulation does not get any clearer. S9 The work which sheds 
the greatest light on this comes more than ten years later in which Balthasar wrote 
In the Bible, in both Old and New Testaments, the relationship 
between God and mankind is described chiefly under the headings of 
revelation and faith. And it is true that revelation is transmitted through 
individuals, of whom one can say that as prophets or visionaries they 
possess a different, more experiential knowledge of God than those 
who `believe because they hear' (Rom 10: 17). It is likewise true that 
the disciples' eyes and ears are called blessed, because they see and 
hear what so many others before them have longed to see and hear (Mt 
13: 160. But this beatitude actually receives its force only after Easter, 
when the Lord disappears from the disciples: during their 
`contemporaneity' with him they did not yet really see and hear at all. 
And it is precisely in this `seeing and hearing', which becomes actual 
11 GL 1: 362. 
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only in the moment of the Lord's withdrawal ('It is good for you that 
I go'), that the Apostles' experience becomes archetypal for succeeding 
generations. On the one hand, the generations to come are deprived of 
`seeing and hearing': `Happy are those who have not seen and yet 
believe' (Jn 20: 29; cf. I Pet 1: 8); on the other hand, they are drawn 
by faith into the archetypal experience of the eye-witnesses on the same 
footing with them: `What we have heard, what we have seen with our 
own eyes, and touched with our hands ... of the Word of life (not `the historical Jesus') - this is what we bear witness to and proclaim to you 
... so that you too may have union with us' (1 Jn 1: 1-3). 
Evidently, according to John's letter, this sharing in the 
`experience' of the original revelation of Christ, which should 
explicitly bring about `union', is attainable only if hearers are drawn 
into a community of faith which implies a realisation of Christ in the 
Holy Spirit ... 
60 
This long quotation is necessary because it is here that Balthasar gives a 
clearer and more adequate answer to the question he posed in 1962. The experience 
of the Apostles `becomes' Archetypal after their Easter experience of the Risen Lord. 
Succeeding generations of Christians are drawn into this experience by faith and by 
the work of the Holy Spirit. But does not this understanding of the experience of 
Biblical man place too much emphasis on the exceptional nature of their experience 
neglecting the fact that the percipient man in the Bible is in fact an ordinary man? 
Barth tries to show this by emphasising the commonly shared human element in the 
perception of Biblical man. The Biblical eye-witness is therefore to him exemplary but 
not archetypal. 61 
4. Spiritual Senses 
The concept of the `spiritual senses' is another key to understanding 
I New Elucidations (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 42-3. 
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Balthasar's theological epistemology in its subjective aspect. He himself states this fact 
when he begins his discussion of the subject. 62 Balthasar understands perception as 
a fully human act of encounter. This necessarily does not only include the senses but 
emphasises them: it is only through the senses that man perceives the reality of the 
world and Being. 63 But with man's encounter with God who is Spirit one should not 
only speak of sensibility but `spiritual' sensibility. The Christian who has `risen with 
Christ and ascended to the Father', becomes a `spiritual man' who not only possesses 
a `spiritual intellect and will, but also a spiritual heart, a spiritual imagination and 
spiritual senses'. ' Balthasar investigates the history of Christian spiritual theology 
to bring his understanding of the `spiritual senses' into sharper focus. 
It was Origen who first expounded the doctrine of the `five spiritual senses'. 
Taking a few scriptural texts as his basis, Origen developed the doctrine that there 
exists in man a `general sense of the divine', which he then subdivides into several 
kinds. He maintains further that there are two kinds of senses in us - one mortal, 
corruptible and human; the other immortal, spiritual and divine. This has led to two 
conflicting interpretations of Origen, one rationalistic and the other mystical. 65 
Balthasar argues that neither would do, because a dualistic interpretation of Origen 
is impossible. Rather one must understand him to refer to the same senses `which first 
are earthly and then become heavenly through the infusion of grace'. ' He 
GL 1: 365. 
63 GL 1: 365. 
GL 1: 366. 
GL I: 371. 
GL 1: 371. 
104 
concludes, `It is Christ's grace, therefore, in his dying and rising, that the "old man" 
is created anew and that the old fleshly senses become spiritual'. 67 The medieval 
phase saw the spiritual senses receiving a more mystical interpretation disappearing 
into the `inaccessible heights of contemplative mysticism'. 68 Bonaventure understood 
the spiritual senses as the acts of the human intellect and will as they grasp God in 
contemplation, having been `restored (refecti), facilitated (expediti) and brought to 
perfection (perfecti) by the triple infused habitus of the "virtues", the "gifts of the 
Spirit" and the "beatitudes"'. ' Hence, we are not speaking about a second higher 
power or faculty alongside our corporeal senses, but the same sense having been 
perfected through regeneration. In the Exercises of Ignatius Loyola, Balthasar saw the 
modern exposition of the meaning of the spiritual senses. The Exercises have received 
two different interpretations. The first is to interpret Ignatius in the same light as 
Bonaventure, i. e., mystically. The second is to see the exercises as therapeutic and 
a preparation for prayer. Balthasar is of the opinion that both the mystical and the 
corporeal är-, included in Ignatius. 70 
The relationship between the Spirit and the senses is then explored. The 
thoughts of four thinkers -a religious phenomenologist, a philosopher, a poet and a 
theologian - help to delineate the main concerns of this aspect of Christian 
anthropology. Speaking as a religious phenomenologist, Romano Guardini laments the 
fact that the capacity for spiritual knowledge has `largely been lost' to man in the 
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course of cultural history. Seeing häs become merely an act of observation and 
verification which is then ordered and what is perceived is articulated by the 
intellect. " Images have lost their significance, having been overshadowed in this age 
of technology by concepts and machines. This results in a `dislocation into abstract 
conceptuality and sensualistic corporeality' which must be overcome if the living 
human reality is to re-emerge. Guardini then explains what he understands as 
perception. He stresses that the `forms' that the eye sees are not only corporeal. The 
eye `sees' the life of the plant, it `sees' the vitality of the animal, in man it `sees' the 
soul. Thus, for Guardini, `seeing is an encounter with reality, and the eye is simply 
man himself as he can be confronted by reality in its forms which are related to the 
light. This definition is very similar to the Augustinian `eye of the soul' and it is from 
this understanding of perception that the relationship between the Spirit and the senses 
is located: `The bodily eye ... constitutes the material, so to speak, out of which the 
Holy Spirit means to create that eye which is to behold God "face to face"'. 73 
The main purpose of the philosopher Gustav Sieweth was to show how words 
are rooted in images, hence arguing for the sensory basis of words. Abstractions, he 
maintains, are the product of modernity. For Sieweth, the arc of cognition goes from 
the senses to the memory to the imagination to the synthetic intellect (logos) and to 
reason. Each of these is the basis for the next. It is the senses, asserts Sieweth, that 
are open to the world. The eye does not see its own seeing but only the things 
themselves. Following Thomas Aquinas, Sieweth argues that the eyes are the most 
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spiritual of all the senses - it is the `tree of the senses' while hearing is the `centre or 
heart of sensory energy', and touch, taste and smell are the `root of the senses'. 74 
To see is to empty oneself into the light of the real, so that human vision is that which 
moves out into the open and into that which is the other. 75 
With the poet Paul Claudel, the sensory perception of God is seen under two 
premises: the philosophical and the theological. In terms of the former, Claudel 
explains that the body is a work of the soul; it is the expression and the extension of 
the soul in matter. 76 Through the body, the soul experiences the world. Theologically 
he asserts that in the Incarnation, the God who became man began with the external 
senses and moves to the interior senses thereby awakening in the world dulled by sin 
a sensorium for himself. `Claudel's approach presupposes that, through the correct use 
of the external senses, we can encounter God in everything in the world'. " 
Balthasar chose Karl Barth as the representative theologian to inform his 
theological anthropology. The Bible shows no abstract interest in the rational nature 
of man, rather its interest lies in man who meets and stands before God. This 
relationship of man before God attains its perfection in Jesus Christ, who is also `God 
with us' and `Man for Others'. By asserting emphatically that Christ reveals the 
essence and the humanity of man, Barth distances Biblical anthropology from all 
modern humanists since the Renaissance, including that of Goethe, the great idealists 
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and the humanism of Nietzýche. '$ Balthasar agrees with Barth in his critique of 
Patristic and scholastic anthropology that both have strayed away from this primary 
Biblical premise of human reality allowing themselves to be enticed by the abstract 
Greek concept of essence. 
Monastic humanism and that of the modern times are also criticised for their 
failure to understand the full meaning of `fellow-humanity'. Arguing that Gen 2.18f 
and the Song of Songs are concerned primarily with the spiritual-corporeal-being- 
together and being-for-one-another of man and woman, he shows that this mystery 
foreshadows the union between Yahweh and Israel, portrayed in the marriage- 
covenant and fulfilled in the relationship between Christ and the Church. `This entire 
relationship is inseparably spiritual and corporeal, both as between persons and as 
between God and man, and this is developed in all directions on the basis of 1 Cor 
6: 12-20,2 Cor 11: 2f., I Cor 11: 1-16 and Eph 5: 22-33'. 79 
Through the reality of the hypostatic union in Christ, which is for Barth the 
supereminent archetype of the analogous order between soul and body, man is a 
spiritual-corporeal reality. As a corporeal-psychic reality, Biblical man receives the 
Spirit not as a state but as an event. `The (Biblical) spirit is the dialogical principle 
which is bestowed on man from the outset, coming from God and therefore leading 
back to God'. 8° The anti-Platonism of Barth's theological anthropology is seen very 
clearly in the following statement: `If the body is not organic body but purely material 
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body then it is without soul when it is without body'. " Another quote from Barth 
which Balthasar cited would help us to see the crux of the matter: `Perception is an 
undivided act, in which awareness makes thinking possible and thinking awareness ... 
[It is] certainly not only my body, but also my soul which has awareness, and it is 
certainly not only my soul but also my body which thinks'. `The situation', Barth 
continues, `is rather that man as soul of his body is empowered for awareness, and 
as soul of his body for thought'. 82 
The study of these four thinkers led to a deeper understanding of the spiritual 
senses. Here are Balthasar's own words as he draws the section to a close 
The agreement that emerges from four thinkers of such different 
temperament is striking. In his own way, each of them conceives man 
as a sensory-spiritual totality and understands man's two distinctive 
functions from the standpoint of a common centre in which the living 
person stands in a relationship of contact and interchange with the real, 
living God. All four insist on justifying sensory knowledge pre- 
eminently by proceeding from the higher to the lower and from the 
interior to the exterior - regardless of the fact that in themselves, the 
senses constitute the `exterior' and the `inferior' and, as such, are the 
empirical basis for all spiritual thinking and willing and the vehicle 
which sets this in motion. 83 
5. The Place of Theology 
Before we conclude this chapter by offering our assessment of Balthasar's 
theology in general and his theological epistemology in particular, we need to examine 
yet another important issue - Balthasar's understanding of the place and function of 
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Christian theology. In an article entitled `The Place of Theology"' published in 
1965, Balthasar argues that it is only by a serious reflection on the form of God's 
revelation that we can come to a correct understanding of the nature and task of 
theology and the approach it should take. Balthasar begins therefore with the 
Incarnation which he eloquently describes as `[T]he Word that is God became man, 
without ceasing to be God. The Word that is infinite became finite, without ceasing 
to be infinite'. 85 It is God's revelation in Jesus Christ that makes theology possible: 
`And because he is Word, and as Word, took flesh, he took on, at the same time, a 
body consisting of syllables, scripture, ideas, images, verbal utterances and preaching, 
since otherwise men would not have understood ... 
'$b 
The true preparation for the reception of this revelation is faith which is 
defined as the `surrender of the finite person in his entirety to the infinite Person'. " 
There is hence an encounter of two existences - that of the finite person embodied in 
the flesh, and that of the believer. The surrender of the latter in faith implies two 
things. Firstly, an absolute will and readiness to encounter what is human (i. e., 
through the Incarnation) and the infinite content in finite concept; and, secondly, `the 
surrender in question means the will to make this infinite meaning (to which no 
knowledge in time can attain) the ground of one's existence', which Balthasar, in the 
same sentence, defines as the willingness `not only to live in the presence of the 
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Word, but to live by its power and in view of it'. " 
The external graces and `signs' with which the Spirit has endowed the Church 
are not ends in themselves, but the means to the above-mentioned ends. Because this 
applies to the whole official side of the Church, it also applies to theology. 
Like all the modes in which the Church sets forth her teaching, 
theology can only be oriented toward these two poles, and so toward 
the purity and fullness of the Church's teaching, with which it partially 
coincides. For, while being a special form of the Church's teaching 
(the theologian, too, has an official role), theology is, at the same time, 
a function, a corrective, a preliminary to the official teaching. Together 
with this latter and the sacraments, theology -is a means, an active 
agency for pouring the infinite riches of divine truth into the finite 
vessels in which revelation is given to us, so that the believer may be 
capable of encountering this infinity in adoration and active 
obedience. 89 
Notwithstanding the subtle allusion to the theologian's allegiance to the magisterium, 
the main point to be gleaned from the above citation is that theology is to serve as an 
agent whose purpose is to purify the Church's teaching and to bring about true 
worship and active discipleship within the Church. 
From the above reflections a few conclusions follow. Firstly, `in theology all 
that has to do with the finite aspect to the Word (with concepts, images, the letter) 
must be considered solely as a means of reaching the infinite therein'. 90 In order for 
theology to do this it must first investigate the `formal logic of the mode of speech 
and thought of the Word of God'. Though such an investigation resembles the 
approach of Bultmann it must differ from him in that it does not approach the Word 
of God through any philosopher or existential presuppositions, but from the basic fact 
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of the Incarnation. Faith alone is the criterion for Balthasar. `The theologian, 
therefore, is required to apply the laws of human thinking in such a way as to bring 
out clearly the law of faith'. 91 Secondly, theology must be concerned with the whole 
truth that is presented in the Word of God. Theology must thus be `universal' and 
`catholic'. `Theology is the expression of the verdict passed by the divine word over 
the human. This is, in fact, the form taken, from the beginning, by the entire word 
of scripture; and it is impossible for theology to evade this form'. 92 
Can theology, then, be called a science? If it can, in what sense must this be 
understood? Balthasar is reluctant to say that theology is a science identical with the 
other sciences. Theology is indeed a science, but in a unique sense, and only 
analogously equivalent to the exact sciences. For the Fathers, theology was `the 
somehow conclusive gnosis that brought to truth that which the Greeks and other 
nations designated "philosophy" (which always included a doctrine about divinity or 
the gods)'. 93 In the Middle Ages, theology was understood to be wisdom, sapientia, 
and therefore stood at a higher plane than the theoretical sciences. The transition to 
high scholasticism saw the rise of Aristotelianism and with it a certain concept of 
science. Thomas Aquinas argued that sciences are not autonomous; they always need 
to assume certain propositions or results from other sciences. The science of God is 
two-fold. One aspect comes from the evidence of the principles of reason, perceived 
by the senses and which seeks to reflect about the origin of things through the use of 
" Ibid., 15. 
' Ibid., 16. 
" Convergences: To the Source of Christian Mystery, (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1984), 47. 
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reason (philosophy or `natural theology'). The other is the way of revelation and faith 
where one, as it were, acknowledges interiorly the rightness of the truth and clings 
to it for its own sake. 
Thomas therefore asserts an analogy (not an identity) between the 
structure of natural reason (what is given by the senses and is worked 
upon by the light of pure reason, which corresponds to the basic 
disposition for `being as a whole') and the structure of theological 
reason (what is historically given) - the Bible, summarised in the Creed 
and kerygma, believed and worked upon with progressive 
understanding through the light of faith, which is a certain participation 
in God's self-contemplation and in the vision of God which the blessed 
have. ' 
Theological work is scientific in the sense that reason is used to penetrate that which 
is put before it to be believed. Reason (no doubt supported always by grace) is 
required to analyse, to see connections and to work out the ramifications and 
implications. Balthasar concludes 
Without the concept of analogy, the inquiry into the scientific structure 
of theology will fail. For theology cannot possibly be counted 
univocally among the other sciences (which argue from the highest 
principles evident to reason); belief in `that which is presented for 
belief' whether in statements or in historical events) remains its basis 
and prerequisite. On the other hand, it can only be called a science 
(analogously) when what is received in faith can be assimilated and 
understood in a genuine effort of reason. 95 
The material -of theology is then considered. Balthasar makes the following 
points. Firstly, the material of theology must be governed by revelation. This 
historical revelation is described in scripture: `and this (i. e. the revelation) in the way 
in which it actually was given in history - or, more precisely, as it happened 
' Ibid., 49; GL 1: 76. 
' Convergences, 51. 
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historically within the human race and is described in scripture'. ' Again Balthasar 
emphasises the importance of understanding scripture in its entirety: `Scripture is not 
a quarry out of which theology can hew individual sentences to suit its purpose: It is 
the witness of the total event, a unity in itself; and it is as a totality that it is the object 
of theology'. 97 Secondly, theology must be contemporary. By this Balthasar means 
that theology must always be attentive to the light that the Holy Spirit sheds here and 
now on revealed truth. The theologian is described as a watchman who is able to read 
and interpret the signs and to discern the spirits. Thirdly, theology must always be in 
conversation with tradition. Only in so doing will it result in tradition today. This of 
course is the hallmark of Balthasar's own theology, a principle by which he tries very 
hard to abide. 
Nothing brings so much harm in its train as the failure to appreciate an 
historical context. It is bound adversely to affect the theology of the 
present. It is an ostrich-like proceeding - with this difference, that the 
ostrich, in hiding its head in the sand, counts on not being seen at all, 
whereas the theologian, hiding in the sands of timelessness, hopes 
despite his disregard of history, to be taken account of by history. 9S 
Another issue that seriously troubled Balthasar is the modem tendency to 
divorce theology from spirituality. In another article, `Theology and Sanctity', 
Balthasar makes this startling observation: `In the whole history of Catholic theology 
there is hardly anything that is less noticed, yet more deserving of notice, than the 
fact that, since the great period of scholasticism, there have been few theologians who 
' Word and Redemption, 11,16. 
97 Ibid., 17. 
vx Ibid., 21. 
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were saints'. ' The theologian, according to Balthasar, is someone `whose office and 
vocation is to expound revelation in its fullness and therefore whose work centres on 
dogmatic theology'. '°° The witness of the theologian, Balthasar maintains, involves 
both theory and practice, since it is impossible to dichotomise the two. 
From the standpoint of revelation, there is simply no real truth which 
does not have to be incarnated in an act or in some action, so that the 
incarnation of Christ is the criterion of all real truth (1 Jn 2: 22; 4: 2) 
and `walking in the truth' is the way the believer possesses the truth (2 
Jn 1-4; 3 Jn 3-4). 10' 
This unity of theology and spirituality is found in all the Fathers of the 
Church. In the middle ages, it was given its most brilliant elaboration by the 
mysterious Denys the Aeropagite in his Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. `But as theology 
increasingly took on a "scholastic" form, and Aristotelianism burst like an elemental 
force, the naive unity hitherto accepted was gravely shaken'. 112 The result of this 
is that philosophy somehow began to emerge and was regarded as a special discipline 
alongside theology `with its own concept of philosophical truth, which was perfectly 
correct in its own sphere ... 
703 The Aristotelianism of the thirteenth century gave 
birth to `modern "secularism" and thereby introduced new tensions and set new 
problems to the Christian'. " 
"I Ibid., 49. 
11 Ibid. Writing some twenty years later, Balthasar could say that every member 
of the Church of Christ is a saint and witness. Cf. `Theology and Holiness', 
Communio 14,4,1987,344; `Theology and aesthetic', Communio 8,1,1981,345. 
1' Word and Redemption, 11,50. 
"' Ibid., 54. 
'°' Ibid., 54. 
'w Ibid., 55. 
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Teachers behaved as though man knew from the outset, before he had 
been given revelation, knew with some sort of finality what truth, 
goodness, being, light, love and faith were. It was as though divine 
revelation on these realities had to communicate itself to these fixed 
philosophical conceptual containers that admitted of no expansion. 105 
The harmful separation between theology and spirituality ensued. `Theology and 
spirituality have become, as it were, each a world of its own, with hardly any point 
of contact, and so saints and spiritual writers are more and more ignored by 
theologians'. 106 The end result of this is the disappearance of what Balthasar calls 
the `complete' theologian, i. e., the theologian who is also a saint. 
Balthasar is convinced that the solution to this problem cannot be found until 
a serious re-assessment of the nature of theology is made. We have already discussed 
what Balthasar understood the nature of theology to be. To that discussion we would 
like to add the analogy of the bridegroom and the bride which Balthasar himself uses 
to describe theology: theology must always be seen as a conversation between the 
bridegroom and the bride in which `the bridegroom gives, (and) the bride receives 
.. '107 In this respect Balthasar 
is in agreement with Bultmann's understanding of 
revelation as personal encounter. Theology for Balthasar must be contemplative 
-ttv- act of C. Ot" lez", I 
theology. He objects to the modern tendency to abstract from theology, and 
wlMCt4 
methodically bracketing as Husserl does., onº j- that,, is factual. His approach rather is 
similar to the theology of the Fathers, a contemplative theology where the whole of 
God's revelation is contemplated. 
In the light of the above analogy, Balthasar maintains, as does Barth, that 
105 Word and Redemption, 11,56. 
106 Word and Redemption, 11,63. 
" Word and Redemption, II, 76. 
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Christian theology can only be done within the church. For him the Christ event exists 
only in correlation with the Church event, and it is only in this situation of 
`reciprocity that the individual can appropriately situate himself in his believing and 
in his theologising'. `Outside the circulation of love between the bridegroom and the 
bride, between head and body', he adds, `no one will ever know what theology 
signifies, and still less, what is the momentum of the glory of divine love'. "' In the 
same sense, exegesis, which for Balthasar is a very valuable theological science, must 
(in fact can only) be carried out in and with a view of the Church. 
Hence the fundamental principle that exegesis - which is indeed a very 
valuable theological science - can be practised meaningfully only within 
the comprehensive view of the Church. If one stands outside, one will 
- unavoidably - begin to break up the indivisible unity of the figure of 
Christ by changing words to more fashionable ones which most likely 
do not mean the same, or to words that can be found also in other 
religions so that while one hears similar expressions, these are merely 
generically religious and not uniquely individual to Christianity. Such 
manipulations are just as destructive as if, for example, someone would 
omit every fifth or tenth beat from a phrase of a Mozart 
symphony. 109 
The dialogical nature of theology (i. e., between bridegroom and bride) 
presupposes a place for prayer. Like Barth, Balthasar was much influenced by 
Anselm. `Knowledge must never be separated from the attitude of prayer with which 
it began. It can do no more than gnosis could outstrip faith, and indeed it is an inner 
form of faith: "faith that seeks understanding". "' Prayerful theology does not mean 
frivolity: theology must always be conducted with rigorous precision; it must 
`correspond at all points with its object, itself unique among objects of knowledge; 
10SGLVII: I10. 
" `Theology and aesthetic', Communio 8,1,1981,65. 
"° Word and Redempsion, II, 83. 
117 
and conform to its special content and method'. "' Only the renewal of this 
perspective can prevent the `theology at the desk' from superseding the `theology at 
prayer'. Balthasar learns this not only from Anselm, but also from the `Marian 
prototype' which is upheld and emulated. Balthasar claims that Marian spirituality is 
able to dissolve the artificial dualism that may result from a `theology at prayer'. He 
maintains 
This is the proper origin of the theology of the Church. This wisdom 
of the Marian Church consists of making place in oneself from the 
beginning for the word of God with the Fiat, in meditating on it in'the 
heart, in letting it grow, in bringing it to the world in the form of man, 
and in entrusting it to humanity. In this, Mary is also the prototype of 
the whole theology of the Church, and for this she is honoured by the 
Fathers with the title `Theologus'. From this is derived the primary 
connotation of every theology of the Church: it can move only in the 
circuit of word and responding wisdom, of revelation and ecclesial 
obedience, a wide circle given the fact that it embraces every truth, 
because in the Logos of God is founded the logos of every purely 
human knowledge, of every worldly science ... From this it follows further that every ecclesial theology as a response to the infinitely free 
and gratuitous word of God must be adoration, thanksgiving, in brief, 
doxology. Given that it moves in the circuit of divine invitation and of 
human response, it cannot be separated even for a second from the 
character of the word as personal appeal; it cannot even for a second 
transform and reduce the infinite speaking subject to a neutral object, 
not even under the pretext of separating content of everything said 
from him who speaks, who is God ... 
To cultivate this theology by following Mary cannot be the privilege 
of the `saints' (whose theology is then rejected as a spirituality not to 
be taken seriously) but must be the fundamental act of every. theologian 
whether layman or `professional'. "'- 
Antonio Sicari writes that according to Balthasar `theology takes place 
beginning with the living insertion of the theologian within the Church ("conversion", 
I' Word and Redemption, II, 85. 
"- `Dalla teologia di Dio all teologia della Ciesa', Conuur»io, Italian edition, 58 
(1981), 15-16. Quoted by Antonio Sicari in `Hans Urs von Balthasar: Theology and 
holiness', Coin, nunio, 16,1,1989,362-3. 
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"new beginning of thought"); and this living insertion is both an assumption of 
objective ("communal") holiness and a gift/task of subjective holiness. It is from this 
sole point of view that theology can firmly maintain its identity and wholeness'. "' 
6. Concluding Reflections 
We have now come to the end of our exposition of Balthasar's conception of 
revelation and theology. Through this exposition Balthasar's theological epistemology 
and with it his theological methodology becomes clear to us. 
We recall at this juncture Louis Dupre's succinct assessment of Balthasar's 1 
theological vision, namely the integration of grace and nature, thought and feeling, 
culture and theology `within a synthetic, comprehensive, theological reflection on 
form'. 114 The central theme of Balthasar's enterprise can therefore be located in a 
simple idea which is inspired by the reality and mystery of the Incarnation. Dupre 
encapsulates Balthasar's basic impulse in the following description. 
By assuming human nature God transformed the very meaning of 
culture. Henceforth all forms have to be measured by the supreme 
form of the Incarnation. Theology itself, indissolubly united to this 
visible form, thereby acquired an aesthetic quality. It would have to 
show in its very structure and diction `the diversity of the invisible 
radiating in the visibleness of the Being of the world' (I: 431). "s 
So what we see here is a cultural theologian at work; a theologian who seeks to 
`harvest the fullness of his Germanic, literary, philosophical and theological, 
Antonio Sicari, `Hans Urs von Baithasar: Theology and holiness', Communio 
16,3,1989,365. 
I" `The Glory of the Lord: Hans Urs von Balthasar's theological aesthetics', 
Coinmuuio Vol 16,386. 
"i Ibid., 385. 
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exegetical and systematic knowledge into a theological synthesis'. "' His major 
works can therefore be described as collages of culture and Christianity. But the 
genius behind all this is the presentation of that integration in the form of a theological 
aesthetic. 
Although Balthasar has written many seemingly disparate things, and this is 
certainly one of the reasons why he is not as well known as a theologian as Yves 
Congar, Lonergan or Rahner, his major theological works Herrlichkeit, Theodramatik 
and Theologik offer us a brilliant synthesis of the content and form of his theology. 
In an article entitled `A Witness of Christ in the Church: Hans Urs von Balthasar', 
Henri de Lubac pays a tribute to Balthasar and outlines the salient features of his 
theology. Balthasar's theology is, firstly, essentially Trinitarian. Using the symbol of 
the `seamless coat' Balthasar brings home the point that the Trinity does not in any 
way fragment the divine unity - `it is revealed to us, after all, through its work of 
salvation which is itself perfectly one' (233). Balthasar's is a traditional theology. But 
the conservatism of the author does not in any way make his theology obscure or 
irrelevant as some who have failed to understand his purposes have alleged. 
His spiritual diagnosis of our civilisation is the most penetrating to be 
found. Though it would be going too far to claim that he had produced 
a complete outline of the famous Scheme 13, he did, certainly, 
anticipate its spirit when he shows how `in the same way that the Spirit 
calls the world to enter into the Church, so he calls the Church to give 
herself to the world'; and he warns us that no good will come of a 
facile synthesis of the two. In many cases one would also find in his 
writings the means to avoid the pitfalls of false interpretation which 
inevitably follow a call to aggiornamento (229). 
The sources of Balthasar's theological thinking are not only sacred scripture, modern 
"' Medard Kehl, `Introduction: Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Portrait by Medard 
Kehl' in The von Balibasar Reader (ed) Medard Kehl and Werner Loser (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1980), 46. 
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philosophy, modem theological movements and the investigation of the human 
sciences, but also, and supremely, the great tradition of the church. `The symbolic 
holistic understanding of the fathers of the church and not the critical-analytic 
reflections of the modems is what forms the real horizon of his thought'. '" Thus 
though Balthasar's theology reflects a dialectic between tradition and modernity, it is 
ultimately the great traditions of the patristics and the Schoolmen that constitutes its 
life-blood. It is a theology which submits, sometimes uncritically, to the authority of 
the tradition, and one which, precisely on account of this submission, seeks to address 
the problems posed by modernity. O'Meara observed that `Balthasar's originality lies 
in structure more than in content'. "' 
As. long as he is unfolding for us approaches leading to Christ, 
propaedeutical questions drawn from religion, culture and metaphysics 
(Paul Tillich's questions, Justyn Martyr's logos spennatikos), the Swiss 
theologian's creativity seldom flags. The core of Christian revelation, 
however is rarely reached. We have not a new theology of grace in 
history but new arrangements of biblical and theological insights 
phrases and motifs. "' 
There is a sense in which the form and content of Balthasar's theology 
constitute an indivisible whole. That is to say, the structure of his theology cannot be 
so divorced and isolated from the content as the above observation seems to imply. 
The structure reveals his theological presuppositions and the selection of materials 
shapes his thoughts as well as giving them expression. This in turn determines the 
form of his theology, and consequently its structure, so that aesthetically and 
"' M Kehl, `Introduction', 5. 
"" See Thomas O'Meara, `Of Art and Theology: Hans Urs von Balthasar's 
Systems' Theological Studies, Vol 42,1981,272-6. 
" Ibid., 276. 
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substantially, his theology is a dynamic symbiosis of form and content. But the 
general thrust of the remark must be taken seriously, for there are to be found in 
Balthasar's theology some fundamental anomalies. These shall be discussed later in 
this section. 
Two more general remarks about his theology must be made at this juncture. 
The first concerns his affinity with Plato. There is much in his theology which 
associates him closely to the perceptions of the ancient philosopher. To begin with, 
it is clear that Balthasar's understanding of aesthetics as `perception' is consonant with 
that of the original Greek sense. His transcendental aesthetics places him in close 
proximity to Plato's theory of Forms. So does his idea of Beauty, which bespeaks of 
Absolute Beauty which is permanent and eternal giving meaning to the lower forms 
of beauty, so that the latter points to the former while the former gives meaning and 
defines the latter. Balthasar's conception of the inextricable unity of Beauty and 
Goodness also finds its parallel in Plato's perception that the Absolute Beauty of the 
Symposium cannot be divorced or separated from the Absolute Good of the Republic. 
Balthasar's theology aims to show the circumincession of the three transcendentals. 
Plato's use of the analogy between Beauty and Light is also found in Balthasar. So is 
the philosopher's emphasis, in the Phaednis, that Beauty is the most clearly seen of 
all the forms - hence his emphasis on sight. 12' Balthasar's theological project is to 
show the superiority of the eye as the theological organ. Furthermore Balthasar's 
indebtedness to the Great Tradition of Western Theology (Augustine, Ansel m, Scotus, 
Bonventure and Aq as)1and of the Dionysian mystical Tradition that flowers from 
St. John of the Cross does appear to portray him as a theologian who is formed by 
120 Phaedrus, 250d. 
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Christian Platonism. Though his exposition of Plato gives the impression that his own 
theology is inimical to the thoughts of the great philosopher, at least one of his 
interpreters felt that Balthasar's negativism towards Plato is strategic rather than 
substantive. 12' 
There is however a fundamental difference between Plato and Balthasar. The 
latter does not wish, as the former does, to pierce behind the appearance of matter, 
and arrive at eternal ideas. Rather his whole aesthetics, and therefore the basic 
premise of his theological epistemology, is affirmation of the real and the concrete, 
and thus learning to see things as they are in themselves and in their entirety. Only 
by so doing can we perceive the reality of being in its pluriform concreteness. This 
is the crux of his theological aesthetics. `The Light which shines forth from the form 
and reveals it to the understanding is accordingly inseperably light of the form itself 
(Scholasticism speaks, therefore of splendor fonnae) and light of being as a whole, 
in which the form is immersed, so that it may have a unitary form'. '22 
It is this emphasis on sight and vision that makes Balthasar's analysis of the 
alleged neglect of aesthetics in Reformed theology questionable. Protestant theology's 
emphasis on the transcendental ity of God does not preclude the fact that God 
objectifies himself in the world and that the world as such manifests his glory through 
its participation with its Creator. Frank Burch Brown offers us an alternative 
assessment when he writes that 
... all in ' all, Reformed piety affirms the power and activity of a 
121 Noel O'Donoghue, `A Theology of Beauty', The Analogy of Beauty. The 
Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, (ed) John Riches (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1986), 7. 
12' GL IV: 31. 
123 
radically transcendent God. This is a God who graciously chooses to 
communicate through particular forms - even aesthetic . 
Although in 
principle reserving the right to grace and bless everything equally, the 
God of radical transcendence makes most use of what is plain and 
humble and pure, in sense, form and imagination. 123 
Overemphasis on the leitmotif of the visual arts led him to overlook to aural and 
therefore intangible aesthetics of the Protestant tradition. Luther's famous statement: 
`After theology I give music the highest place and highest honour' is a case in point. 
We spoke earlier about the alleged anomaly in Balthasar's theological 
aesthetics. This has been argued eloquently by Noel O'Donaghue in his article entitled 
`A Theology of Beauty' where he maintains that there is a disconcordance between 
the announced intentions of the Jesuit theologian and the actual form and content his 
theology takes. ''-' The structure of Balthasar's theological aesthetics postulates a 
prominent role to the principle of the analogy of being. Balthasar argues that `[T]he 
fundamental principle of a theological aesthetics ... is the 
fact that, just as this 
revelation is absolute truth and goodness, so also is it absolute beauty; but this 
assertion would be meaningless if every transposition and application to revelation of 
human categories from the realms of logic, ethics ('pragmatics'), and aesthetics, if 
every analogical application of these categories, were simply forbidden'. 12' To be 
sure, Balthasar develops his understanding of the analogy of being from the standpoint 
of the absolute gratuity of grace in concert with de Lubac's Surnaturel. But given 
Balthasar's affinity with Platonism and Neo-Platonism, and of course his indebtedness 
121 Frank Burch Brown, Religious Aesthetics. A Theological Study of Making and 
Meaning. (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 122. 
124 O'Dongghue, `Beauty', 1-10. See also my article, `Theological Aesthetics or 
Aesthetic Theology? Some Reflections on the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar' 
(forthcoming in SJT, Vol. 47,1994). 
12' GL 1: 607. 
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to the great Western tradition, one is left in doubt, O'Donoghue - c! k, if he has 
actually departed from the nature and grace schema and has fully accepted the 
absorption of the natural by the supernatural. 
The central drama of Balthasar's theology comes from the fact that he 
has accepted the disappearance of the traditional natural man and 
natural law philosophy in theology, but yet shows at every step that he 
has been formed in the old way and brings along with him, without 
looking at it directly, the central principle of the traditional way, the 
principle of the continuity of the natural and supernatural, the principle 
that Karl Barth called somewhat ambiguously the analogy of being. '26 
Balthasar's affinity to the Western theological tradition and his intellectual 
formation in the Thomist school cannot be denied. But it must be remembered that 
along that same continuum of his intellectual development stands also the significant 
influence of Przywara, de Lubac and Barth. There is in Balthasar's theological 
aesthetics a genuine attempt to articulate his theology following the impulses of de 
Lubac's theology of grace, and Karl Barth's Christological focus. This has resulted, 
as we shall see later in our discussion, the concept of catalogical analogy which is a 
way of conceiving culture and theology, nature and grace, christologically and in a 
trinitarian fashion. Through catalogical analogy, Balthasar hopes to surmount the old 
nature-supernature mould of neo-scholasticism which postulates the natura pura and 
the impasse between the analogy of being and the analogy of faith which led Barth to 
what the Jesuit theologian calls a dead end. Is Balthasar's attempt to develop a 
rounder Christocentric approach successful? Has he taken the objections of Karl 
Barth seriously? Or has he glossed over quickly and carelessly the issues that Barth's 
theology have raised to develop the very kind of theology of correlation which Barth 
has so emphatically warn against? These questions can only be answered after looking 
121 O'Donaghue, `Beauty', 6. 
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at the revelation theology of the great Reformed theologian. This is the task of the 
next three chapters. 
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PART TWO 





THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD 
The purpose of this and the following two chapters is to examine Barth's 
concept of theological knowledge. This chapter seeks to examine the main 
presuppositions behind Barth's theological epistemology, and his rejection of natural 
theology. Chapter V discusses Barth's revelation theology and the place of faith and 
reason in the knowledge of God. The final chapter in this part, Chapter VI, deals with 
the limits of man's knowledge of God in Barth's theology. As we shall see, though 
man's knowledge of God is limited, this limitation does not, for Barth, imply that it 
is therefore uncertain. Barth argues for the veracity of our knowledge of God. In this 
chapter we also see how Barth's theological anthropology shapes and determines his 
epistemology. We end our study of Barth by looking at his understanding of the 
nature of theology. We trace this understanding through Barth's study of Anselm, the 
eleventh century theologian to whom Barth is very much indebted. 
1. Man Before God 
Barth begins his discussion by arguing the thesis that the knowledge of God 
is the basic presupposition behind our articulation of God. He therefore begins not 
with the question `whether God is knowable' but with the fact that Christians speak 
about God and that God is actually known in the Church through his Word. 
Discussion of the knowledge of God, then, begins with its own actuality and reality. ' 
'CDII/1,2-4. 
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The question whether God can be known is posed in abstracto, a priori. It 
presupposes that there is a standpoint and a criterion that is outside our real 
1 
knowledge of God from which we can judge its possibility and its reality. Barth 
maintains that this pre-supposition is erroneous: our question about the knowability 
of God can only be asked in concreto, a posteriori. Hence the proper question to ask 
is not `whether God is knowable' but `how far, i. e., to what extent is God 
knowable'. '- Epistemology is not the prologomena to theology. Rather, theological 
epistemology is located within theology proper, that is, within the doctrine of God 
itself. ' Thus the problem of the knowledge of God can only be solved in virtue of the 
knowledge of God. ' Put differently, the knowledge of God must be considered 
inwardly on the basis of the Word of God and not outwardly to the exclusion of the 
Word. Barth's theory therefore stands formally among other human theories of 
knowledge, but materially his theory is exclusive. It postulates the outward problem 
of the knowledge of God as impossible. ' 
The object of our knowledge of God is given a priori, in the Word of God' 
and nowhere else. ' Since God is the God of the Bible, Barth reasons, a knowledge 
of God that is based upon other determinants is impossible and therefore untrue. ' 
2 CD 11/1,4-5,29-30,63,65,242-243. 
3 CD 11/ 1,233. 
CD IPI, 30; Cf., 170-1. 
CD 11/ 1,30; Cf., 259-72. 
6 CD II/l, 7,32. 
7 CD II/l, 224,226. 
" CD II/1,7, Cf., 26-7,207. 
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Reason alone cannot succeed in coming to the knowledge of God. ' The force of this 
argument is perhaps felt best only if we listen to Barth's own words, `Because it is 
bound to God's Word given to the Church, the knowledge of God with which we are 
concerned is bound to the God who in His Word gives Himself to the Church to be 
known as God. Bound in this way it is true knowledge of the true God'. 10 Two 
conclusions follow. Firstly, the knowledge of God which is found in the constraints 
of the Word cannot be attacked; it is without anxiety and doubt. Barth's displeasure 
with apologetics is well known. And secondly, the natural knowledge of God, with 
its uncertainties and anxieties, cannot be a true knowledge of God. We cannot come 
to the knowledge of God by experimentation and discovery, but only from it by the 
work of God's grace. " 
The transcendent God who is the object of our knowledge makes himself 
accessible to man through revelation. This revelation is mediated and so man's 
knowledge of God is mediated knowledge. The knowledge of God then is two-fold. 
Firstly, in his Word God becomes the object to man the subject, and secondly, by his 
Holy Spirit he makes this subject accessible to him. 12 In this way Barth distinguishes 
his theory from all forms of pantheism which tend to unite object and subject. t3 In 
similar vein Barth warns against the mysticism and subjectivism in the Augustinian 
sense of the Confessions (IX. 10) where the so-called via negativa reigns and the 
9 CD II/1,6-7. 
'o CD II/1,7. 
" CD Il /1,8-9. 
'2 CD II/1,9-10. 
13 CD II/l, 9-10. 
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objectivity of God is undermined. 14 
God in his objectivity is known by man solely by faith, which Barth defines 
as `the total positive relationship of man to the God who gives himself to be known 
in His Word'. ` Faith is `man's turning to God', man's `Yes' to God, but this 
turning is entirely grounded in the fact that God demands that he do so in his Word; 
it is the work of grace. 16 Trust, love and obedience to God are all determinants of 
total faith. " Knowledge of God is included in faith since it is an orientation to God 
as object. " Barth is careful to emphasise the importance of the objectivity of God 
in view of the modern abrogation of the theological concept of faith which reduces 
it to a mere religious desire in man. Without God as its object, Barth maintains, faith 
is nothing. 19 
Although God in as far as he is the object of our knowledge has a genuine 
objectivity like all other objects, his objectivity is in a sense different (because he is 
`Wholly Other'). So is our knowledge of God different from our knowledge of 
natural objects. `Knowledge of faith means fundamentally the union of man with the 
God who is distinct from him as well as from all his other objects. For this very 
reason this knowledge becomes and is a special knowledge distinct from the 
" CD II/I, 10_11. 
CD II/1,12. 
CD II/I, 12. 
17 CD II/1,12. 
'B Dogmatics in Outline (London: SCM, 1988), 22-7. In this sense Barth's 
understanding of faith differs from that of Kierkegaard. The latter would not equate 
faith with knowledge. 
'v CD II/1,13-14. 
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knowledge of all other objects, outstanding in the range of all knowledge'. 20 
Similarly, though God is also known as the object of our intuition (Anschauung) and 
concept (Begrif, ), our knowledge of him differs from that of a common thing in that 
our knowledge of the former is horizontal and the latter vertical. 2' 
Barth distinguishes the primary objectivity of God, which is God as he knows 
himself, from the secondary objectivity of God, which refers to God as he is known 
to us through his revelation. The first kind of knowledge is immediate, and the second 
is mediate. The latter is based on the former; indeed the latter is made possible and 
constituted by former. -Z However, the fact that man can know God only mediately, 
namely, through his clothed objectivity, does not mean that our knowledge of God is 
not real or true. Because God is true and trustworthy, our secondary knowledge of 
him in revelation does not lead us into error. ' The knowledge of faith is always 
indirect knowledge since it is the objective knowledge of God through his special 
works which are the garments of his objectivity. Faith is satisfied with this veiled 
objectivity. Unbelief, however, not contented with this, tries in vain to venture beyond 
the parameter. 24 In his emphasis that man's knowledge of God is indirect, Barth is 
consistent not only with the older Reformed theologians but with Luther himself who 
stresses that in our knowledge of God, we are not to concern ourselves with the nuda 
essentia or natura of God, but with the velmnen, the volucra, the cena species, and 
20 CD II/1,15. 
2'CDII/1,8. 
22 CD 11/1,15-6, Cf., 19-20,26,51-52,205-206. 
23 CD II/1,16,49. 
24 CD I1/ 1,17-8. 
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the larvae of his works. 
The problem here concerns what Barth means when he says that our 
knowledge has the same content with God's self knowledge. The secondary objectivity 
of God, Barth explains, is `the objectivity which He has for us too in His revelation, 
in which He gives Himself to be known by us as He knows Himself'. `It is 
distinguished from the primary objectivity', he continues, `not by a lesser degree of 
truth, but by its particular form suitable for us, the creature'. 25 Though Barth is 
careful to distinguish between primary and secondary objectivity, he appears to have 
obliterated the difference between what the older theologians call the archetypal and 
ectypal knowledge of God. The former is the knowledge of God in himself, and the 
latter man's knowledge of God in his revelation. The ectypal knowledge of God is 
therefore that segment of the archetypal knowledge of God which he wishes man to 
know. It is conveyed in special revelation and constitutes the datum of theology. Barth 
appears to be saying here that our knowledge of God, indirect as it is, is nonetheless 
similar to God's knowledge of himself, i. e., his archetypal knowledge. 
The knowledge of faith is a double-sided phenomenon. On the one hand it is 
like any other knowledge because it too has an object. But on the other hand, it is 
dissimilar to any other knowledge because its object is unique. It is because of this 
difference that we are to understand that the knowledge of faith must stem from the 
position of grace. It is a `given' in that God posits himself as the object. 26 Thus the 
material object-signs through which God chooses to reveal himself cannot be used as 
a kind of atlas of revelation as if we can `survey and master God from some sort of 
25 CD 11/1,16. 
26 CD 11/1,22. 
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humanly logical, ethical or religious precedence'. '-' Human logic, ethics and religion 
can only produce demons and dead gods. 28 God enables us to know him. This 
knowledge is not abstract but concrete, imparted to us by the free activity of God, 
which is grace. 
The knowledge of faith which is the knowledge of God is in essence obedience 
to God. Obedience is defined as an `act of human decision corresponding to the act 
of the divine being as the Living Lord; corresponding to the act of grace in which 
faith is grounded and continually again grounded in God'. 29 Prayer as the `essentially 
necessary determination of the knowledge of God' has a central place in his 
theological epistemology. Prayer, and through it obedience, prevents us from falling 
into what he calls the trappings of over-objectification, i. e., `a disinterested non- 
obedient consideration which holds back in a place which it thinks secure'. Prayer 
opens us to grace, without which there can be no knowledge of God. Barth also 
speaks of a Biblical cycle outside of which there can be no knowledge of God. 
The will of God offers itself as good will towards man and is met by 
faith. Man with his will yields and becomes submissive to the will of 
God. Faith becomes the determination of his existence and therefore 
obedience. And in this way the knowledge of God takes place. 
According to the Bible, there is no knowledge of-God outside this 
cycle. 3o 
27 CD II/l, 23. 
'8 CD 11/1,22,23,27. 
2' CD 11/1,26. 
'° CD 11/1,29. 
134 
2. God Before Man 
In the previous section we saw that Barth's understanding of the knowledge 
of God is developed on the basis that man, as a knowing subject, stands before God 
who is the Object of man's knowledge. We saw that this act is made possible by the 
grace of God bestowed upon man. Thus the act of `man before God' is necessarily 
preceded by the first and therefore primary act of `God before man'. `Knowledge of 
God comes into force as the knowledge of faith by God awakening man to faith; in 
and by his showing Himself to man as his object; and in and by His opening man's 
eyes to see God Himself in his objectivity'. 3' This, as we'saw above, implies that 
theological epistemology is an essential aspect of theology and cannot be seen as an 
independent prologomenon. 
The question, `Who then is this God who awakens man to faith? ' must be 
addressed here. God, Barth asserts, is he whom we may (dürfen) love above all 
things. This obligation has the character of a permission, a liberation and an 
authorization (Erlaubnis, Befreiung, Autorisienung). This obligation has a three-fold 
implication: (l) that God is worthy of our love above all things and we cannot be 
disappointed loving him; (2) that God lets us know him in such a way as to open to 
us the possibility of loving him; and (3) that God effects in us a willingness to love 
him. Thus, this love involves the whole of our existence, it evokes within us a 
3 response to God's invitation. - 
Secondly, God is he whom we must fear above all things. This fear is not the 
same as that which perfect love casts out. In fact, this fear, Barth explains, is based 
" CD 11/1,31. 
CD 11/1,33. 
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upon our duty to love God. 33 It is therefore absolutely indispensable. For without it, 
there is no faith, no trust, and no obedience. God is he whom we must fear above all 
things. This `must' means that (1) God himself is in fact the one to be feared, so that 
there is really no escape from him; (2) he wills for us to fear him giving us the 
motives and grounds for so doing; and (3) he opens our eyes and ears to the reality 
that he is to be feared. The essence of this fear is that of extinction, not punishment. 
This is the real meaning of fear. Barth is here accused of adopting an existentialist 
concept of fear that is generally found in Jaspers and Satre but specifically in 
Kierkegaard. 34 Barth maintains that our failure to use our given freedom to love and 
fear God could only lead to our total destruction. 35 
The fact that our knowledge of God is of the existence of him whom we must 
fear above all things because we may love him above all things means that this 
knowledge is realised in our obedience to God. This obedience should be childlike, 
not slavish, seeing; not blind, free, and not coerced. 36 From his study of the New 
Testament, 37 Barth concludes that the relationship between faith and obedience must 
not be understood in such a way that obedience is seen either as a replacement or 
completion of the concept of faith, or even as something incidental happening 
alongside faith. Faith must be understood as obedience. 33 The knowledge of God that 
" CD"II11,34. 
'4 See Matczak, Karl Barth on God (London: St Paul's Publications, 1962), 58. 
35 CD II/l, 34-35. 
36 CD II/1,36. 
" E. g. Rom. 1: 5; 6: 17; 16: 5; Acts 6: 7; 2 Thess 1: 8; Phil. 2: 12; 1 Pet 1: 1-2,14. 
11 CD II/ 1,37-8. 
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springs from this love is true simply because it is from God. 
In love we are set on the circular course in which there is no break, in 
which we can and shall only go further - from faith to faith, from 
knowledge to knowledge - never beginning with ourselves (and that 
means, with our own ability for faith and knowledge) but therefore also 
never ending with ourselves (and that means, with our own inability 
for faith and knowledge). " 
We move on to the second pair of concepts, mystery and clarity. Mystery 
corresponds to the fear of God while clarity corresponds to his love. The two 
concepts mystery and clarity can only be resolved in revelation. Just as fear is 
accompanied, determined and limited by the love of God, so is mystery accompanied, 
determined and limited by the clarity of God in his revelation. Barth maintains that 
this clarity and certainty can only come from God. If it is acquired through some 
other means, then our knowledge would not be the knowledge of God since, as we 
have seen earlier, the content of our knowledge must be identical with that of God's 
knowledge of himself. The following statement helps us to see Barth's point quite 
clearly. 
The acknowledgement of the fact that revelation has taken place is 
faith, and the knowledge with which the revelation that has taken place 
begins is the knowledge of faith. And for the knowledge of faith, the 
existence of God is the problem already solved in and by the clarity 
and certainty of the existence of God Himself in His revelation. ' 
By so stressing the indispensability of supernatural faith in our knowledge of God, 
Barth stands in direct contradiction with Thomistic and Catholic theology according 
to which faith completes natural cognition and does not contradict reason. ' For this 
- CD II/l, 37-8. 
40 CD 11/1.40. 
°' Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I. 3-8. 
137 
reason, some critics have reacted adversely to Barth's so-called wholesale rejection 
of the use of reason. Others attempted to point to an inconsistency in his method 
arguing that while on the one hand Barth resorts to a kind of fideism, on the other 
hand he uses reason more than faith in the actual outworking of his system. 4- But 
surely this is a misinterpretation of Barth's intentions and purposes and a blurring of 
the distinctive ways in which reason is used. Barth is indeed a rational theologian" - 
his whole project is an attempt to formulate 'proof' n the Anselmian sense from 
revelation. In his rejection of the power of reason to appropriate the true knowledge 
of God independently, Barth is echoing the teaching of the older Reformed 
Dogmaticians. ' Reason in Barth has only an instrumental, not magisterial, function 
(usus instnanentalis, non uses »nagisterialis). The certitude of our knowledge of God 
is the knowledge of faith. So important was it for Barth that this certitude and clarity 
of our knowledge of God be emphasised that he went on to assert that in the light of 
the existence of God, our own existence is less evident to us. " 
Because God is known to us in clarity and certainty, he also remains a mystery 
to us. `Mystery' means that God is and remains the One whom we know only because 
he gives himself to be known. Thus the ineffability of God stems from the fact that 
the knowledge of God in clarity and certainty is made possible by him in his self- 
°' Robert Crawford, `The Theological Method of Karl Barth', SJT, 25 (1972), 
331-2. 
43 See Colin Gunton, Becoming and Being (Oxford: OUP, 1978), 218. 
" For example Quenstedt wrote, `Human or natural reason is not the source of 
theology and supernatural things' (Doctrin. Theol., I, 38); quoted by Theodore 
Mueller, Christian Dogmatics (St Louis: Concordia, 1934), 16. 
 CD II/I, 39. 
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disclosure; its actuality and therefore its possibility is due to his permission. In other 
words, the possibility of this knowledge constitutes the divine power (Macht), the 
actuality of it (Tatsächlichkeit) is the actuality of the divine will and decision (seines 
Willens und Beschlusses), and the consequence of the process of this knowledge is 
ultimately the deliberate arrangement (AnordVung) of the divine wisdom (Weisheit). " 
`Mystery' means that God can only be known in his own light: `... we can gather all 
that has to be said about the fulfilment of the knowledge of God in the final statement 
that God is known through God and through God alone'. 47 In this way God is 
sovereign: He permits us this knowledge of him. Either we know him as Master or 
we do not know him at all. " Man the creature, in and by himself, has no ability to 
grasp God at all. 
Barth asserts that God, in his sovereignty, knows how to act on man in an 
objective and cogent way. 49 In the light of this Barth is in opposition to the 
Schleiermacherian theology of `religious experience', accusing it of subjectivism and 
a pre-occupation with experiences and emotions rather than God's truth as it is 
revealed in his Word. 50 The question here is, could Barth's theory escape from 
' CD II/1,40. Cf., Dogmatik II/1,43. 
" CD 11/1,44. 
49 CD II/1,45. 
41 CD 1I/1,47. 
" CD II/1,73-4. For Barth, what Schleiermacher and the Protestant theology that 
followed regarded as an important subject, i. e., the pre-occupation with the religious 
man and his piety, the Reformers did not regard as important at all. It is 
understandable then that when Barth traced his spiritual ancestry from Kierkegaard 
through to Luther and Calvin and to Paul and Jeremiah, he added significantly that 
`it does not include Schleiermacher'. Cf., John McConnachie, The Significance of 
Karl Barth (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931), 72. 
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subjectivism? The knowledge of God, according to Barth, comes to us through God's 
revelation. But how do we know that we are subjects of God's special revelation? It 
does seem to us that Barth cannot answer this question without appealing to personal 
conviction, even if this is seen in the larger context of community. 
Barth proceeds to argue that our knowledge of God, which is based on his 
revelation, is the result of his activity as Trinity. The knowledge of God is possible 
only because God truly knows himself; he stands before himself. `This occurrence in 
God himself is the essence and strength of our knowledge of God'. ` The reality and 
the actuality of our knowledge of God proceeds from the reality and actuality of 
God's self-knowledge. Though derived and therefore secondary, our knowledge of 
God is the consequence of `the fact that knowledge of God is real as God's own 
hidden work in his being as the triune God from eternity to eternity'. 52 
The veiled objectivity of God's self-disclosure to us in the creaturely realm, 
discussed summarily in the last section, must be reiterated again at this juncture. The 
following passage gives a succinct elucidation of what might be called Barth's 
`sacramental' understanding of revelation. 
But God gives Himself to be known - and this is the limitation that we 
have to bring out in the idea of impartation - in an objectivity different 
fron his own, in a creature! y objectivity. He unveils Himself as the 
One He is by veiling Himself in afonn He Himself is not. He uses this 
form distinct from Himself, He uses its work and sign, in order to be 
objective in, with and under this form, and therefore to give Himself 
to be known. Revelation means the giving of signs. We can say quite 
simply that revelation means sacrament, i. e., the self-witness of God, 
the representation of His truth, and therefore the truth in which He 
knows Himself, in the form of creaturely objectivity and therefore in 
s' CD II/ 1,49. 
s' CD 11/ 1,50. 
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the form which is adapted to our creaturely knowledge. 53 (Italics 
mine). 
Barth's insistence that the modalities of revelation which at once reveals and obscures 
can lead us to a theologica archetypa caused him to draw a further conclusion that 
either God is known to us in his entirety or he is not known at all. ' Further 
knowledge of God is indeed possible, but it cannot be conceived as quantitative 
knowledge: `a further knowledge of God will only lead us deeper into just this 
entirety of His being'. 55 This position in a sense forces Barth to take the Triune God 
as the only possible point of departure for the knowledge of God. S6 The difficulty 
with this line of argument, however, comes to the fore when we consider the 
knowledge of God in the Old Testament. Barth argues that the concept of the Trinity 
is incipient in the Old Testament. But the point is that if the idea of the Trinity is not 
fully present in the Old Testament, what are we to make of the knowledge of God of 
the patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament? If we were to push Barth's point 
to its most logical conclusion, we would have to say that the prophets of the Old 
Testament had no real knowledge of God at all, since for Barth, God must be known 
in his entirety or he is not known at all. But if we grant that the prophets' knowledge 
of God is indeed authentic, albeit incomplete and preparatory, then we are led to the 
conclusion contrary to Barth that the idea of the one God who is the supreme and 
5' CD I1/1,52. 
u CD II/I, 51. 
- CD II/1,52. 
Cf., CD II/1,49. Barth's trinitarian theology however began as early as his 
Göttingen days. Thus in his Göttingen Dogmatics he could already write that he 
regarded `the doctrine of the Trinity as the true centre of the concept of revelation' 
(131). 
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unique Being is indeed valid, and that the concept of God as Trinity does not 
contradict the fundamental notion that God is One, Unique and Supreme Being. 
Before we conclude this section, we need to consider two more points in 
Barth's argument. The first has to do with Barth's contention that God in his 
revelation is recognised as the `Thou'. God knows himself as the `I', as the object and 
subject in itself and for itself. We know him differently in that we know him only 
through his revelation as something different from us. Hence we know him as `Thou' 
only indirectly albeit truly and really. Our knowledge of God as `Thou' and our 
knowledge of human persons also differs' We recognise others by applying to them, 
by analogy, our own self-knowledge. We cannot do this with God since as creatures 
we depend entirely upon him for our being. 58 Barth is thus in opposition to the 
Catholic notion of the analogy of being which establishes some similarity between 
Creator and creature. Our knowledge of God cannot be approached from 
anthropology but must begin with the analysis of God himself. Jesus Christ, then, is 
the concrete being through whom we recognise God as `Thou'. Through him the 
reciprocity between God and man is created. 59 Our second point is regarding Barth's 
understanding that our knowledge of God is temporal, imperfect and progressive. As 
such it differs from God's self-knowledge which `happens at a stroke and once and 
for all in the same perfection from eternity to eternity'. 60 Our knowledge of God is 
57 CD II/l, 58-59. 
- CD 11/1,59. 
sv CD II/I, 60-61. 
" CD 11/1,61. 
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therefore attained in time and by repetition (zeitlich und wiederholungsbedürfiig). 61 
Moreover this repetition does not depend on us but on God alone. Our knowledge of 
God is from God and is effected by God and God alone. That God is `ready' to 
bestow man this knowledge is the subject of our next section. 
3. The Readiness of God 
Having completed his exploration of the `knowledge of God in its fulfilment', 
Barth now focuses his attention on its possibility and basis. For Barth, this is the only 
correct approach. The subject must be considered by way of descent, starting from 
the fact that we do know God. It thus begins a priori from God. The alternative 
approach, namely the way of ascent is for Barth `grasping', `self-autonomous' and 
`untheological'. 62 
The possibility of man's knowledge of God, must be considered from two 
aspects. The first is from the perspective of God's readiness. This, as we shall see, 
is absolutely vital and primary. `The superordinate, and therefore in the last resort not 
only the superordinate but the only readiness which we have to understand and explain 
as the knowability of God, is the readiness that is grounded in the nature and activity, 
11 CD II/1,62. Cf. Dogmatik II/1,67. 
62 CD II/l, 63-64. Barth's theology of religion is well known. He sees religion as 
unbelief being the concern of godless man. In religion we `lock the door against God, 
we alienate ourselves from Him, we come into direct opposition to him' (CD 1/2, 
309). Unlike Balthasar who understood Christ as the fulfilment of the religious 
longings of man, Barth argues that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ contradicts 
and displaces human religion. `Jesus Christ does not fill out and improve all the 
different attempts of man to think of God and to represent Him according to his own 
standard. But as the self-ordaining and self-manifestation of God He replaces and 
completely outbids those attempts, putting them in the shadows to which they belong' 
(CD 1/2,308). 
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the being and existence of God. He is the Lord of the event which we call the 
knowledge of God. He is also the substance of the possibility (Inb, ý; grifj`' der 
en en 
Möglichkeit), presuppositions (Voraussetzung, and conditions (Bedingung, of this 
event'. ` The second is from the perspective of man's readiness. This too is 
important, for without the readiness on the part of man, the knowledge of God cannot 
be actualised. 
In other words the readiness of God is rooted in his essence (Wesen) and his 
action (Handeln). The possibility of the knowledge of God is the function of the 
readiness of God. 65 Consequently, human readiness is really not self-supporting or 
autonomous, but is rooted in God's readiness. There can ultimately be only one 
readiness - the readiness of God. Human readiness consists of his willingness to be 
grateful and obedient. ' The real man is he who stands before God. 
Barth again begins with God himself. As we have seen, for Barth, the 
knowledge of God is only possible because God knows himself. 67 God is Truth; he 
is the Truth and not only a truth. Truth means the unhiddenness (Unverborgenheit) 
of God. The essence of all truth lies in the fact that God is open to himself in his 
Trinitarian relationship. But this does not mean that all created beings which are open 
to God can therefore participate in the truth of God. Neither can it be argued that 
63 CD 11/1,67. 
' CD II/ 1,65-66. 
6s See Otto Weber, Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1953), 76. 
MCDII/1,66. 
67 CD 11/1,67-68. 
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since all created things are open to us, we can therefore reach God. Barth rejects this 
salient feature in scholastic theology by emphasising the yawning gulf that separates 
man from God. God is known only when he offers his openness to fallen man through 
his revelation. 68 There can be no analogy whatsoever between man and God. That 
is to say, there can be no analogy on the basis of which the nature and being of God 
as the Lord can be accessible to us. Human notions about lordship can only hinder 
us from understanding the lordship of God. This can be understood only through 
revelation. 69 There can be no analogy on the basis of which the nature of God as 
Creator can be accessible to us. Our attempt to contemplate this from below, i. e., 
from the cosmos, could only lead to futility and will in the end make God the Creator 
superfluous. There can be no analogy on the basis of which God the Reconciler and 
Redeemer can be accessible to us. Though we have witnessed many reconciliations, 
the act of God when he makes peace with the world is very different. Similarly 
redemption `does not mean that the world and we ourselves within it evolve in this 
or that direction. It means that Jesus Christ is coming again. Redemption means the 
resurrection of the flesh. It means eternal life as deliverance from eternal death'. 70 
All this we can know only through God's revelation. 
Man does not have the power to control God's revelation: `God's revelation 
is not in our power, and therefore not at our command. God's revelation takes place 
among us and for us, in the sphere of our experience and our thinking'. " Truth is 
ýR CD II/ 1,68,199,228-229. 
69 CD II/1,75-76. 
70 CD 11/1,78. 
"CDII/1,69. 
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God's truth and as such it is effected by God himself from outside man. '= The 
criterion then, is grace and not the intelligibility of the object or the evidentia 
objectiva. " Here Barth differs from Balthasar who seems to suggest, albeit ever so 
cautiously, that the form has the ability to impress upon the beholder its evidential 
beauty of the form. 74 
The polemic of Barth is self-evident at this point. He wages war against the 
theological epistemologies that have arisen in the philosophy and theology of the 18th 
and 19th centuries. Against the anthropocentrisms of those who postulate that the 
revelation of God can be found in the exercise of man's practical reason (Kant), who 
locate God's revelation in and through man's immediate experience or religious 
consciousness (Schleiermacher), who teach that the impersonal absolute spirit became 
self-conscious (and in this way personal) in man (Hegel), who subjugate theology to 
anthropology (Feuerbach), and who claim that the idea of God was innate in man 
(Ritschl), Barth champions the theocentrism of the Reformers with a view of inflicting 
a mortal wound to the titanism of his day. 75 He beckons theologians not to yield to 
the temptation to follow the footsteps of these thinkers. By abstaining from the 
" Here as in many other aspects of Barth's thought, the influence of Kierkegaard 
shines brilliantly. 
" CD 1111,12,15,16,69,240-1; I/1,5-13,47ff. See also Otto Weber, Karl 
Barth's Church Dogmatics, 16-17,20-21,76,80-81. 
11 See Chapter 2 above. 
75 See J. McConnachie, The Significance of Karl Barth, especially chapters II `A 
Bomb on the Playground of the Theologians' and IV `Barth as a Witness to the Word 
of God'; Philip Almond, `Karl Barth and Anthropocentric Theology', SJT31 0 435- 
447, and T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian 
(Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1990), especially chapter 2, `The Intellectual Context of 
Barth's Thought', 27ff. 
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encroachment from our side, we become aware of the encroachment that comes from 
f 
God, which is the act of grace. It is this grace alone, which Barth defines as `the 
majesty, the freedom, the undeservedness, the unexpectedness, the newness, the 
arbitrariness, in which the relationship to God and therefore the possibility of knowing 
him is opened up to man by God himself', " that enables us to come to the 
knowledge of God. This grace is God's good pleasure. Hence Barth could write quite 
unqualifiably that `God's good pleasure is his knowability'; in it we have the certainty 
of the true knowledge of God. " 
4. The Readiness of Man 
Simply put, the readiness of man is the dependence and openness of the 
creature upon the Creator. This readiness cannot be seen as an independent factor (as 
in Natural Theology) alongside God's readiness as if it has, in itself, powers of its 
own. Rather the readiness of man is delimited by the readiness of God and subsequent 
to it. " In this way, the readiness of man must be understood as the readiness for 
grace. This readiness or openness is analysed by considering the difference between 
the need (Bedf i lichkeit), recognition (Erkenntnis) and willingness (Willigkeit) to 
accept the grace of God. Need has two aspects, the need of the knowledge of God, 
and the need for grace, without which there can be no knowledge. Recognition is the 
76 CD II/1,74. 
" CD II/l, 75. 
78 CD II/1,128-129. See also Otto Weber, Karl Bail/i's Church Dogmatics, 76-81. 
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knowledge of this need, and willingness is the disposition of man to respond to 
grace. 79 
For Barth all this becomes actual only by God's action. By himself man is 
unable to become aware of his need. He is closed to God. 
The deepest and most real need of man for the miracle of grace does 
not lie in the fact that he needs it objectively, and that he has objective 
need that it should come to him as grace, but in the fact that he is in 
a position to cover up and hide from himself this need of his, to be to 
himself, and - even if illusorily - to God also, not this needy man, but 
a rich man who can live without God's grace and who can even allot 
it to himself. 8° 
Barth attributes this closedness of man to sin. Man as sinner is `willing to live as a 
needy man', even in his greatest need he will `not be able to help feeling and 
behaving at some point as the rich man who knows very well how to come to terms 
with his need and therefore knows very well how to live otherwise than a real 
pauper'. " If we are to understand Barth's theological epistemology properly, we 
must first understand his theological anthropology, especially his concept of sin and 
its implications. `[W]e have to understand man better than he wants to understand 
himself: namely, as the man who is really entangled in guilt and really submerged in 
death; as the man who in one way or another is really filled with fear and despair'. $- 
Statements like this should be considered with all seriousness because in them we see 
the very crux of Barth's rejection of human autonomy and the way of natural 
theology. 
79 CD 1111,129-130. 
' CD II/1,130. 
" CD I1/1,131. 
X2 CD II/ 1,132. 
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Man is not at peace, but at war with grace. 83 Though he may come to 
understand grace, he will not embrace it. Theoretically he may acknowledge the 
necessity of grace, but practically he will reject it. Thus the openness to God and our 
readiness for him is totally lacking for `even our deepest reality is still separated by 
an abyss from our openness for God's grace and therefore from the knowability of 
God for us'. " Already we see how Balthasar parts company with Barth here. 
Balthasar no doubt agrees with Barth's emphasis on grace and the indispensability of 
God's revelation, but his understanding of nature and grace permits him to speak at 
least of a theological a priori in man where his openness, his `seeking after God' is 
given a more positive interpretation. Barth would be highly suspicious of such claims 
which to him would open the gateway to natural theology or is in fact natural 
theology masquerading in the language of grace. 
We must not make use of 'anthropological postulates when we attempt to 
provide a positive answer to the question regarding the readiness of man because 
though postulates of this kind can be formulated very accurately and precisely, they 
can be of no value in so far as their `presupposition and therefore the measure of their 
material determination is man: man who cannot simply be re-interpreted as though he 
were a friend of grace instead of an enemy ... '85 For Barth, the same can be said 
about the ecclesiological view point for even here the humanness of man cannot be 
" CD II/1,133. 
' CD 11/ 1,134. 
xs CD II/1,144. 
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undermined. ' Our question can be answered only from the view-point of 
Christology. 
Anthropological and ecclesiological assertions arise only as they are 
borrowed from Christology. That is to say, no anthropological or 
ecclesiological assertion is true in itself as such. Its truth subsists in the 
assertions in Christology, or rather in the reality of Jesus Christ alone 
... We can, therefore, anticipate the positive answer to our question by 
stating simply that the readiness of man included in the readiness of 
God is Jesus Christ. And therefore Jesus Christ is the knowability of 
God on our side, as he is the grace of God itself, and therefore also the 
knowability of God on God's side. " 
By starting with Christology, Barth is arguing that man's openness to God is 
transcendent to man and can therefore only be imparted to him from above. Truth is 
unattainable to man. It is transcendent and is realised only in Jesus Christ. 
`But who is this Jesus Christ that we must say this of Him, and can say it of 
Him only; and can say it of man and therefore of ourselves only as we first and 
properly say it of Him? '$$ Barth answers his own question by pointing to the fact 
that Jesus Christ is truly God and man; in him we meet with `the only begotten, 
unique and eternal Son of God, and therefore God Himself; and therefore always the 
One who is ready and open for God and to whom God is knowable'. 89 Here Barth 
weaves his theological epistemology with soteriology. Better, it is in the context of 
soteriology that a sound theological epistemology can be conceived. Emphasis is made 
on the vicarious and substitutionary nature of Jesus Christ. In Christ the whole of 
' CD II/1,142-145. Barth is here not considering the ecclesiological man in 
relationship with Christ as such, but rather only as a member of the human race. 
87 CD 1111,149-150. 
xx CD II/I, 150. 
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mankind can know God and through him participate in the archetypal knowledge of 
God. 90 Through his death and resurrection Christ gave new life to man who upon 
receiving it-becomes open to God in Christ. 
In him the enmity of. man against the grace of God is overcome, 
therefore man is no more outside, where God must be unknowable to 
him because he does not accept the grace in which God makes himself 
knowable to him. He is inside, where God is knowable to himself, the 
Father to the Son and the Son to the Father, where in the Son, 
therefore, God is also knowable to man. 9' 
This participation is a participation of faith in Christ. The life of faith is life in the 
Spirit of God. Faith precedes our intuitions and concepts. ' It bespeaks of a 
relationship with God through Christ and this in turn means that we have abandoned 
our standing for the `real standing in which we no longer stand on ourselves'. 93 
The closedness of man to God is not the final and proper thing to be said about 
man. The final and proper thing to be said about man is that `we have peace with God 
(Rom. 5: 11), and in this peace we stand in such a relationship to God that the 
knowability of God which he has bestowed upon us in His grace is received and 
accepted as such by us'. " This peace is found only in Jesus Christ. We must not 
look in any other direction: `our question is not answered at all if it is put and 
90 CD 11/1,153-154. 
" CD II/1,153. 
'- CD II/l, 201. 
' `We abandon it for a real standing in which we no longer stand on ourselves (on 
our moral and religious, or even our Christian state), and in which we obviously do 
not stand on our faith as such, but - now at last firmly and securely - on the ground 
of the truth of God and therefore on the ground of the reconciliation which has taken 
place in Jesus Christ and is confirmed by him to all eternity'. Cf. CD II/1,159. 
' CD 11/ 1,161. 
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answered with apodeictic certainty. But this certainty depends upon whether it is put 
and answered under the christological aspect of man, and under the christological 
aspect alone'. 95 
5. Natural Theology 
We come now to the most controversial aspects of Barth's thought, namely, 
his absolute rejection of natural theology. To be sure this rejection issued from years 
of intellectual struggle for Barth. His rejection of natural theology must be understood 
as a reaction to the movement in theology that had become so powerful and so 
blinding in his own day. It is the rejection of anthropocentric theology - the 
reductionism of theology into anthropology. His reaction can be clearly seen when he 
wrote the following about his former theological teachers: 
I suddenly realised that I could not any longer follow either their ethics 
and dogmatics or their understanding of the Bible and of history. For 
me at least, nineteenth century no longer held any future. ' 
Reflecting on this theme Philip Almond writes as follows: 
Barth, in rejecting the main trends of theology from Schleiermacher 
onwards and the earlier Kantian philosophy of religion, was rejecting 
every notion of the necessity of, or even the possibility of, the 
grounding of God since it was his conviction that German theology, in 
endeavouring to do this, had confused the truth of God with the truth 
of man. Barth's attack was directed against what he saw as its basic 
error - it had become anthropocentric theology. 97 
Barth was also fighting the battle on another front. Across the borders of his 
own ecclesiastical tradition Barth was also engaging with the natural theology of 
" CD II/1,162. 
96 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God (London: Fontana, 1971), 13. 
I Almond, `Karl Barth', 438. 
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Roman Catholicism. The Vatican's teaching on natural theology can be seen clearly 
in the following two statements. 
The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the origin 
and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the light of 
human reason from the things that he created; for since the creation of 
the world his invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood 
through the things that are made (Rom 1: 20). 98 
Canon 1: If anyone says that the one and true God, our creator and 
Lord, cannot be certainly known with the natural light of human reason 
by means of things that have been made: let him be anathema. " 
Barth rejects the above. To him the position of the Council smacks of heresy 
since it assumes that there can be a distinction between God as rerurn omninum 
principium et finis, i. e., God who can be known by man's natural power, and the 
Deus nosier, i. e., the God of the Bible who is really the true God. That is to say, the 
position of the Council suggests for Barth that there can be a distinction between the 
noetic God and the ontic God. Barth rejects this dissolution of the unity of God. God 
has to be known as he exists. " This argument is consistently maintained by Barth 
throughout his debate with natural theology. As we shall see, this is the fundamental 
premise which led Barth to reject not natural theology but general revelation as well. 
Closely connected to this is Barth's rejection of the Catholic doctrine of analogy, 
particularly the doctrine of the analogia entis. We have alluded to this problem earlier 
and will return to it later to discuss it at great length. For the purposes of the present 
discussion it is sufficient to say that this doctrine is anathema for Barth because it 
yx Cf. Denzinger, Endriridon Symbolorwn (Barcelona, 1946), np. 1785, Cf., no. 
1786; quoted by Matczak, Karl Banh on God, 221-222. 
I Cf., Denzinger, no. 1806, n. 1801. Quoted by Matczak, Ibid., 222. 
'()() CD 11/1,81-82; 83-84. 
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makes the difference between God and man quantitative and not qualitative. The 
doctrine also makes the knowledge of God possible independently of revelation and 
grace. '°' 
With this background in mind, we are now ready for a close examination of 
Barth's argument against natural theology. Barth's objections to natural theology are 
consistent with his theory of the knowledge of God. The reader will recall that Barth's 
theory begins with the actuality of this knowledge in the Church. It begins with God 
himself - the knowledge of God is possible only because God knows himself. '" God 
cannot be known apart from his self-disclosure and apart from the work of grace. 
Thus it is consistent for Barth to reject natural theology since his definition of it is 
`every (positive and negative) system which claims to be theological, i. e., to interpret 
divine revelation, whose subject however, differs fundamentally from the revelation 
in Jesus Christ and whose methods therefore differ equally from the exposition of 
Holy Scripture'. 103 Natural theology cannot be considered as a preparation for the 
gospel; the natural knowledge of God has led man to create God in his own image. 
Its anthropocentrism leads to a dead-end in which all talk about God is idolatrous. 
Denial of natural theology involves therefore nothing less than self-abnegation. `It 
involves self-denial to deny the basic idea of all natural theology, no matter whether 
it has been explicitly evolved and developed or not'. 143 Furthermore, for Barth, all 
101 CD IM, 188,243. 
I'- CD II/1,67-68. 
"" Quoted by Robert Crawford, The Theological Method of Karl Barth', SJT 25 
(1972), 320. 
"" CD 11/1,136. 
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forms of natural theology are attempts to `domesticate' God in the service of human 
interest. 105 
Underlining Barth's theory of the knowledge of God and consequently his 
rejection of natural theology is the basic theological assumption that God's noetic 
absoluteness is based on his ontic absoluteness. In other words, because of God's 
ontic absoluteness, his noetic absoluteness is `inevitable'. 106 By ontic absoluteness 
is meant the absolute uniqueness of God's being, and by noetic absoluteness Barth 
postulates that all genuine knowledge of God derives from revelation: knowledge is 
not only initiated but controlled by God. 1 ' Thus true knowledge of God is attributed 
solely to the being and action of God himself. 1°8 In the ontological mode this means 
that if God is the one absolute being then it is necessarily impossible for creatures to 
know him by their own rational powers alone. Epistemologically it means that if we 
do in fact possess an adequate concept of God, and Barth assumes this, then these 
concepts cannot have been framed by our own rational powers alone. 109 
105 For example through Schleiermacher European Christianity is totally absorbed 
and assimilated to the bourgeois culture of his time until it only appears as a 
manifestation of that culture. Cf. T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and 
Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 2. 
"*' Cf., CD II/1,310-311. Especially 311: `Behind this noetic absoluteness of God 
there stands decisively his ontic. This is decisive because in God's revelation it is 
really a question of His ontic absoluteness, from which his noetic absoluteness 
inevitably follows'. 
107 CD II/1,23. 
"' CD 11/1,63. 
" Robert Brown has argued that the statement that God's noetic absoluteness 
derives from his ontic absoluteness appears to be a non sequitur. But this is only true 
if the concept of the analogic entis is admitted into the scheme, Thus from the 
perspective of the analogy of being, which Brown defines as a theological method in 
which theology is done `as an adjunct to ontology, so that one envisages God as a 
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This is why the theological epistemology that is laid out in Thomistic 
philosophy is an impossible venture for Karl Barth. The realism of Thomistic 
philosophy starts from the creature. It argues that by unaided reason we can know 
God as the first mover, the supreme and absolute being. God therefore is the being 
who contains all the perfections found in creatures but in an infinitely more perfect 
way. 1° Revelation would supply the rest. "' The knowledge of the Triune God 
that comes only by revelation does not however contradict the knowledge of God 
attained by reason. Thomistic philosophy does not doubt, as Barth does, that the God 
of reason, that is, the `first cause', `prime mover', is actually the true God. "' While 
the content of revelation is ultimately known by faith, reason can indeed lead us to 
a knowledge of the possibility and fact of God's revelation. "' Balthasar's attempt 
to baptise this whole approach in the name of grace would appear highly suspect for 
Barth. His attempt to rename the religious a priori appeacsto be nothing other than 
being, albeit the highest one, within the hierarchical series of beings. Such a God 
would be cognisable according to the same categories applicable to creatures and 
thereby would be accessible also via nature and not exclusively via grace'. Cf. `On 
God's ontic and noetic absoluteness: A Critique of Barth', SJT 33,541. On the basis 
of this Brown could say that theologians like Nicholas of Cusa, Aquinas and Tillich 
have no difficulties with an approach `from below' as it were. But Barth considers the 
whole concept of the analogy of being and the corresponding theological method as 
anathema. For him to speak of the ontic absoluteness of God is to pronounce the 
Catholic notion of analogy totally inadmissible since it suggests that the difference 
between God and creatures is only one of degree. Furthermore, even if the analogia 
entis is allowed as a valid way of describing reality, it does not mean that the 
objective reality automatically imply the subjective perception and knowledge of that 
reality. Do we not have here a non sequitur? 
ST I. q. 2, a. 2-3; q. 13. a. 2; C. Gent. I. c. 13-14,30, III. c. 38-40. 
ST. I. q. 32, a. 1.12, a. 4, et. 12. I. q. 39a. 7. 
"'- ST. I. q. 2. Heroical. q. 3-4,12; C. Gent. I. c. 10-14,29,36. 
"' ST. II. 11. q. 2, a. 4; C Gent. c. 7; III. c. 98-100. 
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another form of a theologia naturalis. 
In a similar vein, Barth objects to the Roman Catholic principle of causality. 
We shall see the force of this objection when we look at the problem of analogy. The 
point to be made at this juncture is that Barth's objection is based on his 
understanding of the ontic and noetic absoluteness of God, which makes it impossible 
for the relationship between God and the world to be reversed. Scholastic theology 
affirms that God is a totally different being, i. e., he is ipsum esse subsistens, whereas 
finite beings are dependent and composed. Still there is this creational relationship 
('cause' and '`create' are used interchangeably) between God and his creation. To be 
sure Barth does not deny this relationship and is most willing to speak of an analogia 
relationis, his objection lies in the principle of causality which warrants the 
application of the perfections of the creature via afnnationis to God even though it 
is elevated to an infinite grade, i. e., via supereminentiae. This is impossible simply 
because we do not know God. Natural knowledge deals with the given; God is non- 
given. Furthermore this procedure results in abstractions which Barth rejects. For him 
the relationship with God cannot be obtained by abstraction but only through the 
concrete action of God. The knowledge of God is possible only through the action of 
God. Natural theology as `the attempt of man to answer the riddle of his own 
existence and of that of the world, and in that way to master himself and the world' 
is not only doomed to failure but is positively dangerous as it leads man to a false 
god, an idol, and not to the knowledge of the real God. "' More about this later. 
For the moment we must turn to other concerns. 
Might it not be argued that there are at least some `justification' for natural 
114 CD II/1,85,87-88. 
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theology from the pedagogic and pastoral standpoints? Could there not be a case for 
natural theology when we look at the matter from the standpoint of Tillich's 
apologetic theology or Brunner's `eristics'? Could natural theology not provide that 
proverbial common ground, the basis of conversation between the Church and the 
world? Barth answers in the negative and has no qualms whatsoever about calling 
such intentions and procedures 'childish'. "' There can be no preambulae fidel. The 
knowledge of such gods in its diversity cannot provide a preparation for the 
knowledge of the real God. For Barth any such attempt would not only lead us to the 
Roman Catholic dissolution of the unity of God but also an abstract consideration of 
his being. `The establishment of the knowledge of the one god or all the gods in 
question cannot, therefore, be advertised as a preliminary step towards the 
establishment of the knowability of the real God'. "' Preparation for faith must 
depend exclusively on God. "' Barth argues that if natural theology can bring man 
to a knowledge of God, then it can also lead man to salvation since for Barth faith and 
knowledge of God are identified with salvation. "' Aware that some scholars have 
interpreted Anselm as an apologist, Barth explains that Anselm's method cannot be 
understood as `apologetics' in the modern sense. `Since he believes (i. e. the Creed), 
he wants to know it and prove it'. He therefore concludes that Anselm `is not the 
right man to appeal to as the patron saint of natural theology'. "' But the question 
"s CD II/1,88-89. 
16CDII/I, 91. 
"' CD II/1,91. 
"R CD 11/ 1,90,92-93. 
 CD 11/1,92-93,184,190-191,195,305. 
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remains: How then can a Christian talk to an unbeliever, the Church to the world, 
faith to unbelief? Barth answers: 
If we are going to address this other person from faith with any 
prospect of being heard by him, then we must say to him what we 
have to say to him out of faith. He can then come to grips with it, and 
it will be able to bring him to the point of decision, and therefore to 
the decision of faith itself. 12° 
Thus not only does natural theology have no pedagogical use, its very procedure, 
according to Barth, is insincere. `Z' 
Barth argues that natural theology has no biblical basis whatsoever. On a 
superficial level, Barth explains, it is possible for one to raise a whole strand in 
scriptures that appears to summon or at least to invite us to a natural theology. '22 
But this line of interpretation seems to ignore the fact that the Biblical witness appeals 
to God alone and does not look past him. ''-3There is nothing in the Bible to show 
that there is an immediate or direct natural theology. In his consideration of the 19th 
Psalm, Barth argues that the `gospel' of the psalm, if taken as a whole begins its 
declaration of the glory of the Lord by pointing to the Exodus. ''-4 `After He has 
made Himself visible in His action, [God] now also (but always as this One who acts) 
becomes visible in heaven and on earth and in everything which is therein'. "' Even 
the nature psalms do not lead us in any way, in the context of Israel's understanding 
120 CD II/1,92. 
121 CD 11/ 1,93-94. 
'" CD 11/ 1,100. 
123 CD 1I/1,100. 
124 CD II/1,101. 
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159 
of God's actions, to find a `representation of the conscience and omnipotence of God 
in abstracto'. " Barth concludes with these words: `Therefore on formal grounds 
of exegesis we cannot say that it is possible to demonstrate in the Psalter an 
independent witness to man in the cosmos as such'. ''-' 
Barth adopts the same approach in his exegesis of Romans 1&2. Paul's 
epistle is grounded on God's 617roKaXu&cs. Paul is therefore not speaking about the 
heathen in general. `The Jews and the heathen of whom he speaks are very definitely 
characterised as Jews and heathen objectively confronted with the divine a7roKuXv1LS 
in the gospel (1: 15-16)'. ''-8 The gospel is the theme of the whole epistle and Paul 
is speaking as an apostle and not as a religious and historical philosopher. Thus Paul 
was, according to Barth, speaking in the light of the evangelical kerygma. 129 
Barth's interpretation of this passage is of course not universal. 13' Barth's 
exegesis is coloured by his own theological prejudice and epistemological theory. The 
`side line' does not contradict the `main line' of the gospel. There cannot be a natural 
theology which stands alongside special revelation even if it is seen to be occupying 
only a secondary place. The `sideline' is derived from revelation and not from any 
other authority. 13' The content of the Bible `constitutes a single witness, and this is 
'26 CD 11/1,108. 
127 CD 1111,108. 
12' CD 11/1,119. For a fuller exposition of Rom. 1.18ff, see CD 1/2,304ff. 
129 CD II/1,120. 
10 See for instance, Calvin's interpretation in his Comm. on Rom., James Dunn, 
Romans 1-8, Word Biblical Commentary (Dallas: Word,. 1984), 50ff; and Millard 
Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), 163ff. 
"' CD II/1,110. 
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to be understood strictly and exclusively as the witness of God's revelation of grace 
in his covenant with Israel and the fulfilment of the promise of the Messiah and the 
outpouring of the Holy Spirit on all flesh'. "' The Bible cannot be regarded as a 
product of human systematisation where a `Yes' and a `No can stand side by side. 
We can lay down that the Biblical witness does not say one thing in 
one way, but in many ways, not one line only, but on several 
converging lines, and therefore not without difference or contrast, but 
yet without contradiction. It is on the `without contradiction' that we 
must insist. 133 
Barth's treatment distinguishes Christian theology from natural theology. The 
two are antithetical. Only the former is worthy of consideration. One last quotation 
before we bring the section to a close. 
We may conclude, therefore, that Holy Scripture neither imposes the 
necessity nor even offers the possibility of reckoning with a 
knowability of the God of the prophets and apostles which is not given 
in and with His revelation, or bound to it; and therefore to the extent 
with a `Christian' natural theology. Holy Scripture does not present us 
with `another' task of theology, nor are we allowed to impose it upon 
ourselves. Holy Scripture neither urges us nor even authorises us to 
look around for a readiness of God for man which is different from 
His readiness in the grace of His Word and Spirit. "' 
Barth's exegesis of the above passages of scripture is rather forced. He has 
made up his mind about the matter and appears here to have brought his assumptions 
to his exegesis and interpretation. Though his offensive against natural theology is 
understandable, he has overreacted and therefore overstated his thesis. As such he fell 
into the very trap that he has so conscientiously cautioned theologians against. He has 
forced his theology of revelation into a Procrustean bed the result of which is not only 
132 CD 11/1,109. 
"' CD 11/1,106. 
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the wholesale rejection of natural theology but also the marginalisation of the 
revelation of God in creation. We shall return to this very important question of 
general revelation and the natural knowledge of God at a later stage of this study. But 
first we must subject Barth's theology of revelation to closer examination. 
162 
CHAPTER V 
THE REVELATION OF GOD 
1. Introduction: Revelation and the Trinity 
In the previous chapter we examined the basic presuppositions that underlined 
Barth's theory of the knowledge of God. The fundamental assertion made by Barth 
in this regard is that `God can only be known by God'. Barth's theology of revelation, 
as we shall see, is developed on this basis. It is for this reason that Barth places the 
Trinity at the forefront of his Church Dogmatics. ` Though this approach has its 
precedence in theologians like Peter Lombard of the Middle Ages, it is nevertheless 
uncommon. The Reformers, and the ensuing confessions in the post-reformation age 
began customarily with the doctrine of scripture, although there have been some whö 
have chosen the doctrine of God as a starting point. Though Barth recognises the fact 
that he is adopting a very isolated position from the standpoint of dogmatic history, ' 
his revelatory realism and his theological epistemology led him to conclude that the 
concept of the Trinity should come first. The Trinity is primary for Barth because it 
' This basic orientation in Barth's thought began very early in his theological 
development. Its genesis can be traced back to his Göttingen Dogmatics, first 
published in 1927. This orientation can perhaps be attributed to his response to 
Schleiermacher. Cf., The Göttingen Dogmatics, Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1990), 96f. 
2 `The reason for this strange circumstance can be sought only in the fact that with 
overwhelming unanimity it has obviously been thought that a certain formally very 
natural and illuminating scheme of questioning should be followed in which one can 
and should speak first of Holy Scripture (or in Roman Catholic dogmatics the 
authority of the teaching office, or in Modernist dogmatics the reality and truth of 
religion as the principiunt coguoscendi (apart from the actual content of faith), and 
then that even in the doctrine of God itself one can and should deal first with God's 
existence, nature and attributes (again apart from the concrete givenness of what 
Christians call "God"). ' CD 1/1,300. 
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is a distinctively Christian idea of God which is found in his unique and ultimate self- 
disclosure in Jesus Christ. He writes, `[t]he doctrine of the Trinity is what basically 
distinguishes the Christian doctrine of God as Christian, and therefore what already 
distinguishes the Christian concept of revelation as Christian, in contrast to all other 
possible doctrines of God or concepts of revelation'. ' Like Barth, Balthasar has also 
given central place to the Trinity. His theological aesthetics can be said to bear similar 
traits to Barth's Church Dogmatics in the sense that like Barth, Balthasar accords a 
defintive role for the Trinity in his theological thinking as a whole. Werner Löser is 
therefore right in saying that Balthasar's `whole theology has trinitarian contours'. ' 
Though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail Barth's 
doctrine of the Trinity, two important aspects of that doctrine must be highlighted 
here to prepare the ground for our discussion of Barth's theology of revelation. 
Firstly, what God is in himself is known from what God is and does in his revelation. 
That is to say, the immanent Trinity, what God is in himself, is known through the 
economic Trinity, what God is in the economy of salvation in the world for 
mankind. 5 Secondly, in the perichoretic relationship within the Godhead, Father Son, 
and Spirit cohere and interpenetrate one another so that though these three `persons' 
are distinct, God himself is not divided. When God acts ad extra, towards us, his acts 
CD 1/1,301. 
`Trinitätstheologies Heute, Ansatz und Entwürfe', Trinitat, Aktuelle 
Perspektiven der Theologie, Wilhelm Breuning (ed. ), Freibrug, Basel, Vienna 1984, 
39. Cited by J. Thompson, `Barth and Balthasar: An Ecumenical Dialogue', The 
Beauty of Christ, 182. 
ICDI/1,332&479. 
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are one and indivisible: opera trinitatis ad extra suns indivisa. 6 There can therefore 
be only one revelation though there are three aspects of it: God the Father is the 
Revealer (der Offenbarer), God the Son the revelation (der Q enbarung), and God 
the Holy Spirit the revealedness (der Offenbasein). This, Barth maintains, will make 
it clear to us `that and to what extent we are led by revelation itself to the problem 
of the three-in-oneness'. ' John Thompson explains. 
The revelation in Jesus Christ is of one who is Lord, who is God; and 
this points to a Revealer who is the same Lord, the same God, the 
same subject of revelation. It points also to the one who might in one 
sense be called the person who completes revelation, brings revelation 
to humanity, involves us in it. This third aspect is God again in another 
form, the same God, the same Lord; thus we have God as the revealer, 
the revelation, and this reaching out to and involving humanity, himself 
from himself not as another God, but as three ways in which the one 
God exists, comes to us, is known by us and experienced. ' 
2. Jesus Christ the Objective Revelation of God 
a. . General Perspectives on Banh's 
Clrristology9 
6 See John Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Bartft, 21. 
CD 1/1,539. 
' Ibid., 20. 
I There has been some discussion about whether Barth is Antiochian or 
Alexandrian (see, for example, Charles T. Waldrop, Karl Barth's Christology: Its 
Basic Alexandrian Character [Amsterdam: Mouton, 1984]). It seems to us that any 
attempt to determine that Barth's Christology is either Antiochian or Alexandrian 
would almost inevitably end up with statements that do not seem to square with the 
mainline of his thinking. We agree with Hans Boersma's observation that with a 
synthesis of both views the difficulty disappears. `Jesus Christ is God by nature as the 
second mode of being in the Trinity. This being is at the same time God's act. Being 
is becoming. Therefore, Christ's direct identity is at the same time indirect identity. 
The "static" doctrine of both the Alexandrian and the Antiochian traditions are 
overcome in the Word of God where being and becoming are identical. The Christ 
is by nature the Son of God but also becomes the Son of God by association through 
God's act'. Cf. `Alexandrian or Antiochian? A Dilemma in Barth's Christology', 
165 
There can be no doubt that Karl Barth accords Christology the central place in his 
theology. Barth himself wrote that `a church dogmatics must ... be Christologically 
determined as a whole and in all parts, as surely as the revealed Word of God attested 
to by Holy Scripture and proclaimed by the Church, is its one and only true criterion, 
and as surely as this revealed Word is identical with Jesus Christ'. `If dogmatics 
cannot regard itself and cause itself to be regarded as fundamentally Christology', he 
argues, `it has assuredly succumbed to some alien sway and is already on the verge 
of losing its character as church dogmatics'. 1° Hartwell pointed out that the 
Christological concentration not only in the Church Dogmatics, but indeed in the 
whole of Barth's theology is `unparalleled in the history of Christian thought'. " 
Christological thinking, for Barth, per definitionem, forms the very basis for all 
theological thinking. If our Christian knowledge of God arises from his self revelation 
in Jesus Christ, Christian theology, as T. F. Torrance argues, `involves a knowledge 
which is determined and controlled in its content by what is given in Jesus Christ, and 
operates with a mode of rational activity which corresponds to the nature of the object 
of this knowledge in Jesus Christ'. ''- Christology is the decisive word that must be 
spoken, " for without it theology will cease to be Christian. 14 
Westminster Theological Journal, 52 (1990), 270. 
`° CD 1/2,123. 
" The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction, 15-16. 
12 `The Place of Christology in Biblical and Dogmatic Theology', in Essays in 
Christology for Karl Barth, T. H. L. Parker (ed., ) (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1956), 13. 
13 CD IV/2,79. 
" CD II/l, 320. 
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But does not this Christological concentration run the danger of very quickly 
becoming `Christomonism', where there can be no theology except Christology. 
Indeed Barth has been criticised for this on all sides. 15 However, we are in 
agreement with John Thompson who maintains that Barth never intended to use 
Christology as a abstract principle with which to do theology. He was simply dealing 
with the living reality of Jesus Christ as God's supreme revelation. '6In the same way 
Berkouwer's thesis that Barth's theology is motivated by the `grace' principle is 
untenable. " Barth's answer to Berkouwer will shed light on his understanding of the 
function of Christology in dogmatics. Clarifying what he means by `christological' 
thinking, Barth wrote 
... I maintain that for me thinking is christological only when it 
consists in the perception, comprehension, understanding and 
estimation of the reality of the living person of Jesus Christ as attested 
by Holy Scripture, in attentiveness to the range and significance of His 
existence, in openness to His self-disclosure, in consistency in 
following Him as is demanded ... I underline, however that we are not 
dealing with a Christ-principle, but with Jesus Christ Himself as 
attested by Holy Scripture. 18 
Two aspects of Barth's treatment of Christology vindicate- him from the above 
's See discussion in G. C. Berkouwer, General Revelation (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1955); Colin Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message (London, 
1967); John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London: OUP, 1962) and KB. 
In response to the latter's critique Barth wrote: `I now have an inkling of something 
which at first I could not understand: what is meant by the "christological 
constriction" which my expositor and critic urges me in terms of mild rebuke. But we 
must bring against him the counter-question, whether in all the spiritual splendour of 
the saints who are supposed to represent and repeat Him Jesus Christ has not ceased - 
not in theory but in practice - to be the object and origin of Christian faith'. CD 
IV/1,768. 
" John Thompson, Christ in Perspective (edinburgh: St Andrew Press, 1978), 5. 
" Cf., The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1956). 
" CD IV/3,174. For the whole discussion, see CD IV/3,173-185. 
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allegation of Christomonism. The first is Barth's reference to history. Jesus Christ as 
man exists as a single member `in the natural and historical nexus of the created 
world'. " The second is to be found in Barth's insistence on a definite Christology 
as the articulation of the doctrine of Jesus Christ. 20 We therefore agree with E. W. 
Wendebourg's assessment of Barth's Christocentric theology: 
The whole of the Church Dogmatics, the further one goes into it, is an 
attempt to illumine the centre of the Holy Scripture and of all true 
Christian preaching, viz, the person and work of Jesus Christ and to 
let this centre be perceptible and relevant in every dimension of 
Christian theological thinking. 
We are also in agreement with his insight that `the way of evangelical theology will 
only be full of promise if it does not fall back again behind the solus Christus which 
Barth demands'. '-' 
b. Jesus Christ as the Revelation of God 
Mackintosh wrote that according to Barth, `revelation, in essence, is an event 
which has taken place in Jesus Christ and still takes place in Him ... '-'- The proper 
approach to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is to put the question of the fact of 
revelation before the question of interpretation. Hence the reality of God's revelation 
in Jesus Christ must first be considered before the question of its possibility can be 
" CD IV/3,39. See also CD IV/1,16,158. 
20 CD 1/2,123-124. 
23 Quoted by John Thompson, Christ in Perspective, 7, fn. 50. 
22 Types of Modern Theology (London: Collins, 1964), 264. 
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properly raised and investigated. 23 The New Testament, Barth asserts, is from 
beginning to end, constantly appealing to the name of Jesus Christ: `The content of 
the New Testament is solely the name of Jesus Christ, which, of course, also and 
above all involves the truth of His God-Manhood. Quite by itself this name signifies 
the objective reality of revelation'. 24 
Barth's polemic here is obvious. He is voicing his trenchant opposition to all 
forms of anthropocentric theology which assumes that it `could interpret the reality 
revealed in Jesus Christ simply as the revelation of the deepest and final reality of 
man'. 2'Al1 forms of docetism must be avoided in our theological perception. 
The ascertaining of the first fact, that the Son of God is this man, that 
the Christ is Jesus, is not to be conceived of as though those who 
thought and spoke had first a definite conception of God or of a Son 
or Word of God, of a Christ, and then found this conception confirmed 
and fulfilled in Jesus. This would be an arbitrary christology, docetic 
in its estimate and in its conclusions, on the basis of which there can 
be no serious recognition of the divinity of Christ. 26 
Ebionitism is also to be avoided, because here too is the serious recognition 
of the divinity of Christ impossible. '-' But can there not be a synthesis of the two? 
2' Barth is in this instance weary of the trappings of modern Protestantism: `In the 
Protestant theology that has prevailed since about 1700, it has actually become a 
fundamental presupposition. The basic difference between this and the theology of 
older Protestantism is that from some source or other, some general knowledge of 
God and man, it is known beforehand, known a priori, what revelation must be, may 
be, and ought to be'. CD 1/2,4. Barth explains that this is the mistake committed by 
Lessing, Kant and Schleiermacher. 
'ý CD 1/2,15. 
's CD 1/2,12. 
26 CD 1/2,16. 
27 Barth's incisive comment cuts at the very heart of the modem Christological 
controversy: `As docetism starts from a human conception to which it logically returns 
in the course, so does Ebionitism start from a human experience and impression of 
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Barth answers this question with an emphatic `No! ' 
... that God's Son or Word is the man Jesus of Nazareth is the one Christological thesis of the New Testament ... In the variety of their language about the reality of revelation, when they call the true God 
man and the true man God, they are uttering only their penultimate 
word, not their ultimate. When they are uttering their ultimate word, 
they say the same thing. This ultimate word, however, is not a further 
thesis, not a synthesis, but just the name Jesus Christ. By naming Him, 
they want to let Him who is so named have the final word. " 
Barth is concerned here, as he is throughout his Church Dogmatics, to stress the point 
that we can derive the concept of the Son or the Word of God from no other source 
than Jesus Christ Himself, the Word of God made flesh. 
c. The Incantation of the Word 
Barth's discussion on the `Problem of Christology' in CD 1/2 is crucial for 
understanding the place and function of the Incarnation. His argument can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, in trying to understand God's revelation, we cannot 
go beyond or behind the objective reality of the Incarnation: `Our first crucial 
statement, "that the eternal Word of God chose, sanctified and assumed human nature 
and existence into oneness with Hin1self, in order thus, as very God and very man, 
to become the Word of reconciliation spoken to man", signifies the mystery of the 
revelation in Jesus Christ. That is to say, in this statement we describe absolutely the 
sole point from which a doctrine of revelation congruous with this witness can 
originate'. 29 Because the Incarnation is absolutely the sole point from which the 
the heroic personality of Jesus of Nazareth. On the basis of this impression and 
experience, divinity is ascribed to this man'. CD 1/2,20. 
28 CD I/2,23-4. 
29 CD 1/2,124. 
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doctrine of revelation must originate, we must not look for some higher vantage point. 
Neither can we `derive or prove the statement in which this point is to be described, 
from a higher discernment'. All we can do is to describe it as a starting point. 
Secondly, it cannot be transformed into a non-mystery. 30 As a starting point 
it must be described again and again as a mystery. It is not something discoverable 
by man through the use of his own powers or through his observation of the cosmos. 
`At all costs we must make it clear that an ultimate mystery is involved here'. His 
next statement presses the point still further: `It can be contemplated, acknowledged, 
worshipped and confessed as such, but it cannot be solved, or transformed into a non- 
mystery. Upon no consideration must it be treated in such a way that the mystery is 
resolved away'. 31 It is in this very area that modern Christology has committed its 
most serious error. By trivialising or even forgetting the mystery, it has blinded itself 
to the objective reality of God's revelation and created a situation in which any 
understanding and discussion has become impossible. 
Thirdly, we must be aware and constantly remind ourselves of the limits, goals 
and boundaries of Christology. 
30 Barth is very much beholden to the wisdom of primitive Christology of 
Chalcedon for not attempting to solve the mystery and turning the Incarnation into a 
non-mystery. `It began and ended with the realisation that this was simply impossible'. 
Concerning the charge of `intellectualism' that modern theology brought to primitive 
Christology, Barth wrote, `We have, then no cause to give ear to the charge of 
intellectualism urged against primitive Christology. In its formal as in its material 
shape its root and upshot are the same, a half-bold, half-puzzled failure to see what 
the New Testament actually says and what is actually heard in the Church and by the 
Church. Whatever may be alleged against primitive Christology, it was not guilty of 
this failure, and therefore, in spite of the reproach in question, at every decisive point 
we have good reason to take our stand on its side and not on that of the accusers'. 
Cf., CD 1/2,126-131. 
11 CD 1/2,124-125. 
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In Christology the limits as well as the goal must be fixed as they are 
seen to be fixed already in the Evangelists and apostles themselves, 
i. e., the goal of thought and language must be determined entirely by 
the unique object in question. But this same object in its uniqueness 
must also signify for us the boundary beyond which we are not to think 
and speak. Christology has to consider and to state who Jesus Christ 
is, who in revelation exercises God's power over man. But it must 
avoid doing so in such a way as to presuppose that man may now 
exercise a power over God. 3'- 
The central statement about God's revelation in Jesus Christ is this: `The Word 
was made flesh'. It is this statement that must guide our reflections on the dogmatic 
statement of Christology, that Jesus Christ is very God and very man. For Barth, the 
`Word' spoken of in John 1: 14 is indeed the `divine, creative, reconciling, redeeming 
Word which participates without restriction in the divine nature and existence, the 
eternal Son of God'. 33 The Word is identified with Jesus Christ. It is this Logos Who 
was made flesh and who has proclaimed the invisible God. Indeed only the Logos can 
proclaim him `because He is Himself the only begotten, in the bosom of the 
Father'. " Barth goes on to make several important statements about the Incarnate 
Word 
1. In becoming flesh the Word remains who he is, the true and eternal God. 
The kenosis implies no loss in divine majesty, but, when considered in the light of the 
goal of the Incarnation, its triumph. 35 The Word remains wholly the Divine Subject. 
Schleiermacher's notion that the appearance of Jesus Christ signals that `the creation 
of human nature is now completed for the first time' is rejected. The Incarnation for 
'2 CD 1/2,125. 
33 CD 1/2,132. 
Ibid. 
3S CD 1/2,37. See also CD IV/2,157ff. 
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Barth is not `the movement of the creature's own. Like creation itself, it is a 
sovereign divine act, and is not an act of lordship different from creation'. ' 
2. The Incarnation took place in the divine freedom of the Word. The 
Incarnation is not a determination immanent in the cosmos or in man. 37 Even sin and 
the impending destruction of the whole of creation cannot be said to have necessitated 
it. 38 `If He has actually done this, we have to recognise His free goodwill in so 
doing and nothing else ... so we say that when the Word becomes 
flesh, we are 
concerned with a miracle, an act of God's mercy', 39 
3. In this state of becoming and having become flesh, the Word remains 
the free, sovereign Word of God. In the incarnation, therefore, it is the Word who 
speaks, acts and reveals. `The Word is what He is even before and apart from His 
being flesh'. Hence the equation `very God and very man' is irreversible. The Word 
is not dependent on the flesh. Rather the reverse is true: `... flesh not only could not 
be flesh apart from the Word, but apart from the Word it would have no being at all 
'4° To speak of the flesh becoming the Word is impossible and blasphemous. °t 
The Incarnation means that God has chosen a modality in which to meet man 
in his revelation. The Word became `flesh' means that the Word became true man, 
36 CD I/2,134. 
CD 1/2,135-137; IV/2,45. Cf., IV/2,37. 
'" Contra Athanasius and Anselm. 
39 CD 1/2,135-136. 
40 CD 1/2,136. 
41 Barth rejects the `Jesus of history' movement and the Roman Catholic devotion 
to Jesus and the teaching of the sacred heart of Jesus. See CD 1/2,136-137 and J. 
Thompson, Christ in Perspective, 147, fn. 50. 
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the object and theatre of God's action. Through the incarnation the Son has assumed 
our hunwnitas, and in so doing he became one particular man. 42 But why this 
particular modality? This is so because of its objectivity. But we also realise that this 
objectivity is a veiled objectivity. For `there is nothing stranger, nothing more 
puzzling to a man than a fellowman'. 43 This modality therefore becomes most fitting 
for the revelation of God: `The encounter with man who is flesh is the encounter by 
which we exist. And in that case we will understand that this existence can cover up 
and conceal something, make a mystery of it, as nothing else in the world can. It may 
therefore become the means of divine revelation which is always a veiling as such'' 
Furthermore, Barth argues, `there is nothing nearer or more familiar to man than just 
man. Nothing else comes closer to us, is so constitutive for ourselves, as the other 
man in all his strangeness and obscurity'. 45 Thus if there is to be a revelation, 
42 Barth considers the idea that God assumed our humanity without in fact being 
one particular man to be impossible. Barth's interpretation of the traditional doctrine 
of the anhypostasia and enhypostatsia can be gleaned from the following comment by 
T. F. Torrance: `By anhypostasia classical Christology asserted that in the assumptio 
carnis the human nature of Christ had no independent per se subsistence apart from 
the event of the incarnation, apart from the hypostatic union. By ei h3postasia, 
however, it asserted that in the assumptio carnis the human nature of Christ was a 
real and concrete subsistence within the hypostatic union - it was enhypostasis in the 
Word. Anhypostasis and enhypostasis are inseparable. In the Incarnation the eternal 
Son assumed human nature into oneness with himself but in that assumption Jesus 
Christ is not only real man but a man'. Quoted in Essays in Christology for Karl 
Barth, T. H. L. Parker (ed. ) (London: Lutterworth Press, 1956), 16. Anhypostasis then 
asserts the negative, while enhypostasis asserts the positive. Barth writes: `... from 
the utter uniqueness of this unity follows the statement, that God and Man are so 
related in Jesus Christ, that He exists as Man so far and only so far as He exists as 
God, i. e., in the mode of existence of the eternal Word of God'. CD 1/2,163. 
43 CD 1/2,41. 
" CD 1/2,42. 
 CD 1/2,42. % 
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`where else will it announce itself than as it does, in the same neighbour, who can 
stand for us as the essence of objectivity? "' 
The above statement, however, raises a very important question: Is the 
huinanitas Christi as such the revelation of God? To this question Barth gives the 
reply that since it conceals as well as reveals, the humanitas Christi is only indirectly 
the revelation of God: `... the power and continuity in which the man Jesus of 
Nazareth was in fact the revealed Word according to the witness of the Evangelists 
and apostles consists here too in the power and continuity of the divine action in this 
form and not in the continuity of this form as such'. 47 Here we see a sacramental 
understanding of the humanitas Christi. Barth argues that Jesus Christ did not become 
a revelation to all who met him, but only a few. He postulates from this that the 
revealing itself cannot be ascribed to the existence of Jesus Christ: `... the Godhead 
is not so immanent in Christ's humanity that it does not also remain transcendent to 
it, that its immanence ceases to be an event in the Old Testament sense, always a new 
thing, something that God actually brings into being in specific circumstances'. 48 In 
this way Barth hopes to maintain his doctrine that God is and remains the Subject of 
his self-revelation in Jesus Christ; he is Deus absconditus as well as Deus revelatus. 
We have then, before us, the raison d'e"tre for the Incarnation: 
If God's revelation is the way from veiling of the eternal Word to His 
unveiling, from crib and cross to resurrection and ascension, how can 
it possibly be anything else than God's becoming man, His becoming 
flesh? As the Incarnation of the Word it can be revelation. To be 
revelation it had to be an Incarnation. Incarnation was needed in order 
CD I/2,43. 
47 CD I/l, 323. 
49 CD 1/2,323: 
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that God might become manifest to us, that He might be free for us. 49 
d. Jesus Christ, The Truth of God and Other Truths 
In a lengthy section in CD IV/3.1 Barth discusses the relationship between 
Jesus Christ who is the Light of life and the truth of God with the other truths in the 
world. Space does not permit us to trace all of Barth's arguments closely. We shall 
attempt, in this sub-section, to highlight the salient points of his argument, especially 
those aspects that have direct bearing on the concept of general revelation. 
Jesus Christ radiates the light of life because he is the light of the world. He 
shines not with an alien light that falls as it were from without. Rather he is illumined 
by his own light that proceeds from himself: `He does not need to receive light from 
without, from men, the world, or the faith of his community. On the contrary, as He 
lives, He is the light which shines on men, and men to themselves and also the world 
of men'. 50 The careful reader will immediately notice how close Balthasar's own 
understanding of the Gestalt of Christ is to Barth's here. 
The life of Christ is light because in it we are dealing `not with an 
indeterminate happening, but with the very presence and action of God'. It is because 
of God's presence and action that we can say that the life of Christ is light, truth, 
revelation, Word and glory. 5' The life of Jesus Christ, then, in its fullest sense, is 
av CD 1/2,42. 
° CD IV/3.1,46. 
s' CD IV/3.1.79. 
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the declaration of God's glory. 52 The true and living God is both eloquent and 
radiant; and this is not only so in creation, time and history. He is eloquent and 
radiant in all eternity because He is not only Father, `but also the eternal Word as the 
Son of the Father, and that in the Son He has the reflection of His own glory'. 53 
Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word of God is therefore the total and complete 
declaration of God concerning Himself: `What [God] is for us and wills for us, but 
also what we are for Him and are ordained to be and will and do in this relationship, 
is exhaustively, unreservedly and totally revealed to us in Jesus Christ as the one 
Word of God'. ' By saying that Jesus Christ is the Light of life, Barth means that 
He is the one and only light of life in all its fullness, in perfect adequacy; and 
negatively, it means that there is no other light of life outside or alongside His, 
outside or alongside the light which He is'. 55 
Having said the above however, Barth does concede to the fact that there are 
other words, lights and even revelations. 
We recognise that the fact that Jesus Christ is the one Word of God 
does not mean that in the Bible, the Church and the world there are not 
other words which are quite notable in their way, other lights which 
5' Here again both Balthasar and Barth share the same view regarding the 
significance of the concept of glory in the Bible. Barth could write that `[I]n the Bible, 
glory ... is a characteristic, indeed, it is the supreme characteristic, of divine being 
and action, and it finds its reflection and response in the creaturely sphere of the 
glorifying ... of God which is proper to man'. CD IV/3.1,47. 
s' CD IV/3.1,80. 
u CD IV/3.1,99. Thus Jesus Christ is profoundly the glory of God and the 
glorification of man: `The glory of Jesus Christ embraces both the gloria of God and 
the human glorificatio which it deserves and exacts ... It is the glory of God who 
humbles Himself to man, anti also of the man exalted to God. It is the glory of the 
Lord who is Servant and the Servant who is Lord'. CD IV/3.1,48. 
SS CD IV/3.1,86. 
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are quite clear and other revelation which are quite real ... Nor does 
it follow from our statement that every word spoken outside the circle 
of the Bible and the Church is a word of false prophecy and therefore 
valueless, empty and corrupt, that all the lights which rise and shine 
in this outer sphere are misleading and all the revelations are 
necessarily untrue. Our statement is simply to the effect that Jesus 
Christ is the one and only Word of God, that He alone is the light of 
God and the revelation of God. " 
The question that now arises is how do these other words and truths relate to the one 
Word and Truth of God in Jesus Christ. As far as the words of the Bible and the 
Church are concerned, Barth argues that they are wholly dependent on how far they 
(a) coincide and agree with the Word spoke in Jesus Christ, (b) attest to this one 
Word, and (c) are commissioned to attest, reflect and reproduce the Word spoken in 
Jesus Christ. " Concerning the words that are found outside the Church, Barth 
maintains that though the Church cannot close her ears to them, they must be tested 
by the witness of Scripture. 58 
Creation, as the location and setting of the mediation of the life and work of 
the Incarnate Word, is, for Barth, as it is for Calvin, the theatrum gloriae Dei, `the 
external basis of the covenant which conversely is its internal basis'. 59 The creaturely 
world, the cosmos, has its `own lights and truths and therefore its own speech and 
" CD IV/3.1,97. 
s' CD IV/3.1,114. 
sa 'Words of this kind cannot be such as overlook or even lead away from the 
Bible. They can only be those which, in material agreement with it, illumine, 
accentuate or explain the biblical witness in a particular time and situation, thus 
confirming it in the deepest sense by helping to make it sure and concretely evident 
and certain. They can only be words which will lead the community more truly and 
profoundly than every`to scripture'. CD IV/3.1,115. 
" CD IV/3.1,137. 
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words'. 60These may be perceived, heard and considered. They have been used in the 
service of the self-attestation of God, but they must be distinguished from God's 
revelation. Indeed Barth cautions against speaking of the luminosity of the world as 
`lights' and `revelation'. He warns- his readers of the dangers of the modem 
expressions like the `revelation of creation' or `primal revelation' as these terms 
`might be given a clear and unequivocal sense in this respect which they do not have 
in common parlance'. 6' 
The above statements seem to suggest that Barth has totally rejected the 
traditional doctrine of general revelation. Indeed many have accused Barth of this, and 
of wrapping his concept of revelation in the strait jacket of Christo-monism. But is 
this a fair criticism of Barth? We think not. To be sure Barth makes it absolutely clear 
that though creaturely existence has its own lights and truths, they do not point 
beyond themselves to the transcendent being of God. 6'- But Barth could also speak 
of the self-witness of creation speaking `as from God Himself, praising and glorifying 
Him: "the heavens declare the Glory of God; the firmament sheweth his handiwork" 
(Ps. 19.1)'. 63 But the important qualification for Barth is that they do this not out of 
60 CD IV/3.1,139. 
b1 CD N/3.1,140. 
I Barth is emphatic about this because any weakening of this emphasis could mean 
that theology will once again slip into the grips of an analogy of being. With force 
and clarity, Barth stresses that these truths `tell us nothing concerning God the Creator 
and Lord, nor concerning man in his relationship to God. For the Word of God, the 
revelation of the truth of God and man, is not pronounced by them. Primary and 
ultimate questions are neither raised or answered by them'(CD IV/3.1,147) and that 
these truths are `its own revelations', that is to say, the revelations of the creatura 
itself. CD IV/3.1,140. 
" CD IV/3.1,134. 
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their own power. Hence, `[t]here is no speech nor language'. They acquire this power 
from God who instituted, installed and ordained them to the ministerium Verbi Divini. 
In other words, God uses the objectivity of the world to objectify Himself, to reveal 
Himself. The world in and by itself, with its own revelations and truths, is unable to 
point beyond itself to God. God in his goodwill, freedom and sovereignty uses the 
creaturely world to perform this service. The positivity of the world is affirmed, and 
the concept of God's revelation in and through the world and its place and function 
in the whole reality of God's revelation is developed, albeit very cautiously. 
3. The Holy Spirit, the Subjective Reality of Revelation 
a. The Subjective Reality of Revelation 
Barth's understanding of the place and function of the Holy Spirit in the 
revelation of God is summarised in a single pregnant sentence: `The one true God and 
Lord Himself in the "person" of the Holy Spirit, is His own state of revealedness for 
us'. ' Barth's approach here is consistent. He is concerned first to investigate the 
'4 CD 1/2,204. Rosato's thesis that Barth's pneumatology acts as a kind of counter 
to Schleiermacher's `theology of experience' is both interesting and tenable. There can 
be no doubt that the former is both influenced by, and is reacting to the latter. Of 
Schleiermacher's idealistic methodology and mediating principle Barth thought to be 
wholly inadequate. To be sure, the place that Barth accords to pneumatology in his 
exposition of the Christian life (and in the subjective reality of revelation in the 
Christian) can be seen as a redress to the reductionisms of the theology of 
Schleiermacher and that of 19th century Protestantism. Thus Rosato is perhaps right 
when he asserted that `Barth's expressly pneumatological reinterpretation of these 
theologies leads him to conclude that the validity of their latent intention is irreparably 
compromised by their particular anthropological blurring of God's Spirit and man's 
spirit; such an identity causes anthropology to absorb christology into itself'. The 
Spirit as Lord. The Pneumatology of Karl Bar//i (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1981), 15. 
But Rosato's thesis turned awry when he insisted that Barth, in his reaction to the 
above theologies, `gradually became more properly a pneumatocentric than 
christocentric theologian' (Ibid., 3). See J. Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology 
of Karl Barth (Pennsylvania: Pickwick, 1991), Chapter 11, for a rebuttal of the above 
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question of the reality of the phenomenon before considering its possibility. The 
second question, though equally important, must be raised only as a secundum 
ordinem. Only in this way, Barth asserts, can true objectivity to the revelation of God 
be achieved. `Certainty of faith, i. e., a grounded awareness that God's revelation 
reaches man and how it does so, has first to be regarded simply in its reality, and 
only then, and on that basis, in its possibility, and in the various conditions of that 
possibility. Even in theology we can end in certainty of faith only if we have already 
started in certainty of faith'. 65 
For Barth the reality of God's revealedness for man includes man's 
corresponding response and the fact that this response has been made. 
The existence of men who render faith and obedience to the Word of 
God; the fact that there is such a thing among men as faith and 
obedience to the Word of God; the entire correspondence on man's 
side to the divine act of revelation: all this is just as seriously the 
context of biblical witness to revelation as is the objective reality of 
revelation, i. e., Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word of God. ` 
Revelation cannot be understood in a general way as though it were the eternal 
definition and eternal meaning of all time. Revelation has its own time and comes to 
a certain group of people in history. 67 In other words, revelation can only be 
view. 
6s CD 1/2,206. Here, as in many other aspects of Barth's theology, we can detect 
the strong influence of Anselm. We shall be looking at this in greater detail in the 
next chapter. For our present purposes it is sufficient to highlight Barth's application 
of the Anselmian principle that the subjective knowledge of the believer corresponds 
to the ontic rationality and necessity which is prior to it. See John Thompson, The 
Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth, 6; Philip Rosato, The Spirit as Lord, 61; 
and G. Watson, `A Study of St. Anselm's Soteriology and Karl Barth's Theological 
Method', SJT, 42 (4), 1989,493-513. 
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revelation in concreto. All these other aspects, for example, man's response to 
revelation, `constitute an integral part of the biblical testimony to revelation and of 
revelation itself, and that part belongs directly and indispensably to the substance of 
the record' . 
68 The Word of God attested to in scriptures has to do not only with God 
but with man as well, namely, biblical man who is confronted by the revelation of 
God. 
It is for the above reasons that ecclesiology looms so largely in Barth's 
explication of the subjective reality of revelation. Of course, when Barth speaks of the 
Church, he is not referring to an arbitrary construction which is formed by individuals 
according to their own ability and insight. He is speaking of the Church of Christ, 
that is, a community whose existence is utterly dependent on Christ. Only in such a 
community can the saying extra ecclesiam nulla salus hold true. `The significance of 
the Church for the subjective reality of revelation', Barth emphasises, `is not a Roman 
Catholic but a biblical and therefore of necessity a universally Christian doctrine'. 69 
In a long historical study Barth discusses numerous theologians of the past, Ignatius 
of Antioch, Irenaeus, Origen, Cyprian, Lactantius, Augustine, Luther and Calvin, to 
substantiate his point. Perhaps a quotation from Luther here would suffice to help us 
to understand Barth's fundamental impulse: `Therefore whoso would find Christ must 
first find the Churches. How would we know where Christ and His faith were, if we 
wot not where His faithful are? And whoso would know somewhat of Christ must not 
trust himself nor build a bridge to heaven by his own understanding, but go to the 
Churches, visit and question the same. For outwith the Christian Church is no truth, 
68 CD 1/2,207. 
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no Christ, no blessedness'. 7° 
The place and function of the Holy Spirit is thus to direct and integrate men 
(ecclesial man, the Christian) into the objective revelation in Jesus Christ. In so doing, 
the Holy Spirit reveals Himself as the subjective reality and possibility of the 
revelation of God. 
The God who acts here and now does so in a way different from His 
eternal action or His action then and there in Jesus Christ. But, since 
God acting on Christians here and now brings them to faith in Jesus 
Christ and to the community of Jesus Christ, this faith and this 
community is the aim of God's self-impartation. This new and specific, 
this inviting and challenging, self-impartation and faith bringing act of 
God in their regard is oriented towards making what has been 
objectively revealed a subjective reality. " 
In the final section of this chapter, we shall examine, albeit very briefly, other aspects 
of Barth's ecclesiology which demonstrate the place of the Church in Barth's 
theological epistemology. For the moment, we must turn our attention to another 
aspect of the subjective work of the Spirit in our knowledge of God. 
b. The Subjective Possibility of Revelation 
Barth considers the Holy Spirit as the subjective possibility of revelation under 
three statements or propositions, and it is to them that we must now turn our 
attention. The question that Barth hopes to answer here is, `How in the freedom of 
man is it possible for God's revelation to reach him? To what extent is the work of 
the Holy Spirit the reality of revelation, i. e., the adequate ground for man's freedom 
70 CD 1/2,213. 
" Rosato, The Spirit as Lord, 52. 
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for God, and therefore of his receiving what God offers him? ''Z 
The first proposition is this: `By the outpouring of the Holy Spirit it is possible 
for God's revelation to reach man in his freedom, because in it the Word of God is 
brought to his hearing'. 73 This corresponds with Barth's trinitarian theology - the 
Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and the Son; he is the Spirit of the Father who 
has revealed himself through the Son. For Barth, the revelation of the Word is 
insufficient for the accomplishment of the purposes of God. The Word must become 
accessible to man. This impartation of the Word to man is effected by the work of the 
Holy Spirit. Inseparably linked to the Word, the Holy Spirit is the power of God 
which draws men to it. 74 
It is important for us to understand the place of pneumatology in Barth's 
essentially christologically centred notion of revelation. Here three pertinent points 
may be made: Firstly, the Holy Spirit, as it were, completes the process of revelation. 
He fulfils the epistemic dimension by ensuring that the ontic in Jesus Christ becomes 
noetic in man. `To achieve this end, God first makes his own readiness for man an 
object capable of being known by man the subject. This is the objective grace in Jesus 
Christ, the person in whom God makes himself present in history. Secondly, God 
makes Jesus Christ, who is his own self-knowledge, accessible to man through his 
I CD 1/2,243. 
73 CD 1/2,246. 
" `The reason, and the only reason, why man can receive revelation in the Holy 
Spirit is that God's Word is brought to his hearing in the Holy Spirit' (CD 1/2,246). 
`Moreover, the Holy Spirit (at least according to the Western notion of the Trinity of 
God) is inseparable from the Word and his power, therefore, not a power separate 
from the Word, but the power that lives in the Word and through the Word' (CD I. 1, 
171). 
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Holy Spirit, his own knowability'. 75 The Holy Spirit, who is God's own historical 
self-impartation to man, ensures that the knowledge of God by man through revelation 
is in correspondence with God in himself. As the Spirit of Truth and the spiritual 
power of God's eternal Word, the Holy Spirit can create a human knowledge that 
corresponds to the truth of God himself. This knowledge of faith is the miracle of 
grace through the Spirit. And thirdly, the Holy Spirit draws men into a new 
relationship with the triune God. Through the experience of faith, the Holy Spirit 
actually incorporates man into revelation. `It is Christ, the Word of God, brought to 
the hearing of man by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit who is man's possibility of 
being the recipient of divine revelation. Therefore this receiving, this revealedness of 
God for us, is really itself revelation. In no less a sense than the Incarnation of the 
Word in Christ, it is the divine act of lordship, the mystery and the miracle of the 
existence of God among us, the triumph of grace'. 76 
The second proposition reads as follows: `By the outpouring of the Holy Spirit 
it is possible in the freedom of man for God's revelation to meet him, because in it 
he is explicitly told by God's Word that he possesses one possibility of his own for 
such a meeting'. " Man is not actually free for God. `It is not merely that man lacks 
something which he ought to be or have to be capable of in relation to God. He lacks 
everything. It is not merely that he is in dangerous and damaged state, but in his 
being toward God he is completely finished and impotent. He is not only a sick man 
's Rosato, Spirit as Lord, 73. 
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but a dead one'. '8 We hear the Word of God not by our own possibilities, but the 
freedom of the Word itself. Therefore the fact that man does hear the Word of God 
shows clearly that this occurrence is a miracle. 79 
And finally, the third proposition: `By the outpouring of the Holy Spirit it 
becomes possible for man in his freedom to be met by God's revelation, because in 
it the Word of God becomes unavoidably his Master'. 80 The outpouring of the Holy 
Spirit, as we have already seen, brings man into a relationship with the Triune God. 
In this relationship, the Word of God is exalted by the Spirit to be Master over 
men. $' Barth goes on to explain what this means, and what it entails. To have our 
master in Jesus Christ means that we always have him over and above us. Barth uses 
Psalm 139: 1-10 to explain divine omnipresence from which we can no longer 
withdraw. We are in a position where we have discovered the supreme authority of 
Jesus Christ under which we are always responsible and subject. The Word of God, 
which strikes us at our very being brings us to an awareness that we are subject to a 
command in face of which `there can be neither subterfuge nor excuse', since, as 
children of God we can only hear in obedience; that is to say, a hearing that is also 
the doing of the Word. $- To have our master in Jesus Christ also means that we exist 
78 CD 1/2,257. 
'y `It is a state or position in which man may very well find himself, but only with 
amazement, only with the gratitude, only in humble recognition of an accomplished 
fact, without any opportunity to think how it might come to pass, without possessing 
any need or capacity to derive it from his earlier state or to indicate the way which 
led from the one to another' (CD 1/2,260). 
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in `an ultimate and most profound irresponsibility'. 83 By this Barth means simply that 
the Word of God does not impose upon us a new responsibility but merely claims our 
response, our will and action. These are claimed as an act of service, not as an 
autonomous work. Under the Word and His command, we participate in His work, 
a participation which rests on forgiveness and not on our own fitness. Finally, to have 
our master in Jesus Christ is to be subjected to a direction or a formation, and to have 
no other concern except that of Christ. 
Just as Jesus Christ is the objective revelation of God, the Holy Spirit is its 
subjective reality and possibility. In Jesus Christ, God says `Yes' to man, and in the 
Holy Spirit, man can say `Yes' to God. The Holy Spirit gives man a new capacity, 
a capacity to perceive, understand and apprehend the objective revelation of God; the 
Holy Spirit makes the objective revelation of God a subjective reality. 
Two other matters must be discussed before we can bring this chapter to a 
close. The first is Barth's understanding of the relationship between revelation and 
Scripture. The second is an issue which we have already alluded to at the beginning 
of this section, namely, Barth's ecclesiology. But before we proceed, perhaps a 
summary of the grounds we have traversed so far is helpful at this point. Barth's 
revelation theology is rooted in the doctrine of the Trinity. God the Father, according 
to Barth, is the revealer, God the Son the revelation, and God the Holy Spirit the 
revealedness. As the form of God's revelation, the Incarnate Son is its objective 
reality. The Spirit is the subjective reality of God's revelation whose role is to 
complete the process of revelation by creating within man that epistemic capacity in 
man so that the ontic in Jesus Christ can become the noctic. Balthasar accords the 
R' CD 1/2,274. 
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Spirit with exactly the same function when he says that the Spirit creates within man 
the sensorium with which to perceive God's objective revelation in the form of Christ. 
Central to all this is the Incarnation of Christ, as we have seen in the second section. 
It is through the Incarnation that the trinitarian activity of God in revelation is made 
manifest. Balthasar is in total agreement with Barth here: `To the God who witnesses 
to himself and in whom we believe there belong not only the divinity of Jesus Christ, 
but equally, his humanity. In the one Christ the Father renders witness to himself 
through the Holy Spirit, and the one Christ, in the indivisible form he sets before us, 
witnesses to the Father in the Holy Spirit'. " 
4. The Holy Scripture and the Church 
a. Revelation and the Bible 
i. Orientation. Barth's doctrine of scripture was developed in response to the 
reductionism in the concept of revelation which he saw in the theology of the early 
church, 17th century Protestantism, and the period of the Enlightenment. The early 
church, in her attempt to make the `miracle of God in the witness of his revelation 
perspicuous to everybody', developed her doctrine of the inspiration of scripture based 
solely on the work of the Holy Spirit in the emergence of the prophetic and apostolic 
word which constituted the Bible. 85 This soon led to a `naive secularisation of the 
whole conception of revelation'. Instead of being placed into the circle of mystery 
which proceeds unbroken from the revelation of God to the illumination of the hearts 
of the recipients, the phenomenon of the Bible `was incorporated into a view of things 
' GL I: 154. 
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in which inspirations and inspired men and states have a place with all kinds of other 
things: have their place, that is, in the Bible, to which in a more or less well-fenced 
circle there may be added what we accept of saints recognised by the Church and the 
teaching office of the Church'. 86 Barth traces, from this standpoint, the later 
relativising of the unique authority of Scripture in relation to tradition as was seen in 
the Council of Trent. 
The doctrine of inspiration which emerged in the 17th century is attacked by 
Barth, not because of its essential supranaturalism, but because its supranaturalism 
was not radical enough. Barth argues, perceptively, that the 17th century's insistence 
that the Bible must offer us a divina ei infallibilis historia has reduced its doctrine of 
inspiration to a kind of naturalism. He writes, `The secular nature of this postulate 
showed itself plainly in the assumption that we must freely approach the good God 
if it is not fulfilled, threatening ruin with distrust, scepticism and atheism -a threat 
which was no less freely carried out in the following generations, when man became 
convinced that the postulate cannot be fulfilled'. 87 It is this secularism, which was 
openly present, that led Barth to reject the l7th century doctrine of inspiration as false 
doctrine. 
The Enlightenment simply carried on what the newer Protestantism of the 17th 
century has started by making `historical' investigation the central role for the study 
and treatment of the Bible. The Bible loses its character as the Word of God and is 
now transformed into a collection of writings of highly relevant historical record. 
Barth makes the connection between the newer Protestantism's and the 
CD 1/2,519. 
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Enlightenment's treatment of the Bible in the following statement: `... this merely 
revealed what high orthodoxy had already sought and attained under the apparently 
supranaturalistic form: the understanding and use of the Bible as an instrument 
separated from the free grace of God and put into the hands of man'. 88 To be sure, 
the solution to the naive reductionism of the Enlightenment's understanding of the 
Bible is therefore not to be found in the renewal of the doctrine of inspiration of high 
orthodoxy. 
From the above discussion, it is not difficult to see why Barth is so insistent 
that due recognition to both the divine and human elements in Scripture must be 
given. Sole emphasis on the pneumatic element of inspiration, like the one espoused 
by the early church has resulted in the reduction of the essential human element. For 
Barth, the price to be paid for such an approach is far too high. 
By, as it were, damping down the word of man as such, by 
transforming it into a word of man which is real only in appearance, 
a Word of God which can be grasped in human speech, the whole 
mystery was lost, the mystery of the freedom of its presence both in 
the mouths of the biblical witnesses and also in our ears and hearts. 
And the miracle which took place, which was recounted in various 
forms about the biblical witness and the result of which was admired 
in the Bible, has only the name in common with the miracle of the 
presence of the Word of God. 89 
Similarly, in the hands of the l7th century theologians of high orthodoxy, the Bible 
was grounded upon itself, apart from the mystery of God. The Reformers' view of 
the Bible which was always intricately interwoven into the work of Christ and the 
Holy Spirit, and of God's sovereignty and free grace, was abandoned. The Bible 
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became a `paper pope', wholly given into the hands of its interpreter. 90 Robbed of 
its free and spiritual force, it has become an instrument of human power. Robbed of 
its unique authority, the Bible has become a book very similar to the holy books of 
other religions. It became a product and achievement of the human spirit. In the hands 
of large sections of the Evangelical Churches, and for a long period of time, the 
Bible's authority was restricted to the `biblical documents as such and in their 
historico-literary givenness, about which the doctrine of inspiration has attested such 
remarkable things'. 91 
The reinterpretation of the Bible as the document of a specific history and the 
so-called spirit of the Bible as the spirit of history, which was engendered in various 
ways by the rationalists of the 18th century, by Herder and Schleiermacher, and by 
Ritschl and the religious historicists, has in no wise broadened the outlook on the 
Bible that was introduced by the Evangelicalism of the 17th century. The only way 
forward for Barth is to return to the theology of the Reformers. For it is in the 
teaching of the Reformers that the delicate balance of the human and the divine in 
scripture is taken seriously. The Reformers' doctrine of inspiration, Barth writes, `is 
an honouring of God and of the free grace of God'. 9- For them the Bible is never 
a revealed book of oracles - the question of the inspired Word is always the question 
of that which inspires and controls the Word. The Bible is a witness to revelation. 
This witness is the result of the sovereign act of God since, according to the theology 
9' CD 1/2,526. 
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of the Reformers, only God can bear witness to God. 93 The Reformers saw that the 
inspiration of the Bible by the Holy Spirit must be set in the context of the 
`relationship of the biblical witnesses to the very definite content of their witness'. It 
is this content that inspires them, making their writing a participation of the work of 
the Holy Spirit, and therefore Holy Scripture. Barth maintains that Luther has always 
insisted that scripture is not of itself: `it is always of Christ as Lord and King that 
scripture has and again and again acquired for us its clarity as the divine Word'. " 
The problem with the newer Protestantism's understanding of scripture becomes 
clearer in the light of the Reformers' teaching. The new understanding of biblical 
inspiration meant that the Bible as the Word of God was transformed from a statement 
of the free and sovereign work of God into a statement about `the nature of the human 
enquiry brought under human control'. 
The Bible as the Word of God surreptitiously became a part of the 
natural knowledge of God, i. e., of that knowledge of God which man 
can have without the free grace of God, by his own power, and with 
direct insight and assurance. That the highly supernaturalistic form in 
which this step was made was only a form used because no better was 
available is proved by the haste with which it was abandoned almost 
as soon as it was adopted. 95 
The teaching of the Reformers, Barth maintains, does not commit the grievous errors 
of a supranaturalism that can so easily slip into a kind of naturalism, where the real 
human word is the real Word of God, and where `the real humanity of it being more 
I `There exists an exact correspondence between the certainty with which the 
word of the apostles and prophets was the Word of God in itself, or of them, and the 
certainty with which it as such illumines us. In both cases only God can bear witness 




or less compounded by a foolish conception of its divinity'. ' In the same way, the 
teaching of the Reformers safeguarded the freedom and sovereignty of God. Thus 
Barth is beholden to the Reformers' understanding of scripture: `On their lips and 
understanding this is the true statement concerning the Bible which is always 
indispensable to the Church'. 97 
ii. The Bible and Revelation. Barth's teaching of the nature and function of 
scripture must be understood from the above context. His doctrine can be summarised 
as follows. Firstly, scripture is a witness to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The 
revelation of God, i. e., his self-disclosure in the Incarnation of his Son, is 
distinguished from and prior to Holy Scripture. The former makes the latter possible: 
`It is because God has revealed himself, and as He has done so, that there is a Word 
of God, and therefore Holy Scripture and proclamation as the Word of God, and 
therefore Holy Scripture and proclamation as the Word of God, and therefore the 
relation and correspondence between the two, and therefore the possibility and 
necessity of this question of their agreement'. 98 
As witness, the Bible is distinguished from the revelation itself. For a witness 
is not identical to that which it witnesses. We have to do with human words and 
human speech in the Bible. As witness the Bible does not speak of itself - it points to 
the revelation of God, `and no honest and unprejudiced reader of the Bible can ignore 
this historical definitiveness of the word'. " But the concept of witness has something 
CD 1/2,518. 
" CD 1/2,522. 
" CD 1/2,457. 
99 CD 1/2,463. 
193 
more positive to say: `In this limitation the Bible is not distinguished from revelation'. 
It appears that we have here something like a paradox. The proximity of the biblical 
witness to the object to which it bears this witness makes the Bible, in this limited 
sense, indistinguishable from revelation. 
It is simply revelation as it comes to us, mediating and therefore 
accommodating itself to us - to us who are not ourselves prophets and 
apostles and therefore not the immediate and direct recipients of the 
one revelation, witnesses to the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Yet it is 
for us revelation by means of the words of the prophets and apostles 
written in the Bible, in which they are still alive for us as the 
immediate and direct recipients of revelation and by which they speak 
to us. 10° 
Barth is able to say that the Bible has a dignity and a validity of the Word of God. 
For if the Bible indeed is the witness of God's revelation, then the witness itself, as 
well as the revelation it attests, `is necessarily in the power of the revelation of the 
Word of God attested by it, and it necessarily acquires in the Church as distinct from 
all other words and signs, the dignity and validity of the Word of God'. t°' 
The statement `The Bible is the Word of God', however, needs further 
unpacking. This statement does not mean that alongside other attributes, the Bible has 
the attribute of being the Word of God. To say this is to violate the Word of God 
which is God himself, since God is not an attribute of something else. He is Subject 
and Lord. `He is Lord even over the Bible and in the Bible'. ` Furthermore the 
statement does not mean that the Word of God is tied to the Bible. On the contrary, 
it is the Bible that is tied to the Word. To say that the Bible is the Word of God is to 
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say that it is the Word of God. It is therefore beyond all human control. 
... it is therefore to speak about a being and event which are not under 
human control and föresight. Our knowledge of this being and event 
does not justify us in thinking and speaking of them as though they 
were under our control and foresight. We know this divine nature 
which we cannot control and foresee when we know this Word, when 
we know, then, what we are saying when we say that the Bible is the 
Word of God. That we have the Bible as the Word of God from a 
statement about the being and eile of God in and through the Bible into 
a statement about the Bible as such. 103 
(2) Scripture becomes and so is the Word of God. Only after the above 
considerations can we come to this important assertion. Here we have Barth's unique 
and sacramental view of scripture. As we have already gathered from the above 
discussion, Barth wanted to emphasise both the humanity of the Biblical writers. and 
the fact that what they have written was inspired by the Holy Spirit. The first 
witnesses of revelation spoke and wrote under the commission of God. They spoke 
and wrote as auctores secundarii, in obedience to this commission. As eye-witnesses 
and ear witnesses, they each spoke and wrote `individually, each within his own 
psychological, biographical and historical possibilities, and therefore within the limits 
set by these possibilities'. 1O' But placed under the lordship of God, being surrounded 
and impelled by his Spirit, the first witnesses stood under the auctoritas primaria. The 
prophets and apostles, in all their humanity and finitude, performed their function as 
witnesses of revelation for which they were chosen and called. Under the authority 
of their Lord they spoke as true men in the name of the true God. As witnesses they 
were unique in that `they have heard his voice as we cannot hear it, as we can hear 
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it only through their voices'. '°5 
The Bible was written by fallible, erring men. They were individuals living in 
a particular time and belonging to a particular culture. Because the biblical writers 
wrote as men in their own cultures and historical environment, we cannot expect them 
to possess a compendium of truth. It follows that we should not expect to find, in 
their writings, solomonic or divine knowledge of all things. 106 The Bible is 
vulnerable not only in matters of historical data and scientific judgement but also in 
its religious, and even theological content, because everything the biblical writers say 
is historically related and conditioned. 1°7 Yet, in spite of all its limitations and 
fallibility, scripture is the kind of testimony which God uses to come and speak to us. 
Scripture as the Word of God is an event in which God uses the testimonies of the 
prophets and apostles to speak to us now. On the importance of the `event' character 
of scripture in Barth's thought, J. K. S. Reid writes: `Round this matter of event, the 
whole problem of Holy Scripture turns, as does also the reality and truth of this event, 
there is nothing already past or very future, nothing that is pure recollection or pure 
expectation. In this event, this original witness is the Word of God'. ` Hence for 
10-5 CD 1/2,506. `That is the mystery of the centre before which we always stand 
when we hear and read them: remembering that it was once the case (the recollection 
of the Church and our own recollection attests to it) that their voice reproduce the 
voice of God, and therefore expecting that it will be so again. The biblical concept 
of theopneustia points us therefore to the present, to the extent which occurs for us. 
Scripture has this priority, it is the Word of God'. Ibid. 
" Barth's next point is very interesting. He insisted that we should be content to 
say that the biblical writers have the capacity for error, rather than say that they have 
actually committed errors. For we ourselves do not possess divine insight or 
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107 CD 1/2,509. 
11 The Authority of Scripture (London: Methuen, 1957), 214. 
196 
Barth, to say the `Word of God' is to say the `work of God'. For what we have here 
is not a contemplation of a state or fact, but to witness and experience an event. This 
event is an act of God which rests on a free decision. It is an event which is relevant 
to us. '°' 
Recollection of God's past revelation discovery of the Canon, faith in 
the promise of the prophetic and apostolic word, or better, the self- 
imposing of the Bible in the virtue of its content, and to be understood 
only as event. In this event the Bible is God's Word. That is to say, in 
this event the human prophetic and apostolic word is a representative 
of God's Word in the same way as the word of the modern preacher 
is to be in the event of real proclamation: a human word which has 
God's commission to us behind it, a human word to which God has 
given himself as the object, a human word which is required and 
accepted by God as good, a human word in which God's own address 
to us(S an event. "' 
Many of Barth's critics have taken issue on his view of the Bible in general 
and verbal inspiration in particular. Gordon Clark, for example, has argued that 
Barth's notion that the infallibility of the Bible would give man control over God is 
fundamentally wrong as it is `merely the expression of God's nature and need'. "` 
He finds Barth's theology self-contradictory and accuses him of irrationality, operating 
on the basis of `incompatible axioms'. 112 The problem here, as in most cases, can 
be located in the misconstrual of Barth's actualism, and his sacramental understanding 
of revelation. Clarke's puzzlement as to how Barth can both assert and deny the 
authority of the Bible proceeds from a perspectival `blind spot'. A brilliant 
109 CD 1/2,527. 
10 CD I/ 1,109. 
"' Barth's Theological Method (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1963), 225. 
112 Ibid., 224. 
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interpretation of Barth's view of the Bible, especially in the area of the debate of 
infallibility, is offered by G. Bolich, a conservative theologian, and a defender of 
Barth. Bolich makes the distinction between the `ontological' and the `functional' 
when discussing Barth's view of the Bible. The `ontological' refers to the inherent 
authority of the Bible while the `functional' refers to the authority of God. He writes, 
in support of Barth's doctrine of scripture, that 
Ontologically, it is not infallible - if ontology is all that is being 
considered. Again, Barth's actualism resolves the matter: the scripture 
is not an 'in-itself', 'for-itself' ntity but exists in the act of God's 
revelation, for God and for man, as the word of God to man in the 
words of man himself. Scripture proves itself functionally infallible 
only in the act of God's gracious opening to human eyes to see Christ - 
and, once opened, human eyes behold the glory of God in the earthen 
vessels of human words. 113 
The above is another way of stating Barth's sacramental understanding of 
scripture. Though Barth's sacramentalism may imply that in principle God speaks to 
us through any literature, and many of his critics have indeed used this against him, 
Barth taught specifically that God in fact uses only scripture for this purpose. 
Misunderstandings often occur when the reader confuses what Barth says that God, 
in His freedom, could do with what he says that God has actually done. The scripture 
is, for Barth, the supreme authority of the Church beside which there can be no equal. 
Barth places the tradition of the church under the authority of scripture. The Bible 
`must be distinguished from and given precedence over the purely spiritual and oral 
life of ecclesiastical tradition'. "' It is the basis of the Church's recollection and the 
basis of her proclamation, though within the Church there is what he calls `relative' 
"' Karl Barlh and Evangelicalism (Illinois, IVP, 1980), 147-148. 
"' CD 1/2,106. 
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authority. Barth's attitude towards the tradition of the church may be described as one 
of respectful freedom. Thompson explains that `... this respect for tradition and 
traditional statements is and must be combined with a freedom of the Word and under 
the Word, a freedom to look at past statements and to formulate them anew'. "' 
If divine infallibility cannot be ascribed to any Church confession, then 
in practise we have to recognise that every Church confession can be 
regarded only as a stage on a road which as such can be relativised and 
succeeded by a further stage in the form of an altered confession. 
Therefore respect for its authority has necessarily to be conjoined with 
a basic readiness to envisage a possible alteration of this kind. "' 
b. The Church 
(i) The Nature of the Church. We now take up once again our discussion of the 
place of Church in our knowledge of God. Space does not allow us to study Barth's 
ecclesiology in detail. "' The main purpose of this sub-section is to examine the 
relationship between the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and the Church in Barth's 
theology. We begin by looking at Barth's understanding of the nature of the Church. 
For Barth, the church, as the community of the redeemed, has her basis in the 
Incarnation, that is to say, in the Person and work of Jesus Christ her Lord. Through 
the power of the Holy Spirit, the church was brought into being - the Holy Spirit 
incorporates men and women into the church, he guarantees the unity of the church 
with Christ. 
The Holy Spirit is the power, and his action the work of the co- 
"S The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth, 65. 
"° CD 1/2,658-9. 
"' For a comprehensive study of Barth's ecclesiology, see C O'Grady, The Church 
in the Theology of Karl Barth, 2 Vols. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968 & 1969). 
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ordination of the being of Jesus Christ and that of his community as 
distinct from and yet enclosed within it. Just as the Holy Spirit, as 
himself an eternal divine `person' or mode of being, as the Spirit of the 
Father and Son (qui ex Patre Filioque procedit), is the bond of peace 
between the two, so in the historical work of reconciliation he is the 
One who constitutes and guarantees the unity in the Lotus Christus, i. e., 
Jesus Christ in the heights and depths, in his transcendence and in his 
immanence 
... He is the One who constitutes and guarantees the unity in . which he is at one and the same time the heavenly head with God 
and the earthly body with his community. "' 
The Church is guided and guarded by the same Lord present by the Spirit. As the 
Spirit of Truth, the Holy Spirit ensures that the Church is guarded against the dangers 
of secularism, secularisation and self-glorification. The theology of Barth establishes 
a very close relationship between the reconciliation of the world in Christ and the 
nature of the church. Christ is the Head and King of both the world and the church. 
The church can be seen to be the provisional form, a concrete instantiation of what 
Christ has in fact done for the world. Rosato writes: `The insight is the germ of 
Barth's ecclesiology, whose main purpose is to show how the reconciliation of all men 
in Jesus Christ takes place in concrete form when Christians recognise and proclaim 
the real union between their existence and that of their Lord'. 119 
The church, as the community of Jesus Christ always has an event character. 
The Holy Spirit is not the soul of the church as the immanentism of Roman 
Catholicism would have us believe. Barth sought to emphasise the ontological 
difference between the Spirit and the church. The Spirit, while remaining always 
transcendent because he is always Lord, comes to the church again and again to 
renew her. The church's being is therefore in its becoming again and again by the 
"x CD IV/3.2,763ff. 
19 The Spirit as Lord, 123. 
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Word and the Spirit. `The Church owes its being to the continual event of its 
becoming by the Word and Spirit'. 120 This consistent dialectic of ontology and the 
dynamic is evident here in his ecclesiology as it is in all of Barth's theological 
thinking. The church is incorporated into the life of Christ by the Spirit. In this way 
the being of the church is in the very being of Jesus Christ in his act of reconciliation. 
(ii) - The Purpose of the Church. The Church does not exist for itself but for the 
world; ''-' it has a missionary purpose. Through it the Spirit of the living Christ 
reaches out to all men. We see here the sacramental nature of the church and its 
ministry: through the being and activity of the community of Jesus Christ, a 
community which comprises of, in Luther's dictum, justified sinners, the light of 
Christ shines to all humanity. Through the Church, Christ reaches out, by the power 
of the Holy Spirit, to the world which is his de jure, but not yet de facto. 
The community is confronted and created by the Word of God. It is 
conununlo sanctorum, the communion of saints, because it is 
congregatio fidelium, the gathering of the faithful. As such, it is the 
coniuratio tertium, the confederation of the witnesses who may and 
must speak because they believe. The community does not speak with 
words alone. It speaks by the very fact of its existence in the world; 
by its silent service to all the handicapped, weak, needy in the world. 
It speaks, finally, by the simple fact that it prays for the'world. It does 
all these because this is the purpose of its summons by the Word of 
God. It cannot avoid these things, since it believes)22 
(iii) The Proclamation of the Church. The Word of God must be the theme of the 
proclamation of the church in order for it to be real proclamation. This means that all 
human talk about God, all proclamation, must be based on the self-objectification of 
120 John Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth, 106. 
121 CD IV/3.2,763ff. 
''-' Evangelical Theology, 38. 
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God in His Word. The Word of God must be the object over and against us. And 
though it must be an object of human perception in order for it to be proclaimed, it 
cannot be something that we can possess or manipulate. We have it only because it 
gives itself to us. '23 Secondly, the Word of God is the judgement in virtue of which 
proclamation becomes real proclamation. `Real proclamation, therefore, is the Word 
of God preaches ... [This] means human talk about God which by God's own 
judgement, that cannot be anticipated and never passes under our control, is true with 
reference both to the proclaimed object and also to the proclaiming subject, so that 
it is talk which has to be listened to and which rightly demands obedience'. "' 
Thirdly, the Word of God is the commission, God's positive command, upon whose 
givenness proclamation must rest if it is to be real proclamation. Thus, human talk 
about God, and also as the Word of God preached, must have its basis on God's own 
direction, `which fundamentally transcends all human causations'. '25 Real 
proclamation is therefore an event in which human talk is exalted and becomes the 
Word of God. The Word of God preached means `man's talk about God in which and 
through which God speaks about himself'. "' Barth is ever so careful to emphasise 
the human element in this phenomenon. 
As Christ became true man and remains true man to all eternity, real 
proclamation becomes an event-on the level of all human events. It can 
be seen and heard on this level, and its being seen and heard thus is no 
mere appearance but must take place in full essentiality. Without the 
ambivalence, the liability to misunderstanding and the vulnerability 
'23 CD 1/1,91-2. 
124CDI/1,90. 
'=` CD 1/1,90. 
126 CDI/1,95. 
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with which this takes place, with which it is itself one event among 
many others, it could not be real proclamation. 127 
This is the miracle of real proclamation. It is not a human willing and doing 
characterised in a certain way. It is primarily and decisively God's own speech. 
Proclamation and the church are, of course, simply and visibly there 
just as the bread and wine of communion are simply and visibly there 
just as the distribution, eating and drinking of the bread and wine in 
communion take place simply and visibly. They are not simply and 
visibly there, however, as that which they want to be and should be, 
as theologically relevant entities, as realities of revelation and faith. 
They have ever and again to come into being as such. '28 
The nature, mission and proclamation of the Church point not only to the fact 
that it is the subjective realisation of reconciliation, that is to say, the ingathering of 
men by the Holy Spirit to Christ, but also the subjective realisation of revelation 
which is the presupposition of redemption and reconciliation. `The revelation of God 
in its subjective reality consists in the existence of men who have been led by God 
Himself to a certain conviction'. The Church is a community of men who believe in 
the objective reality of the revelation of God and have so appropriated this revelation 
for themselves (or rather they have now entered into a relationship with God's 
revelation in the Son by the Spirit) that they could no longer understand their own 
existence apart from it. `They cannot, therefore, understand themselves except as the 
brethren of the Son, as bearers and doers of the Word of God'. '29 We are then 
brought back to the statement of Luther, which is so central to Barth, that the church 
127 CD 1/1,94. 
121 CD 1/1,88. 
129 CD 1/2,232. 
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is the locus within which Christ can be found13° and where theological utterances 
are made and corrected. 131 
The burden of this chapter is to examine the revelation theology of Karl Barth. 
Revelation is an event which involves the Triune God: God the Father is revealed in 
the Son by the Holy Spirit. This revelation is received by faith and in the church. As 
we have seen in the last chapter, for Barth, faith and knowledge cannot be separated. 
The question which must be asked at this point then is, What are the limits of our 
knowledge of God? And can we speak of the veracity of the knowledge of God which 
is the knowledge of faith? These are the questions which we will address in the next 
chapter. 
"0 Cf., CD 1/2,213. 
131 CD I/l, W. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TIC LIMITS AND VERACITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 
1. The Abyss Between God and Man 
In the final section of the fourth chapter, we discussed Barth's response to 
natural theology. According to him, the natural theologies of Roman Catholicism and 
Liberal Protestantism are an affront to the Gospel of grace because they idolise human 
autonomy and attribute powers to reason which it does not possess. Barth maintains 
that we cannot attain to the knowledge of God by our natural faculties because of the 
abyss between God and us caused by creation and sin. The burden of this section is 
to examine the theological justifications for his viewpoint. 
Barth sets out his doctrine of Creation in four lengthy sections in the third 
volume of his church Dogmatics. Against all strands of pantheism and panentheism 
Barth argues clearly and forcefully that the reality of God and that of the world are 
distinct from one another. The proposition that God created heaven and earth asserts 
that the world truly is, it truly exists. But this proposition also points to the truth that 
the world is a whole reality distinct from God. ' Furthermore the above proposition 
asserts that the reality and being of the world has its origin from and is totally 
dependent on God. The world came into being as the result of the divine will. 
Because its whole sphere of reality comes from God, it has no power over its 
existence and form. That is to say, the cosmos does not belong to itself and cannot 
control itself. It is determined and established by God who alone is self-sufficient. '- 
' CD III/1,5. 
2 CD III/1,7. 
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The word bara' used in Genesis I denotes that the divine creation is different from 
all other. It denotes that the Creator, in creating the world, did not use any existing 
material: the world was created ex nihilo. This implies that the `Subject' here can only 
be God and `no one apart from him - no creature'? The world, created out of 
nothing, is the counterpart (Gegenüber) of the reality of God. ' This counter reality 
comprises of two components. The first is that of irrational nature, creatures which 
exist for and alongside of themselves (Mitteinander und Nebeneinander). The second 
is man, the counter to God as being something of a second being in regard to God 
(Gott gegenüber Zweiten). Unlike the other creatures, man exists as something - he 
is directed. towards and for a partner (Gegeneinander und Füreinander). 
The doctrine of creation is an article of faith. It is only by faith that we know 
that the world is-real and that God does not exist alone. ' The fact that the created 
reality has a nature of its own is not self-evident. Neither is it self-evident that the 
world and its whole sphere of reality comes from God, and that God is before the 
world. The doctrine of creation therefore is a `mystery'. There is not a word of the 
first article, Barth argues, which does not point to mystery. 
In line with the tradition of Reformed theology, Barth integrates the doctrine 
of creation with the doctrine of redemption. To be sure, redemption and reconciliation 
are not to be equated with creation. They, however, have their presupposition in 
creation, and in this sense, begin with it. The creation is the establishment of a place 
for the history of the covenant of grace. As God's first work, creation is the `shell' 




of God's second work and belongs to the entirety of God's work, which must be seen 
as one - the accomplishment of the covenant of grace. As the first amongst God's 
work, creation therefore stands indissolubly connected with all of God's other works, 
sharing the same dignity. Its history belongs to the history of the covenant of grace 
or salvation-history `which is the history to which all other history is determined'. So 
although it would be truer to say that creation follows the covenant of grace, creation 
is seen as God's first work because it sets the stage for the story of the covenant of 
grace. Because creation and covenant cannot be separated, the former cannot be seen 
as the first cause or final contingency in all things. ' Although the external dynamics 
of covenant rest on creation, and the covenant is the goal of creation while creation 
is the way of the covenant, creation is not the inner basis of the covenant. Creation 
is the covenant's external basis: it makes the covenant technically possible. The inner 
basis of the covenant, according to Barth, is the free love of God. ' 
This view of creation is to be commended. In an essay entitled `Karl Barth and 
the Doctrine of Creation', W. A. Whitehouse highlights the strengths of Barth's 
approach. ' Barth's doctrine of creation is truly theological. It is worked from the 
biblical testimony and not from scientific and metaphysical speculations and theories. 
This approach also takes the activity of God in creating the world seriously. Barth 
explains that `[w]hen we come to the predicate "creator" in the credal statement the 
main point to be made is that it encloses an event, a completed act. The Creator does 
6 CD 111/ 1,42-43. 
' CD III/1,97-98. 
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not just "exist". He has done something: creavit; He has accomplished the creatio'. 9 
Furthermore it affirms the goodness of that which was created. And finally, Barth's 
doctrine of creation is not a peripheral theme but is located within the context of 
covenant redemption. 
The only approach to the doctrine of creation for Barth is to be found in Jesus 
Christ. The ontological difference between God and the world which has considerable 
bearing on man's natural noetic capabilities, and the indissoluble connection between 
creation and covenant makes this conclusion inevitable. Jesus Christ is not only the 
Word by which God accomplishes creation, through him God has disclosed to us the 
fact that he is Creator of the world. 
Barth's theological anthropology also proceeds from his understanding of the 
relationship between creation and covenant. As the counterpart of God man is the 
reflection or copy of the divine life. 10 The relationship between God and man is the 
relation of the I and Thou. According to Barth, only man enjoys this special 
con 
relationship with God. It is only on the basis of this relationship aha; weconceive and 
understand the tertium comparationis, the analogy between God and man. This is not 
established on the basis of an analogia emis but an analogia relationis, a term which 
Barth borrows from Bonhoeffer. The Imago Dei is not interpreted to be rationality or 
freedom of will or the triple faculties of memory, intellect and will. It is conceived 
in the I-Thou relationship, and this, according to Barth, is concretised and fulfilled 
in the duality of man, that is to say, in the differentiation and relationship of the 
sexes. `Man is no more solitary than God. But as God is One, and He alone is God, 
' CD III/1,13. 
10 CD III/l, 184ff. 
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so man is one and alone, and two only in duality of his kind, i. e., in the duality of 
man and woman'. " The I-Thou relationship is first constitutive of God, and then for 
man created by God. The Imago Dei, conceived in this way, is a special grace from 
God and could not therefore be the possession of man. This for Barth is the only real 
principle of identification and differentiation; it is the true humanum, the true 
creaturely image of God. 
Only the covenant unites man with God. Man's creation is said to be the 
`external presupposition of the covenant'. 'Z By nature man is God's correspondent 
in radical dissimilarity and therefore not a part of the covenant. Considered in 
abstracto, man is such a being that the Fall is an ontological necessity. 13 But man 
cannot be conceived in this way since he is created for the purpose of covenantal 
relationship. From the outset everything must be understood from this two-fold 
reality: `It is not for nothing but something; yet it is something on the edge of 
nothing, bordering it and menaced by it, and having no power of itself to overcome 
the danger'. 14 The distinction between creation and its ground points to a radical 
dissimilarity and as such an abyss between God and man. And it is because of this 
gulf that revelation is absolutely necessary for theological knowledge. 
Barth argues further that man cannot attain to the knowledge of God because 
of sin. The sinfulness of man presents an ontological obstacle to his knowledge of 
God. This, however, has nothing to do with the effects of sin on the Imago Dei. Barth 
CD III/1,186. 
CD 111/1,94,98,228, section 41. 
CD 111/2,146,220. 
14 CD 111/1,376. 
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argues that the image of God in man remains even after the Fall. The image of God 
is not lost either partially or completely, formally or materially as the result of the 
Fall. The Reformers have argued that the Fall has distorted the Image of God in man 
because they understood the Imago as the rectitudo animae or status integritatis which 
man possessed before the Fall. Barth argues that nothing in Genesis suggests that the 
image of God is forfeited on account of the Fall. 
The biblical saga knows nothing of an original ideal man either in Gen. 
1, Gen. 2, or elsewhere. Hence it is not surprising that neither the rest 
of the Old Testament or the New is any trace of the abrogation of this 
ideal state, or the partial or complete destruction of the Imago Dei. 
What man does not possess he can neither bequeath nor forfeit. And 
on the other hand the divine intention at the creation of man, and 
consequent promise and pledge given with it, cannot be lost or 
subjected to partial or complete destruction. 15 
The Image of God in man is conceived in the context of the analogia relationis which 
is established by grace and therefore not affected by the Fall. 
But this does not mean that Barth does not take sin seriously. The Fall 
radically and completely corrupts the nature of man. After the Fall, man's nature is 
no-nature (Un-natur) and his knowledge no-knowledge (Unerkenntnis). 16 Barth of 
course concedes the fact that man, even in his fallen state is capable of acquiring 
some form of knowledge. But this knowledge is fragmentary, relative and lacks 
certitude: it consists of connecting a set of given elements with proper hypothesis. 
Man, by himself, cannot attain to the true sense of God, of himself, and of the world. 
This is hidden from him. It can only be obtained, according to Barth, through 
revelation. The veracity of man's knowledge of God comes from the reality of God's 
11 CD III/I, 200. 
16 CD 111/2,29,31-32,38-48. 
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revelation which is apprehended by faith. This is the concern of the next section. 
2. The Terminus A Quo and Terminus Ad Quem of Theological Knowledge 
The abyss between God and man caused by creation and sin creates serious doubts 
about the theological respectability of natural theology. Theological knowledge is 
possible only because God has disclosed himself to man. Man's views and 
conceptions, in their own inner power, and in virtue of their own capacity, cannot 
attain this knowledge. One cannot even speak of `a potentiality of our cognition which 
has to be actualised by revelation'. " The fundamental thesis that determines and 
shapes Barth's theory of theological knowledge is `God is known by God and by God 
alone'. " To this fundamental principle Barth adds that God must be, and is, known 
with absolute certitude. Only God can convey this certitude. This he does through 
revelation, for, according to Barth, `God's revelation is ... his knowability', 
19 and 
the veracity of our knowledge of God is the veracity of his revelation. " 
Our knowledge of God according to Barth is clearly explicated by its terminus 
a quo and terminus ad quern, that is, its beginning and goal. He explains that `since 
we are dealing with an event, limit here is to be understood in the sense of terminus. 
What happens when God becomes clear and understandable to us, and visible to us 
in form, is when we know the terminus a quo and terminus ad quern of this event, the 
"CDII/l, 180. 
18 CD II/1,179. `Gott wird nur durch Gott erkannt'. Cf., KD 11/1,47,202. 
" Ibid. 
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point with which it begins and the point at which it ends'. 21 
According to Barth, the first word which God conveys to man in his 
knowledge of him is his hiddenness. The terminus a quo, as the starting point of 
theological knowledge, deals with this truth. Barth stresses that even the concept of 
the hiddenness of God must not be seen as a product of human inquiry. It is revealed 
to man - God's first Word to man. Because the hiddenness of God is God's Word to 
us and therefore God's revelation of himself, it must not be understood as our 
`despairing resignation' and `ignorance'. Rather it must be seen as the starting point 
of our real knowledge of God, the original starting point of our way of knowing and 
actual cognisance of God: `The confession of God's hiddenness is the confession of 
God's revelation as the beginning of our cognisance of God'. 22 In this way, the 
knowledge of the hiddenness of God is a consequence of faith; it is Glaubenssatz. 
This is because the knowledge of the hiddenness of God points to our impotence. It 
points to the fact that our view, knowledge and conceptions of God are not based on 
some qualitative potentialities in us. Rather it is `a miraculous work of divine good 
pleasure'. 23 In a similar vein, because we have received permission to know him in 
our human viewing and conceiving, and to speak of him in our human language, this 
does not mean that our human viewing, conceiving and speaking possess their own 
capacity for God, even if this is understood as a capacity that is `awakened' 
(envecktes) or `actualised' (actualiseries) by revelation and by faith. `On the contrary, 
our viewing, conceiving and speaking are placed in service and put to use for which 
21 CD II/I, 184. 
22 CDII/l, 192. 
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they have, of and in themselves, no fitness either before or after this takes place'. 24 
What does Barth mean when he speaks about the hiddenness of God? Barth 
explains that the hiddenness of God does not only point to the question of his 
incomprehensibility. Although it does involve this as well, Barth says that we must 
go further than that. `The statement of the hiddenness of God says of it as such that 
it cannot, on the ground of man's own capacity, be the knowledge of God'. " This 
statement, however, needs further clarification. The above statement means that every 
general consideration of the inapprehensibility of `God' made in philosophy - the 
incomprehensibility of supreme being in the sense of Plato, Plotinus and Kant - every 
general metaphysical speculation about the inapprehensibility of the absolute must not 
be used to base our understanding of the hiddenness of God, since they are products 
of human reason and therefore of human viewing and conceiving. `We must not', 
Barth asserts, `base the hiddenness of God on the inapprehensibility of the infinite, 
the absolute, that which exists in and of itself, etc. For all this in itself and as such 
(whether it is or not, and whatever it may be) is the product of human reason in spite 
of and in its supposed inapprehensibility. It is not, therefore, identical with God and 
is in no way a constituent part of the divine hiddenness'. The hiddenness of God 
means that God is not a being that we can spiritually appropriate. 
For God - the living God who encounters us in Jesus Christ - is not such a one 
as can be appropriated by us, and in so doing permit and command and 
therefore adapt us to appropriate him as well. It is because the fellowship 
between God and us is established and continues by God's grace that God is 
hidden from us. All our efforts to apprehend him by ourselves shipwreck on 
this. He is always the One who will first and foremost apprehend and possess 
us. It is only on the basis of this, and in the area marked out by it that there 
24 CD 11/ 1: 94. 
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can and should be our own apprehension of God. 26 
Thus from the above, it is clear that for Barth God cannot be encompassed by us in 
any way. We cannot incorporate him in our worldview, and if we try to do this, we 
will only reveal our godlessness. Involuntarily we would have confirmed the 
hiddenness of God. 
Barth offers three reasons why God cannot be apprehended by us. Firstly, we 
are one with what we apprehend. As creatures we are one with the created world. 
Therefore, as creatures, we can have intuitions and concepts about the world. We, 
however, have no quality which renders us equal to God: `Between God and man, as 
between God and the creature in general, there consists an irrevocable otherness. 
Because this is so, because the mystery of unity underlying all our other apprehension 
does not exist here, we cannot conceive of God ourselves'. 27 Secondly, we master 
what we comprehend. This means that we limit what we intuit, conceive and 
apprehend, and by thus delimiting these things, we become masters of and are 
superior to that which we encompass. Despite puzzles and mysteries, this is essentially 
our relationship with the world - the apparent infinity of the world is in fact limited 
by the finite and the apparent finitude is limited by the infinite. The Absolute and 
Relative (das Absolute und das Relative), being for itself and being in itself (das für 
26 CD II/1,188. 
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sich und das au sich Seinde) are also limited in this way making them dialectical and 
reversible concepts (dialectische Wechselbegriffe). " This contradiction and dialectic, 
which we experience within ourselves, can be mastered theoretically and practically. 
We cannot however master God. When we attempt to determine God by a worldview 
(Weltanschauung) or philosophical system, we are actually determining the system, 
not God. God cannot be mastered by us; he is hidden and unknowable by any natural 
power. 29 And thirdly, we are one originally with what we comprehend. To 
comprehend means to appropriate (aneigen). Nothing can be appropriated without an 
original unity (Einheit) between the appropriated and the one who appropriates it. It 
is through this unity that we know the world and worldly objects. But between God 
and the world there is no unity at all. `Creation by God - even the creation of man - 
means the institution of an existence really distinct from the existence of God'. 3o 
Barth acknowledges the fact that we become aware of the world by intuitions 
(Anq`hauungen) and concepts (BegrifJ`e). Our awareness of objects comes through 
intentions and images. Concepts are counter images through which we appropriate 
images and arrange them in our thoughts. Intuitions and concepts enable us to speak 
about different things. It follows that since we can and do speak about God, we are 
able to perceive and think of him. 3' But since God is known by God alone, Barth 
maintains that if we do know him by our concepts and intuitions, this is not due either 
to the quality or power or by the actualisation of our cognitive faculty. Our 
28 CD 11/1,188; Cf., KD II/1,220. 
29 CD II/1,189; Cf., KD II/1,211-212. 
Ibid., Cf., KD 11/ 1,212. 
CD 11/1,181; Cf., KDII/1,203. 
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knowledge of God is possible only by faith in his revelation. Hence our intuitions and 
concepts are instruments in our knowledge of God. Though we are active in their 
formation, their veracity is entirely dependent on God, whose truth supervenes upon 
them. For this reason, Barth is anxious to recover the proper understanding of the 
Deus definiri nequit, a term which has been seriously misunderstood by mystical 
theology, especially by Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite and his disciples. Against 
the apophatism of the mystical theologians Barth understands the Deus definiri nequit 
as `the confession of God's revelation by which we certainly affirm the incapacity of 
our own viewing and conceiving of God is disclosed, but by which the mouth is not 
stopped but opened by the delivery of the divine mandate'. 32 In this way Barth's 
understanding of the term is more positive and radical than that of the mystical 
theologians. Positively, the Deus definiri nequit reminds the Church that she has 
received a permission and a command to keep the true knowledge of God bestowed 
upon it. Negatively, the term prohibits the Church from escaping into philosophy's 
supposed knowledge of the absolute. Taking the latter course will no doubt lead the 
Church to a god who will certainly be apprehensible. But it will not be the true God. 
`The true God is the hidden God. The Church must not flee from the task of knowing 
and proclaiming just this God', 33 
In his revelation, the God whom man cannot apprehend, makes himself 
apprehensible and is therefore apprehended. Man is therefore not left alone, but, as 
we have already seen in previous chapters, stands before God in the miracle of his 




Through Christ God works and enters into an actual relationship with man. 
In his revelation in Jesus Christ, the hidden God has indeed made 
himself apprehensible. Not directly, but indirectly. Not by sight, but 
by faith. Not in his being, but in sign. Not, then, by the dissolution of 
his hiddenness - but apprehensibly. The revelation of God is that God 
has given to the creature whom he has chosen and determined to this 
end the commission and the power to take his place and represent him, 
to bear witness to him. The Word was made flesh: this is the first, 
original and controlling sign of all signs' 
By the tenidizus ad quem of the knowledge of God, Barth refers to the end and 
goal of that event or movement of human action which constitutes theological 
knowledge. The terminus ad quern of our. knowledge of God is determined by its 
object; it is the limit by which it is both separated from and united to its object. 35 
True theological knowledge, according to Barth, involves a circular course: God is 
known only by and through God. This knowledge, in both its objective and subjective 
aspects, is made possible by God alone. Theology, if it is to be faithful to its object, 
cannot place itself outside this circular course. It is only when one is operating within 
this course that one can proceed with confidence and be assured of the veracity of 
one's knowledge of God. 
In the process of revelation, God objectifies himself in the world, thus 
becoming an object of our cognisance, at once similar and dissimilar to other objects. 
Apart from this event, God-talk would be impossible. 36As an object of our 
cognisance, God must be a reality in our world, since `our knowledge must be the 
' CD II/l, 1 99. 
35 CD II/I, 204. 
36 CD II/l, 205. 
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knowledge of world-reality if it is really going to be our knowledge'. 37 But this 
worldly reality must always be distinguished from other worldly realities because of 
the gracious presence of God. That is to say, that this object attests to God is the 
result of the gracious work of the Word and Spirit of God and in the freedom of his 
love. It is through this miracle of God's grace that this object `really attests God, that 
it is not, therefore, something quite different standing in the place of God, and that 
therefore our knowledge of God is true'. 38In knowing God, we do not have to do 
with something or someone else, but with God himself; that is, God in his revelation. 
Furthermore, our knowledge of God is not random, or at risk of being mistaken. It 
is `right', `unassailable' and `trustworthy'. The veracity of our knowledge of God is 
the veracity of his revelation. `Our knowledge of God is then true - as true as it can 
be as our knowledge, which cannot coincide with the knowledge of God'. 39 
Barth's central thesis concerning the veracity of our knowledge of God is 
-clear. Human knowledge of God is true because God's revelation is true: God is truly 
God in his revelation. But what is the character of our participation in the knowledge 
of God? Barth maintains that our participation of the truth of God's 
revelation can only be a participation of (1) Thankfulness (Dankbarkeit), (2) 
wondering awe (Ehrfurcht) and (3) duty (Dürfen). 
Firstly, then, our participation in God's revelation should basically consist of 
the offering of our thanks because our knowledge of God does not have its necessity 
in itself or in ourselves but in God. This means that our participation in God's 
37 CD II/1,207. 
38 Ibid. 
39 CD 11/ 1,209. 
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revelation must be understood as a response and an acknowledgement of that 
revelation. As acknowledgement our knowledge of God `is put under the measure, 
order and speaking of his revelation'. 40 That is to say, this revelation of God 
determines our thinking and speaking. The object brings with it the possibility and 
necessity as well as delimits our various perceptions and conceptions. As a work of 
thanksgiving or gratitude, the knowledge of God as participation in the veracity of the 
revelation of God must also take place in joyfulness. The revelation of God that 
reaches us, the revelation in which we participate must fully involve us. By this 
involvement, which places us under the rule of the object, we become obedient. 
Revelation reaches us from without; but this also means that it actually comes to us 
and therefore into us. Without ceasing to be transcendent, the revelation of God 
becomes immanent in us. On the basis of this distinction between the transcendence 
and immanence, our obedience to the revelation is free: since our acknowledgement 
of the revelation of God is a subjectivity of our acknowledgement of his revelation, 
it is our elevation above ourselves. It is this that of necessity makes our knowledge 
of God a joyful action. 4' Secondly, our participation in God's revelation should 
always be an act of wondering awe. There is a general incongruence between God 
and man, between the known and the knower. True knowledge of God would 
necessarily mean the overcoming of this congruence. This has been accomplished on 
the side of God (since it cannot be overcome from man's side) through the grace of 
revelation. The fact that we do actually know God means that we are placed in God's 
40 CD II/1,218. 
41 CD II/ 1,219. 
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revelation which is apprehended by faith. 42 `Awe' necessarily refers to the distance 
between our work and its object which is overcome by grace. `In awe we gratefully 
let grace be grace, and always receive it as such. We never let reception become 
taking. Our knowledge of God is always compelled to be a prayer of thanksgiving, 
penitence and intercession. It is only in this way that there is knowledge of God'. a3 
Our participation in God's revelation is, finally, one of obligation. It is our duty to 
know God. Our intuitions, concepts and words correspond to their exterior object 
(Gegenstand), God, because by the grace of faith there is a positive relationship 
between our thinking and its object. This positive relation implies that between us and 
God there is a community (Gemeinschaft). It is on the basis of this communion that 
our knowledge of God is true and not fictional. 
Barth acknowledges that his line of argument leads to a circulus veritatis. 
There are, however, many kinds of circuli veritatis. They do not only have to do with 
theological knowledge: `There are in fact other circular courses which are in their 
own way legitimate and impressive and full of solutions and fruitful, but in which 
there is never any question of the knowledge of God, but more or less clearly of one 
of different forms of a human self-knowledge metaphysically constructed'. ' As a 
precaution against a possible confusion these other circular courses must be avoided. 
It is only in faith that we can move into the circulus veritatis Dei `we must openly and 
honestly let ourselves be asked whether and how far this really took place in faith'. 45 
4'- CD 11/ 1,220. 
43 CD II/1,223. 
4' CD 11/1,244. 
45 CD II/1,246. 
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The presupposition of faith cannot go unquestioned. Now faith comes from outside 
of us and not from ourselves. Hence it follows that `the substantiation of our faith and 
therefore the necessary confirmation of our systematic deliberations and affirmations 
in respect of the knowledge of God must also come to us from without'. ' The 
circulus veritatis which Barth is referring to and argues for can . 
have nothing to do 
`with an act of synthesis executed by ourselves'. It is an answer only when it is not 
our answer but a witness of God's answer. In this respect we cannot say anything 
conclusively about it by ourselves: `If we try to speak conclusively of the limits of our 
knowledge of God and of the knowledge of God generally, we can come to no 
conclusion'. We can only speak of the divine reality by which the circulus veritatis 
Dei is encompassed. That reality is Jesus Christ. `We can, therefore, only describe 
him again, and often, and in the last resort infinitely often'. 47 This, Barth points out, 
does not only mean generally that we can know God only through Christ. `It has the 
particular meaning that we must know him as the first and proper Subject of the 
knowledge of God'. 43 For in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge 
(Col 2: 3). 
... faith consists absolutely in the fact that we want to know only about 
the temptation and comfort that have come upon Jesus Christ, only 
about his Cross and resurrection as the question, really directed to us 
but in this way really answered for us, of our action: of the. correction 
of our line of thought; of the limits and the veracity of our knowledge 
of God. 49 
CD 11/1,249. 
47 CD II/1,250. 
48 CD 11/1,252. 
" CD II/1,254. 
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By speaking thus of the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem of man's 
knowledge of God, Barth has brilliantly revitalised Luther's dictum that God, in his 
revelation, is both Deus absconditus and Deus revelatus: God is revealed in his 
hiddenness and hidden in his revelation. To be sure Barth does not mean by this the 
scholastic notion of the potentia Dei ordinata/absoluta which envisages the possibility 
of metaphysical speculation about deity based on some `ordained' power. Quite to the 
contrary, Barth, as we have seen, emphasises, like Luther, that God can only be 
known as he is revealed in Jesus Christ. The terminus a quo/ad quern shows that God 
can only be known in his revelation, and this revelation is conceived in a tension of 
hidden/revealed, of mystery/revelation. If the terminus a quo is understood as a part 
of God's revelation, then there is no deus absconditus in the sense of the principle of 
the unrecognisability of God. Luther, in making this distinction, has been charged 
with speaking about the two wills of God or even two Gods. This charge can be 
shown to be without foundation when seen in the context of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Jüngel argues rightly that this distinction is theologically legitimate (and in 
fact necessary) so long as it is understood in the context of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 50 This distinction speaks of God in motion between his Whence and Where- 
to. The trinitarian distinction of Father, Son and Holy Spirit shows that this movement 
of the Whence and Where-to of God is nothing other than God himself. The 
distinction therefore implies the fact that God himself is both origin and goal. This 
Barth tries to show with great persistence. The terminus a quo of our knowledge of 
God is at the same time the terminus ad quern. The deus absconditus, and faith in 
SQ Eberhard Jüngel, God as Me Mystery of the World (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 
1983) 345. 
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him, constitutes the proper starting point of our knowledge of God, just as the deus 
revelatus and faith in him constitutes the end of this knowledge. God is known only 
by God. In this sense, as Jüngel correctly points out, 
... the differentiation between 
God and God can never be understood 
as a contradiction in God. There is a threat of such a contradiction in 
God in Lutheran dogmatics, to the extent that it does not gauge the 
distinction between the differentiation of the triune God. God does not 
contradict himself. God corresponds to himself. " 
3. Theological Science 
In this section it is purposed to examine Barth's understanding of the place, 
function and method of theology. This understanding has gone through several stages 
of development throughout his long career. The first phase, which spans the period 
when the young Barth was a student first at Berlin where he came under the influence 
of Adolph Harnack, and subsequently at Marburg where he came under the tutelage 
of Wilhelm Herrmann, may be best described as his pre-critical phase. During this 
period Barth was introduced to and became an enthusiastic student of Schleiermacher. 
Already in this period the young Barth was deeply interested in the question of 
scientific method and the problem of the interpenetration of Christianity and culture, 
a problem which was most acute in the nineteenth century and was inherited by 
twentieth century European Christianity. So enmeshed is Christianity with the culture 
of the day that it had become nothing more than an aspect of that culture and the 
historical life of European civilisation. How can the Church, when it no longer stands 
over and against the world, bring a genuine message to it? 
The magnitude of the problem intensified for Barth when, in 1909, upon his 
11 Ibid., 346. 
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entry into the ministry of the Swiss Reformed Church he became a pastor in a parish 
at Safenwil in Aargau, after serving a curacy in Geneva for a year. His pastoral 
duties, which entailed the exposition of the Bible week after week, led him into a 
spiritual crisis during which he discovered the `strange new world within the Bible', 
a world which was in sharp conflict with the theology he learned from his teachers 
in the Theological faculty of Germanys'- Barth became disillusioned with his former 
theological teachers; and, in 1919, through the publication of his celebrated 
Römerbrief, Barth announced his radical perspectival shift in which the transcendence 
and goodness of God is exalted, and the anthropocentric starting point of theology is 
called into question. In his explosive book, Barth `called upon the church to let God 
be God, and let man learn again how to be man, instead of trying to be God'. 53 This 
is the second phase of Barth's theological development. 
The third phase began with the re-writing of Rönterbrief(1920-21). During this 
period Barth read Overbeck, Plato, Kant, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, and it was the 
insights which he gained from these studies that led him from dialectic to dogmatic 
thinking. 54 During the summer semester of 1930 Barth also offered a seminar on 
Anselm's Cur Deus Homo. Not long after this he published his book entitled Ansehe: 
Fides Quaerens Intellectuni. In the preface of the second edition of the book (1958) 
Barth writes. 
52 Word of God and Word of Man, E. T. by Douglas Horton (Boston, Chicago, 
1928), 28-50. 
53 T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth. Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1990), 7. 
" T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth. An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1930-31 
(London: SCM, 1962), 48ff. 
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Only a comparatively few commentators, for example Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, have realised my interest in Anselm was never a side-issue 
for me or - assuming I am more or less correct in my historical 
interpretation of St Anselm - realised how much it has influenced me 
or been absorbed into my own line of thinking. Most of them have 
completely failed to see that in this book on Anselm I am working with 
a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that whole process 
of thought that has impressed me more and more in my Church 
Dogmatics as the only one proper to theology. " 
The Church Dogmatics was written using, those Anselmian principles that have so 
profoundly influenced Barth. The definitive and final break with anthropocentric 
theology is made here. And even though it has been said that this new direction can 
be traced back to his commentary on Romans, " it is here in the Church Dogmatics 
that his theological direction is sharply stated and systematically developed and 
applied. `Without the grace of his revelation', Barth maintains, `God is definitely not 
an object of human cognition, and definitely no object of human cognition is God'. 57 
Commenting on Barth's emphasis and approach Hartwell writes. 
He [Barth] categorically denies that man can know God, the world and 
man as they really are apart from God's particular and concrete 
revelation in Jesus Christ, no matter whether man assumes that he can 
achieve this knowledge by means of his innate capacities and 
endowments or whether he thinks that he gain it on the ground of a 
ss FQI, 11. 
In the `Preface to the second edition' of the Römerbrief, Barth wrote: `... if I 
have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the "infinite 
qualitative distinction" between time and eternity, and to my regarding this as 
possessing negative as well as positive significance: "God is in heaven, and thou art 
on earth". The relation between such a God and such a man, and the relation between 
such a man and such a God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the essence of 
philosophy. Philosophers name this KRISIS of human perception - Prime Cause: the 
Bible beholds at the same cross-roads - the figure of Jesus Christ'. Cf. Epistle to the 
Romans (London: OUP, 1933), 10. 
57 CD 11/1,205-206. 
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general revelation in creation or history. " 
The pivotal point in his theological development came about, according to Barth, from 
his study of Anselm. Describing the years 1928-38 Barth writes. 
... 
in these years, I have had to rid myself of the last remnants of a 
philosophical, i. e., anthropological (in America one says `humanistic' 
or `naturalistic') foundation and exposition of Christian doctrine. The 
real document of this farewell is, in truth, not the much read brochure 
Nein!, directed against Brunner in 1934, but rather the book about the 
evidence for God of Anselm of Canterbury which appeared in 1931. 
Among all my books I regard this as the one written with the greatest 
satisfaction. 59 
Although there are a number of scholars who disagree with Barth's 
interpretation of Anselm's theological method, 60 most agree that he has `done 
perhaps more than any other one man to stimulate study and discussion of Anselm in 
the 20th century'. " Dissatisfied with both the traditional and modern interpretations 
of the Anselm of the Proslogion, Barth sets out to provide his own interpretation 
based upon Anselm's own theological schema, and on the careful exegesis of the 
whole passage (Pros!. 2-4). 6' Let us examine Barth's interpretation of Anseim and 
see how the theological method of the eleventh century theologian has influenced his 
" Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction (London: Gerald 
Ducksworth & Co. Ltd., 1964), 48. 
19 How I Changed My Mind (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1966), 42-43. 
60 See, for example, Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth (London: Sands & Co. ltd., 
1962); John McIntyre, Anseim and his Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the `Cur Deus 
Homo' (London & Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1954); and, more recently, G. 
Watson, `A Study in St Anselm's Soteriology and Karl Barth's Theological Method', 
SIT 42 (1990), 493-512. 
61 Louis Merton, `Reflections on Some Recent Studies of Saint Anselm', Monastic 
Studies 3 (1965), 221. 
62 FQI, 8. 
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own theological method. 
According to Barth, theology is understood by Anselm as the intellectusfidei. 
By this he means that theology has its fundamental presupposition in faith which seeks 
understanding (intelligere). Understanding in turn would result in 'proof' d `joy', 
but it is not primarily for these that faith inherently seeks. Anselm's main concern 
therefore, according to Barth is not `proof' (probare) or joy (laetifare), although these 
are desirable. His main concern is to obtain the intelligere of faith. 
As intelligere is achieved, it issues in probare ... what to prove means is that the validity of certain propositions advocated by Anselm is 
established over against those who doubt or deny them; that is to say, 
it means the polemic-apologetic result of intelligere. 63 
The quaerens intellectum is immanent in the fides. The insellegere which faith seeks 
and finds issues in proof because ini'elligere, as we have already seen, has a 
polemical-apologetic result. `Anselm wants "proof" and "joy" because he wants 
intelligere and he wants intelligere because he believes'. 64This whole process is what 
theology is about. Since intelligere lies in the desire of faith, the necessity of the 
intelligere lies in the necessity of theology. 
What, then, is to be understood by `faith'? And what is the role, if any, of 
reason in the movement of `faith seeking understanding'? For Ansel m, faith is nothing 
less than an act of obedience to God involving the rectitude of the will. 65It is the 
`movement of the will' in response-to the Word of Christ, which is, for Anselm, 
63 FQI, 14. 
14 FQI, 16-17. 
61 FQI, 22 
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identical to the `Word of those who preach Christ'. 'Though faith is described as a 
striving of the human will not only towards but into `God and so a participation (albeit 
in a manner limited by creatureliness) in God's mode of Being and so a similar 
participation of God's aseity, in the matchless glory of his very Self ... ', it is not to 
be understood as something which man is able to do for himself. 67 The fact that the 
Word of God `comes to us and that we have the rectitudo volendi to receive it, is 
grace'. ' Man is therefore dependent on the prevenient grace of God (gratia 
Deipaeveniente) for faith. 69 
Anselm argues further that the human telos gives rise to the `right order' 
which must be followed. In Cur Deus Homo he writes: `... [the] right order requires 
that we believe the deep matters of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss 
I FQI, 22. 
67 FQJ, 17. 
6R FQI, 19. 
" In her recent article entitled `Fides Quaerens Intellectum: St Anselm's Method 
in Philosophical Theology', (Faith & Philosophy, Vol 9, No. 4,1992,407-435), 
Marilyn McCord Adams argues convincingly that the `framework' for Anselm's 
Proslogion is provided by his theological anthropology. Anselmian anthropology, 
Adams explains, points, firstly, to the `ontological incommensuration between a 
simple immutable and eternal God and fleeting creatures that "scarcely exist" by 
comparison'. The aseity of God means that the Divine nature is partly beyond grasp, 
that it is fundamentally incomprehensible by the human mind, and therefore 
inexpressible by human language. Secondly, Adam's Fall has caused a severe (though 
reparable) damage which mars the image of God in man. Thirdly, man is a rational 
creature, made in the image of God. They best express this impressed image when 
`they strive into God with all of their powers, straining to remember, to understand 
and to love him above all and for his own sake'. And finally, God has a mysterious 
bias for mercy `which raises hopes of Divine grace for healing, cleansing and 
restoring human nature from its fallen condition, thereby strengthening it for its work' 
(410). 
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them rationally ... '70 Similarly in the Proslogion he insists that `I shall not 
understand unless I believe'. " The priority of faith and its precedence to reason does 
not mean however that faith is irrational. Faith essentially seeks rational understanding 
for the latter is the requirement of the former. George Hunsinger offers four reasons 
why this is so. Firstly, God, faith's object, Hunsinger urges, is `a compendium of all 
rational truth'. Faith seeks understanding simply because of the rational nature of its 
object. Secondly, faith seeks understanding because its subjects, human beings, are 
rational creatures. Thirdly, faith seeks understanding because the relationship between 
the subject and the object is rational. Finally, only when theology is made rationally 
possible thus can it enter into the `inner necessity' of its object. `Theology', 
Hunsinger concludes, `is neither a storming of the gates of heaven not a sacrificium 
intellectum. It does not seek to establish the "general possibility" of the object, nor 
does it require a surrender of reason. It starts from an actuality and arrives at an 
understanding of its rational capacity ... '''- T. F. Torrance summarises it well when 
he writes that `... theology may be spoken of as the activity of reason within the 
knowledge bestowed on man by God, operating within the limits of noetic 
investigation required by the nature of the given object'. 73 
The possibility of theology lies in the special relationship between the faith of 
70 Cur Deus Homo, I. i. All quotations are taken from Jasper Hopkins and Herbert 
Richardson (eds. ) Anselin of Canterbury, (hereafter referred to as AOC) Vols I 
(London: SCM Press, 1974) and III (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1976). The 
above citation is taken from AOC 111: 50. 
11 Proslogion, c. i. Cf., AOC 1: 93. 
''- George Hunsinger (ed. & Trans. ) Karl Barth and Radical Politics (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1976), 218ff. 
73 Karl Bard,, 182,183. 
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the Christian, i. e., his subjective credo, and the teaching of the Church, the objective 
Credo. Anslem's understanding of the latter requires explanation. Authority has a very 
important role in the dynamics of human inquiry, especially theology. This is because 
the subject-matter of theology exceeds the investigator's powers. Furthermore, as 
fallen human beings we are ignorant and require extensive education to develop our 
intellectual capabilities. Anselm recognises the following authorities for theology. 
A. Pre-eminent in Anselm's list is God, who is Truth itself. God the Father, 
together with the Son and the Spirit is for Anselm, the soul's final authority and true 
teacher. 74 
B. The Holy Scriptures, which Anselm believes are infallible and perfectly 
trustworthy. 75 
C. The Creeds. 76 
D. The authority of the Pope, " and 
E. the Church Fathers. 78 
Professor Stanley Kane has argued that for Anselm, Scripture is the touchstone of all 
truth and that Anselm's work 
is a concerted effort to untangle some basic conceptual puzzles or 
problems arising out of the assertions of Scripture. He was looking, as 
he tells us, for the ratio which alone could overcome the apparent 
contradiction and make a single coherent doctrine out of the elements 
" Monologion c. xviii; De Veritate c. i.; Cur Deus Homo, II, xiii; De Processione 
Spiritus Sancti c. xvi. 
Cur Deus Honto I, xviii; De Concordia III, vi. 
76 Epistola c. i.. 
" Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, c. i. 
78 Proslogion, Preface. 
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of the puzzle. Such a ratio would make the meaning of Scripture clear 
and hence give understanding where previously there had been 
puzzlement. This is the kind of understanding that faith seeks and that 
is signalised in the phrase fides quaerens inte! lectum. 79 
That such an approach is deemed possible implies that for Anselm there exists 
what Barth calls the `two-fold affinity between credere and intelligere. 80 The 
relationship between the credo of the Christian and that of the Church determines how 
far theology is possible. As credere of the credo, faith is itself an intelligere, 
distinguished from the intelligere which it desires only in degree and not in kind. 81 
The `ultimate in knowledge' is, in this sense, already anticipated in faith. Awareness 
begins with faith; and understanding, which is the Christian's assent from that 
awareness ends in faith. In the movement from credere to intelligere is the closing of 
the gap which separates awareness from assent. 
If fides quaerens intellectum, then all that remains to be considered is 
the gap separating this awareness that has come about and the assent 
which has been given. And just because the beginning and the end are 
already given in faith, and because all that has to be settled regarding 
the intelligere that we are speaking is the gap between these two 
extremes, this intelligere is a soluble problem and theology is a feasible 
task. 82 
Theology is the process of reflecting or meditating on the faith. The notion of 
`reflection' is important for Anselm, for inrelligere cannot be explained apart from the 
content of what is understood, the objective credo. It is here, in the act of reflection, 
79 Stanley Kane, `Fides Quaerens Intellectum in Anselm's Thought', SJT 26 
(1973), 55. 
" FQI, 25. 
81 FQI, 24. 
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that faith and understanding come together. 83 There are boundaries beyond which the 
theologian must not venture. Consider the following passage from the Epistola de 
Incarnatione Verbi. 
Indeed, no Christian ought to question the truth of what the Catholic 
Church believes in its heart and confesses with its mouth. Rather, by 
holding constantly and unhesitatingly to this faith, by loving it and 
living according to it he ought humbly, and as best he is able, to seek 
to discover the reason why it is true. If he is able to understand, then 
let him give thanks to God. But if he cannot understand, let him not 
toss his horn in strife but let him bow his head in reverence. For self- 
confident human wisdom can, by thrusting, uproot its horns more 
quickly than it can, by pushing roll this stone' 
This passage must be understood in the context of Anselm's understanding of 
theological method. Human inquiry is always an assent to the `that it is' (quod sit) of 
an article of faith into an awareness of `how it might be' (quomodo sit). Fundamental 
questioning of the quod sit is not allowed. Once the intelligere transgresses this 
boundary, the process is no longer intellectus frdei - it is no longer theology. The 
movement from credere to intelligere must take place within the boundaries of faith's 
own inner rationality. `Understood from this vantage point, Anselm's use of the credo 
ut intelliga, n formula signifies neither "an intellectual storming of the gates of heaven" 
nor the "sacrificium intellectus". Rather it stands as the humble motto of a Christian 
theologian who hungers after the fidel ratio even though he already possess "the 
certainty of faith"'. 85 
A' Elizabeth Barnes, An Affront to the Gospel? (Atlanta Georgia: Scholar's Press, 
1987), 22. 
84 c. i. Cf., ADC III: 1 I. 
K` Robert Shofner, Anslent Revisited. 'A Study of the Role of the Ontological 
Argument in the Writings of Karl Barth & Charles Hartshorne (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1974), 52. It is important that we say a word in Anselm's defence at this juncture, lest 
the passage from De Incarnatione Verbijust cited gives one the impression that either 
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The conditions which govern the theological enterprise are spelt out in eight 
succinct points. The first is that theological science, as science of the Credo, has a 
positive character. 86 `Intelligere comes about by the reflection on the Credo that has 
already been spoken and affirmed. 87 Theology should therefore not engage in 
speculation. But this does not mean that Anselm does not take into consideration the 
data of general experience. Anselm's procedure, indeed his application of the dictum 
credo ut intelligmn, is empirical, inductive and dialectic. He begins by canvassing 
human experience and then by interpreting the received doctrines concerning God's 
attributes and activities in the light of the facts gathered from experience. Similarly, 
when confronted by a particular theological problem, Anselm would use the tools of 
linguistic, conceptual and theological analysis to deal with it. But the objective Credo 
remains his highest authority. Kane explains: `Anselm's view is that the whole content 
of significant knowledge is all given in revelation, while the data of experience is 
consulted only as a means for the elucidation of the meaning of the statements in 
Anselm has an authoritarian conception of respect fro ecclesiastical authorities, or that 
he is a fideist. We concur with Marilyn McCord Adams when she argues that 
Anselm's conception of authority is pedagogical. Authority serves as our tutor and 
guide. This conception implies that `the point of believing authority is not to silence 
questions, but to enable the students to ask sensible rather than silly ones, to point 
inquiry in a fruitful direction, lest it come to a dead end! ' (Ibid., 417). The 
prohibition reflects Anselm's appreciation of the difficulty of the subject matter at 
hand: `Where the deepest mysteries of the faith are concerned (and surely Trinity, 
Incarnation and Human Redemption are numbered among these), even Anselm's 
epistemic position is less advantageous than that of the average high school geometry 
student: just as the latter will get nowhere if his "proofs" transgress the theorem that 
the interior angles of a new branch of geometry thereby; so, Anselm believes, we 
humans will never make theological progress by denying Scripture, Creeds or 
conciliar pronouncements, or, by rejecting the institutional correctness of the Church' 
(Ibid., 418). 
I FQI, 26. 
" FQI, 27. 
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which revelation is given'. 88 
The second condition touches on the concern of the theologian: his duty is to 
inquire about `how it might be' of the faith (quomodo sit). Recognising that this line 
of enquiry, if pushed to the limit, would turn theology into a-theology, Anselm 
hastens to remind his readers that intelligere should not go beyond the boundary set 
by the inner necessity of the articles of the Credo, that is to say, `beyond the limit of 
faith's essential nature which corresponds to these articles'. 89 Anyone who attempts 
to go beyond this limit is likened to a fool. 90 Thirdly, `every theological statement 
is an inadequate expression of its object'. 9' Only the actual Word of Christ spoken 
to us is adequate. The incomprehensibility of God therefore shatters every syllogism. 
Shofner comments: 
Nevertheless, because God is the Creator and Sustainer of all that is, 
and because all that is participates in his reality, it is possible for our 
limited human conceptions, by a certain similitude or image (per 
alignam similitudinem auf imaginem) to express in symbolic fashion 
that which is otherwise inexpressible. But this means that even a 
circumspect theology can only be relative and relatively effective. 9'- 
Barth concludes that `not all "speculative" theology says what is true. But even 
theology which does say what is true is still "speculative" theology. Theology can 
neither avoid nor ignore the fact of being thus conditioned; nor ought this to make it 
Stanley Kane, `Fides Quaerens Intellectum in Anselm's Thought', 53. 
xy FQI, 28. 
10 FQI, 28. 
91 FQI, 29. 
I' Robert Snofner, Anselm Revisited, 54. 
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ashamed'. 93Caution rather than shame should be the proper posture for theology. 
Fourthly, scientific certainty and the certainty of faith must be distinguished. Because 
theological statements, challenged by the sheer incomprehensibility of their object', 
they only possess scientific certainty' The theologian speaks with absolute certainty 
only when he is quoting scriptures or other sacred authorities, but, as Anselm 
explains, the task of theology, that is, `the quest of the intelligere in the narrower 
sense, begins at the very place where biblical quotation stops'. 95 Theological 
statements are interim-statements, they are not final but await `better instruction from 
God and man'. ' 
It follows from the above that `fundamentally it is possible and indeed 
necessary for the science of theology to advance along its entire front'. 97 This is the 
fifth point. Thus directed by the wisdom of God, theology is a dynamic movement of 
scientific progress, an ascent from one level of ratio to another. For Anselm, human 
understanding is a process, and this is especially so when deep and difficult matters 
are in consideration. In Cur Deus Homo, Anselm declared the mystery of human 
redemption inexhaustible - regardless of how profound and sophisticated one's 
understanding might be, there is still more to be explored and learned. 98 But as Barth 
93 FQI, 30. 
FQI, 30. 
95 FQI, 31. 
96FQI, 31. 
"IFQI, 31. 
" It is pertinent to note that Barth's own understanding of doctrinal development 
was profoundly influenced by Anselm's theory of limitation of human understanding. 
For an essay on Barth's understanding of doctrinal development, see Colin Gunton, 
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was careful to emphasise, this progress for Anselm is not automatic: `That the 
perfectability of theology implies for Anselm both stop and start must not be 
ignored'. ' Sixthly, as we have discussed above, the Holy Scripture is the `one 
concrete criterion for all theological statements'. " Scripture is the source to which 
the credere and therefore intelligere refer. It functions as the authoritative standard 
of judgement; it is auctoritas veritatis, guanz ratio colligit (the authority of truth, 
which reason gathers). "' Seventhly, the reality of faith in and for itself: `It is also 
absolutely decisive for knowledge that what is Right should be rightly believed'. 10- 
Without `right belief' and thus the possibility of `right knowledge', the very scientific 
nature of theology must be called into question. Anselm stressed the importance of the 
purity of heart ('right heart') of the theologian. Barth explains. 
What is required is a pure heart, eyes that have been opened, child-like 
obedience, a life in the Spirit, rich nourishment from the Holy 
Scripture to make him capable of finding these answers. For him it 
goes without saying that where faith is really faith, that is to say 
obedience, the fight between bats and owls over the reality of the sun's 
rays will just not happen and that a theology that is grounded on the 
obedience of faith will be a positive theology. He knows perfectly well 
that in saying this he is taking a risk and so he adds that even this 
necessary connection between faith in what is right and right faith (and 
vice versa) has to be taken in faith to be understood. For only in faith 
could this connection between the obedience of faith and the faith of 
the Church be experienced and only in experience could it be 
understood. 'o' 
`Karl Barth and the Development of Christian Doctrine', SJT, 25 (1972), 171-180. 
FQI, 32. 
10 FQI, 32. 
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111 FQI, 33. 
103 FQI, 35. 
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The above leads us, then, to the final condition, one which is `sui generis from all the 
others and which conditions all others and makes them relative'. 104 This is the 
connection between theology and prayer. Anselm is convinced that our human search 
for God is a matter of Divine-human collaboration, involving initiative from both 
sides. The insistence on prayer implies that autonomous human reason does not have 
the capacity for the intellecius fidel - as surely as the intellectus is a voluntaris 
effectus, the intellectus fidel is bestowed on human reason. So even though Anselm 
saw that the only appropriate response to the ineffable is to try again and again to 
reflect upon it, to try to understand it, to grasp what is beyond our reach by strenuous 
effort, "' he acknowledges at the same time that `right knowledge is conditioned by 
the prevenient and co-operating grace of God. 106 Without the donum gratiae the 
theological enterprise is doomed to failure. The Proslogion is therefore to be seen as 
a prayer-exercise for believers - it is a pros logion or ad logium in which the soul 
speaks directly to God. 
11 FQI, 35. 
11 This is clear from these two passages in the Monologion in which Anselm 
reflects on the substance of the Supreme Nature: 
... For although I would be surprised if among the names or words 
which we apply to things made out of nothing, there could be found [a 
word] that would appropriately be predicated of the Substance which 
created all [other] things, nevertheless I must try to ascertain what end 
reason will direct this investigation ... (Chapter xv). 
Having now discovered so many, and such important, properties each 
[property] by which a certain remarkable plurality, as ineffable as it is 
necessary, is proved to exist in supreme oneness -I find it especially 
delightful to reflect more frequently upon such an impenetrable 
mystery ... (Chapter xliii). 
1' FQI, 41. 
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The above discussion has paved the way for the subject which we must now 
focus our attention, namely, theological methodology. Our thesis is that Barth's study 
of Anselm has a profound effect on his own theological method. So far, we have seen 
that for Anselm, faith must read and reflect upon what is said in the Credo in order 
for it to come to a self-understanding - the fundamental meaning of intelligere is 
legere. This is because credere and intelligere, for post-Adamic man, are not 
identical. The iniellectus frdei, as we have already mentioned, requires diligence in 
prayer and persistence in thought on the part of the seeker. At this juncture, Barth 
makes an important distinction between the `outward text' and the `inner text'. 
Though this distinction is not found explicitly in Anselm, it is implicitly present in the 
thought of the eleventh century theologian. The outward text of the Credo is that I 
which is obvious to man. But the revealed truth has an inner text. Barth explains that 
this inner text `can be found in the outward text, but cannot simply be heard or read 
along with the outward text, for it can be heard and read along with the outward text 
only by virtue of a distinct intention and act and also - and this is decisive - only in 
virtue of special grace'. "' 
Barth turns next to Anselm's principle of sola ratione. This principle is seen 
at work in his famous rernoto Christo approach adopted in Cur Deus Homo. In the 
treatise, Anselm attempts to prove, by reason alone, the basis and necessity of the 
Incarnation and Atonement. The stress that Anselm has made on the sole ratione 
principle has resulted in the intensification in recent years, in the controversy over the 
question whether Anselm is a rationalist who deduces the truth of the faith from 
rational principle (E. Gilson) or whether his approach is intra-fideistic (Karl Barth). 
'm FQI, 41. 
238 
Stanley Kane reasons that the mature thought of Anselm, in its complexity, seems to 
give evidence that he is both. He is rationalistic as far as his investigative procedure 
and the tools he employs for analysis are concerned, and intra-fideistic in that he is 
dependent on the revelation. Kane concludes: `Accordingly, the whole scheme is 
calculated to keep both the starting point and the results of intellectual labour within 
the bounds of strictest orthodoxy. Hence, the intent of his method and system as a 
whole is intra-fideistic'. 1°8 Barth adds that Anselm, if he was a rationalist, would 
have used the phrase solitaria ratione instead. The sola ratione formula must therefore 
be interpreted in a fideistic, non-rationalistic fashion. 
Anselm calls man a rationalis natura - man by his rationality, has `the capacity 
of forming judgements, the capacity of deciding between true and false, good and 
evil, etc. "' The believer, to Anselm, is this and more; in him reason is held 
captive in his desire for the intellects fidel. In him, therefore, ratio is employed by 
fides in search of intelligere. This is the noetic ratio. The noetic ratio presupposes an 
ontic ratio, `the ratio that belongs to the object of faith itself'. "' This ontic ratio 
is the ratio veritatis which is identical with the ratio fidel and the ratio sutnmae 
naturae, that is, `with the Divine Word consubstantial with the Father. It is the ratio 
of God'. ` What then is the difference between the ontic and noetic ratio? Barth 
explains that the ontic ratio is `fundamentally the same but higher than that of the 
noetic ratio' since truth is conferred upon it `with the creation of the object of which 
" Stanley Kane, `Fides Quaerens Intellectum in Anselm's Thought', 62. 
FQI, 59. 
"" FQI, 45. 
"' FQI, 45. 
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it is ratio'. The noetic ratio on the other hand, is conferred `from time to time in the 
event of knowing'. Thus the ontic ratio is that which belongs to the object of faith. 
It is the bearer of the ratio veritatis which is `hidden in the object of faith'. This 
brings us back to Barth's theory of the `inner' and `outward' text. The former, hidden 
within the latter, is not at the disposal of the reader. It must be revealed to him. When 
this happens, the believer's faith is illumined and his `believing legere' becomes intus 
legere. In this event, the believer's noetic ratio conforms with the ontic ratio of the 
object known - intelligere takes place. In this event also, the noetic ratio of the 
believer becomes, to a certain extent vera ratio. It becomes this only to a certain 
extent vera ratio. It becomes this only to a certain extent because, as Barth was 
careful to emphasise earlier, `truth is itself the master of all rationes beyond the 
contrast between ontic and noetic, deciding for itself, now here, now there, what is 
vera ratio ... '"'- Shofner summarises: `It is under the direction of this "master", 
then, that the believer's ratio is made to conform to the ratio of the object of faith. 
And, as a result, he is led along the path of the intellectus frdei'. 13 The aim of 
theology is, therefore, to provide the `proof' (probare, probatio) that we discussed 
earlier. It must be repeated here that for Anselm `the ratio veritatis inherent in the 
Articles of the Christian Credo is itself at no point the subject of discussion but on the 
contrary it forms the self-evident basis of discussion'. "' Though the probare has a 
polemical-apologetic element, it should not be mistaken for, and here Barth is 
emphatic, the apologetic enterprise as it is currently understood and undertaken. 
112 FQI, 47. 
13 Shofner, Anselni Revisited, 66. 
114 FQI, 64. 
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Apologetics is only admissible if it is treated as in every way identical with the quest 
of the believer himself', "' in which case it would not be apologetics but theology. 
But since apologetics as we have it means for Barth `the attempt to engage unbelief 
in dialogue on its own terms and outside the context of faith seeking 
understanding', "' it is poles apart from dogmatics. 
As fides quaerens intelleciwn, theology is, as T. F. Torrance so brilliantly 
expresses it, `the activity of the reason within the knowledge bestowed on man by 
God, operating within the limits of noetic investigation required by the nature of the 
given object'. "' From the initial faith given to him by God in Christ the theologian 
moves noetically to the `deeper and clearer knowledge through understanding of the 
inner and necessary relation between the knowledge of faith and the inherent 
rationality of that which is believed, the very Truth and Being of God himself'. "' 
The theologian, in Anselm's and Barth's understanding, is an `obedient creature 
before the Creator, who lets God be to him the One who, in his sheer objectivity as 
God, prescribes for men the manner and the limits of his knowing of God'. "' 
s FQI, 67. 
Shofner, Anselm Revisited, 77. 
"' T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth, 182,183. 
"I Ibid., 184. 









KARL BARTB AND CATHOLIC ANALOGY 
1. Preamble: Setting the Stage for the Dialogue 
Our study of the theological epistemologies of Karl Barth and Balthasar has 
brought several fundamental issues to the fore. The dialogue which we shall now 
undertake must deal with these fundamental issues. Broadly speaking these issues have 
to do with revelation and theology, with theological epistemology and theological 
method. In dealing with these issues we are attempting to answer the fundamental 
question about the nature of theology, a question which can be answered only from 
the standpoint of revelation. 
In the organisation and execution of this dialogue, we have tried to apply what 
appear to us to be very sound guidelines for an exercise of this nature, suggested by 
one of the partners in the dialogue, namely Balthasar. We concur with his cautionary 
note that in a Protestant-Catholic dialogue such as this one any attempt to overlook 
differences, to become buddies, will only compound the existing rift. There can be 
no open no-man's land between the two denominations. But this does not mean that 
the dialogue cannot be conducted with a true sense of openness on both sides, an 
openness which presupposes humility, but an openness that is not eager to engage in 
superficial irenics. We concur with von Balthasar when he said that the mistrust 
between Protestants and Catholics 
... should not thwart the task laid on us of reaching an understanding. Protestants by definition do not accept distinctively Catholic doctrines, 
but that does not make them unbelievers. They still dwell in the same 
precincts of faith in the same Christ and are rooted and established in 
the same baptism. Their faith is still a trust in the same revelation; 
their object of faith is a common fides seeking intellectus in common. 
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And so Catholics will not let themselves be deflected from 
trying to understand their partners, despite their suspicions. But the 
only way of dissipating this mistrust will be to continue their own 
earnest search for understanding - quaerens intellectus - and to wait 
eagerly in gratitude for any spark that leads to the fire of a deeper and 
more vibrant understanding of the faith. A calculating spirit of 
reconciliation is not enough; genuine humility must be the mark of all 
dialogue. ' 
We have nothing but admiration for the generous spirit of the author of these words 
and will aim to conduct this dialogue with the same openness and magnanimity. 
The proposed dialogue must have as its focus what Balthasar calls `the 
fundamental and formal set of theological principles that determine all the individual 
doctrines'. '- The dialogue must not be limited to the discussion of individual doctrines 
and issues, even the doctrine of revelation and the problem of theological knowledge. 
It is precisely because this approach must be taken that this dialogue is such a difficult 
undertaking: the formal matters crucial to the discussion are accessible only in the 
material doctrines; yet the formal dimension is not the material content. `The 
"principle" of theology is the content of revelation. But the content of revelation can 
never be cut off from the act of revealing, that is, from the God who freely and 
sovereignly chooses to reveal himself. And this is a dimension, therefore, of which 
man - even and all the more so believing man - cannot be the measure, the way he 
is of the principle of secular sciences'. ' 
What, then, is the principal issue which is responsible for creating this rift 
between the two theologians (and indeed, according to Barth, the two denominations)? 
' KB, 18. 
2 KB, 24. 
KB, 48-49. 
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The answer to this question is found in the Preface to the first volume of Barth's 
magisterial Church Dogmatics. 
I can see no third alternative between the exploitation of the analogia 
entis which is legitimate only on the basis of Roman Catholicism, 
between the greatness and misery of the co-called natural knowledge 
of God in the sense of the Vaticanum, and a Protestant theology which 
draws from its own source, which stands on its own feet, and which 
is finally liberated from this secular misery. Hence I have no option 
but to say No at this point. I regard the analogia entis as the invention 
of the Antichrist, and I believe that because of it it is impossible ever 
to become a Roman Catholic, all other reasons for not doing so being 
to my mind short-sighted and trivial. ' 
The rest of this chapter is an examination of Catholic analogy and Barth's objections. 
2. Catholic Analogy 
a. The Definition of the Term `Analogy' 
The term `analogy' has a long and glorious past. It has its beginnings in the 
Greek language and was used by mathematicians to signify a `proportion (i. e. a 
reciprocal relation between numbers or a direct similarity between them) and a 
proportionality (i. e. equality of ratio or agreement between two numerical 
relations)'. ' It was Plato who first emptied the term of its mathematical meaning of 
numerical likeness and introduced it to philosophy. Plato uses the term in several 
ways. Analogy is used to signify the similarity of relations or proportionality between 
four elements (fire/air = air/water = water/earth), ' between four forms of 
'CD I/1, viii. 
s Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Thought 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The hague, 1963), 1. 
i 
Plato, Timaeus, 32c. 
245 
knowledge (knowledge/opinion = thinking/imagining)' and between the two kinds 
of being and knowledge (being/becoming = knowledge/opinion). ' Plato was the first 
thinker to extend the use of analogy, with its duality of meaning as proportion and 
proportionality, to the philosophical arenas of epistemology and ontology. 
In the theology of the Neo-platonists, analogy serves two fundamental 
purposes. Firstly, it accounts for the possibility of speaking about God. Here, with 
the thought of the Neo-platonists, we have the beginnings of the relationship between 
analogy and causality. Since God is the Cause of all things, it is argued that all 
created perfections can be ascribed to him. All perfections belong to God primarily 
and to creatures secondarily. Perfections are therefore predicated to God and to 
creatures analogously. Secondly, analogy provides a principle by which reality can 
be seen in its unity. Analogy helps man to understand reality in its various grades and 
degrees. ' The concept of analogy, which was later developed by Augustine and 
Aristotle, found its way into Catholic theology, where, under the influence of Thomas 
Aquinas, it played a prominent role. 
The term analogy deals with the similarity of relations between two things. It 
is not unil'oca: `the same term, applied to two different objects in the same way, 
designates the same thing in both of them'. Neither is it equivoca: `the same term 
applied to two different objects, designates different thing in the one and the other'. 10 
It is neither parity or disparity but a partial correspondence and agreement, a 
Plato, Republic, 534a. 
8 Ibid. 
Mondin, Principle, 3-4. 
'° CD II/1,237. 
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similarity. That is to say, an analogous term is that which when applied to `two 
objects, designates the same thing in both but in different ways'. " 
b. 77zonuis Aquinas and the Analogy of Being 
Christian theologians have always been struggling with the problem of 
theological language. Several proposals have emerged from this reflection. Augustine 
believed that though God is transcendent, positive knowledge of him is still possible 
as the mind rises to a vision of God. ''- John Damascene, influenced by Denys, has 
however denied the intellect power to grasp God. In the opening paragraphs of his De 
fide orlhodoxa, he wrote: `Just as the senses can neither grasp nor perceive the things 
of the mind, just as corporeal form cannot lay hold of the intangible and incorporeal, 
by the same standard of truth beings are surpassed by the infinity beyond being, 
intelligences by the oneness beyond intelligence'. 13 The apophatism of Denys means 
that the only appropriate approach to theological discourse is the via negativa. '4 
At first glance, Aquinas may be taken to hold the same position -a kind of 
" Ibid. 
12 Confessions, 7.9f., 18ff. 
11 Divine Names, Ch. 1. 
1d Consider the following passage: `And this is the prudent and Catholic and 
salutary profession that is to be predicated of God: that first by the cataphatic, that is 
by affirmation, we predicate all things to Him, whether nouns or verbs, though not 
properly but in a metaphorical sense (translative); then we deny by the apophatic, that 
is, by negation, that He is any of the things which by cataphatic are predicated to 
Him, only (this time) not metaphorically but properly - for there is more truth in 
saying that God is not any of the things that are predicated of Him than in saying that 
He is'. Periphyseon (De divisione naturae), ed. I. P. Sheldon Williams (Dublin 1978), 
I, 522. Quoted by Brain Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 59. 
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agnosticism, or, at least a standpoint which superordinates the apophatic over the 
cataphatic. Man cannot come to know God quid sit, in his essence, but only an sit or 
quod sit, in his existence. But this must be understood in the context of his broader 
philosophical and theological framework which he sets out in the Summa Contra 
Gentiles: `the divine substance exceeds by its immensity every form which our 
intellect attains, and so we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is, but we have 
some notion of it by coming to know what it is not'. " Thus in the tradition of 
Denys, Pseudo-Dionysius, and those influenced by Neo-platonism, Aquinas is 
advocating the via negativa. Created substance is defined by first assigning it to its 
genus through which we generally know its nature, and distinguish it from other 
things. God, however, transcends all genera and cannot be assigned a genus. This 
means that God cannot be distinguished from other things by the process of positive 
differentiations (per affirmativas differentias). We can, however, attain some notion 
of God's nature by the process of negative differentiations. This does not mean that 
the predicates are denied of God because he does not possess the perfection expressed 
in the predicate. Rather, God infinitely exceeds that limited perfection in richness, so 
that, when we say that God is not corporeal, we do not by this mean that God is less 
than body, but that he is more than body, possessing none of the limitations involved 
in being a corporeal substance. The ontological foundation for Aquinas' theological 
epistemology is furnished by a theory of causality. Since the world is caused by God, 
knowledge of the world can lead to the knowledge of God. But since as uncaused 
Cause God transcends the world and is not himself a sensible object, we must deny 
him of all predicates which are bound up with corporeality. 
I. 14. 
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For Aquinas, however, the apophatic must be balanced with the cataphatic. 
The former is not emphasised to the exclusion of the latter. Though the negative 
predicates or names are, by their very form, associated with the negative way, there 
are positive predicates or names which, instead of removing or denying something 
from the divine substance, are predicated positively or affirmatively to the divine 
substance. To put it rather differently, when we talk of God we do not always say 
what he is not. When we say, for instance, that God is `good' and `wise', we speak 
positively or affirmatively. Two important observations may be made at this point 
regarding Aquinas' understanding of the use of positive predicates to the divine 
substance. Firstly, positive predicates cannot be interpreted in purely causal terms. 
That is to say, positive predicates, when predicated to the divine substance, say 
something about the substance itself. This position is at variance with the one held by 
Maimonides who opines that a statement like `God is good' simply means that God 
causes good things. Aquinas asserts that the statement is a positive affirmation made 
concerning the divine substance. 16In other words, it describes God.. Secondly, none 
of the positive statements describes God perfectly. Our intellect can know God only 
through sensible objects. Since these objects are poor and imperfect reflections of the 
divine substance, our knowledge and concepts of God are, by consequence, imperfect 
and to a large extent, inadequate. Thus when we say that God is `good' and `wise' 
we mean that in him is to be found goodness and wisdom which far exceeds and 
excludes all the imperfections and limitations of creatures. The creature therefore 
16 `Since, as our faith teaches and as Maimonides also grants, creatures have not 
always existed, it follows [on account] that we could not say that God was wise or 
good before the existence of creatures. For it is evident that before creatures existed 
he did nothing as regards his effects, neither as good or as wise'. ST la. 13.1 ad. 1. 
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represents God, who, as its Cause, transcends it infinitely. 
We speak of God as we know Him, and since we know Him from 
creatures we can only speak of Him as they represent Him. Any 
creature, in so far as it possess any perfection represents God and is 
like Him, for He, being simply and universally perfect has pre-existing 
in Himself the perfections of all his creatures. " 
Herbert McCabe describes Aquinas' understanding of the relationship between cause 
and effect and its epistemological implications as follows. 
St Thomas' whole theory of causal explanation is based on the idea that 
things have certain natures and that having these natures they have 
certain activities which are natural to them. When you know what 
something is you already know what it is likely to do - it is indeed the 
same thing fully to understand the nature of a thing and to know what 
it will naturally do ... Thus a causal explanation is one in terms of the 
natural behaviour of things. When you have found the cause there is 
no further question about why this cause should produce this effect, to 
understand the cause is just to understand that it naturally produces this 
effect. 18 
Following the above argument we could therefore say that as regards to what is 
predicated ('goodness' and `wisdom', for example), the positive predicate used in 
relation to God is without defect, whereas the manner of predicating it is defective 
and deficient since it involves something which is perceived by the human intellect. 
Thus predicates of this kind may be both affirmed and denied of God. Here Aquinas' 
thought is consonant with Denys'. Brian Davies explains. 
According to Denys, when we say that God is not thus and so, we are 
not asserting that it is simply or unqualifiably false that he is thus and 
so. His view is that negations concerning God must themselves, in a 
sense, be negated. For, as we have seen, he holds that God can be 
`named' from everything (compared to anything) because he is the 
creator of everything. This, in turn, leads him to be fond of the prefix 
`hyper' ('above'). We may deny that God is good, but not in order 
baldly to assert, `It is not the case that God is good', for we may say, 
" ST la. 13.2. 
"'God Matters (London 1987), 101. 
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`God is hyper-good', meaning that his goodness transcends the 
goodness of created things while at the same time being reflected in 
that. '9 
Further clarifications are needed to understand Aquinas' concept of the nature 
of theological language. In the first place, it must be said that theological language is 
both analogical and literal. For example, when we say that Solomon and God are 
wise, we are using the word `wise' in two different but related ways. But both uses 
are literal. That is to say, both Solomon and God are really wise. One would 
misunderstand Aquinas if one took him to say that our talk of God is entirely 
metaphorical. `Not all words are used of God metaphorically', he writes, `some are 
used literally'. 20 Secondly, the words that are used for both God and creature are 
applied primarily to God and derivatively of creatures. 2' The question is: `Do we 
really know what we mean when we say that "God is wise"'? We certainly do know 
the meaning of the statement `Solomon is wise', but can we say the same about the 
statement `God is wise'? To put it in another way, what is the epistemology of the 
analogy of being? Aquinas explains in his Summa Contra Gentiles that our knowledge 
of God is derived from our knowledge of the world: `the reality in the names said of 
God and other things belongs by priority in God according to the mode of being, but 
the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority. And so he is said to be 
named from his effects'. 22 So once again we come to the theory of causality, and the 
Thomist notion, so brilliantly explained by McCabe, that the cause is known by its 
19 Davies, Thomas Aquinas, 72. 
20 ST 1 a. 13.3. 
21 ST Ia. 13.7. 
22 CG 1: 34. 
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effect. As effect, the world resembles its Cause so that it is possible to come to the 
knowledge of the Cause through the objective reality of the effect. Analogical 
predication is founded on this static notion of resemblance. Barth, as we shall see, has 
much to say in criticism of this notion of God's relationship with the world which 
automatically guarantees theological knowledge. To be sure, this view does emphasise 
that this resemblance and likeness is one way. That is to say, creatures resemble God 
- it would be inappropriate to say that God is like the creature. This view also 
emphasises that creatures resemble God imperfectly, so that in the analogy of being, 
one is confronted with a similarity within an ever greater dissimilarity. Nonetheless 
this view presupposes a very optimistic view of the noetic capabilities of the 
perceiver, since the mind or the intellect of the perceiving subject is able to penetrate 
beyond the surface of the thing perceived. 
Now Aquinas distinguishes the analogy of proportion and proportionality, and 
we must pause briefly to examine these distinctions before moving on to discuss 
Barth's objections. By the analogy of proportions Aquinas means that analogy in 
which a predicate is applied to one analogue primarily, namely God, and another 
secondarily, namely the creature, on the basis of their real relation and likeness. 
Aquinas sometimes calls this the analogy of attribution. As we have observed earlier, 
the perfections attributed to each analogue are really present in them, albeit in 
different ways. The analogy of proportionality can be used in two ways, symbolically 
and properly. For example, we can speak of God as `Sun', when we wish to speak 
of his glory and splendour, so that what the sun is to the bodily eye, God is to the 
soul. In this case we are speaking symbolically. But an analogy can also be drawn 
between God's intellectual activity and man's. And since in this case intellectual 
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activity is pure perfection, we are not here speaking symbolically but properly. 
3. Barth's Objection To Catholic Analogy 
a. Analogy of Being as Grundprinzip of Catholic Theology 
Now what has Barth to say to all this? Barth identified the analogia entis as 
the Grundprinzip of Catholic theology. Accordingly he rejects Catholic analogy, 
calling it the invention of the anti-christ, since it militates against the revelation of 
God, confuses theological discourse, and relativises theological knowledge. The 
analogia entis provides a philosophical and metaphysical foundation upon which the 
super-structure of Roman Catholic theology is erected. It is the fertile soil which 
nourishes the natural theology of the Vaticanum. The analogy of being is not only the 
point de depart of Roman Catholic theology but its dominating and governing 
principle. Balthasar has denied these allegations made by Barth and has come to the 
defence of Roman Catholic theology in general and the analogy of being in particular. 
Catholic theology, he says, does not begin with a preconceived metaphysical system, 
but with revelation. The analogy of being, he argues, is necessary. As we have 
already seen, the analogy of being is for him the only way in which theology can 
work responsibly between the philosophies of identity and absolute otherness. 
b. Knowledge of God in abstracto 
The inner rationality of the analogy of being proceeds from the premise, spelt 
out by the Vatican, that God is known or knowable in abstracto, that is, apart from 
his direct activity in the world. Its first concern is to establish the existence of God 
as Creator, the beginning and end of all things. It then decides from this that God is 
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knowable - knowable even without his revelation. In other words, the knowability of 
God is based, not on God's activity in the world, but on the `being of God abstractly 
understood'. 23 Being is also ascribed to man, although in a different way. The 
philosophical category of `being' is now the neutral ground or concept in which both 1 rcýý 
God and man are bracketed. The ascription of being to both God and man, albeit in A-c 
infinite qualitative disparity, means that an analogy between the two subjects is 
established on the concept of being: hence we have the analogia ends: `the idea of 
being in which God and man are always comprehended together even if their 
relationship to being is quite different, and even if they have a quite different part in 
being'. 2' What this essentially means is that man can come to the knowledge of God 
quite apart from his revelation. 
As himself a being, man is able to know a being as such. But if this is 
so, then in principle he is able to know all being, even God as the 
incomparably real being. Therefore if God is, and if we cannot deny 
His being, or on the other hand, our own being and that of creation, 
necessarily we must affirm His knowability apart from His revelation. 
For it consists precisely in this analogy of being which comprehends 
both Him and us. 25 
The analogia entis must be assessed from another angle as well. We have 
already alluded to the fact that Thomist analogy is founded on the theory of causality. 
Now Barth is aware of the fact that Protestant orthodoxy also uses the concept of 
causa to describe the relationship between God and the world. Indeed he does not 
reject the concept or its language. To be sure, it is legitimate to describe God as 
causa in the sense that he is primarily and supremely the source of all causae, the 
23 CD II/1,81. 
'' CD If/ 1,81. 
2 Ibid. 
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basis and therefore starting point of the whole causal series, so long as this does not 
lead to a mechanistic interpretation of the way things are and of the relationship 
between God and the world. Creation is causa only in virtue of the fact that it is 
absolutely posited by God. Its causare is a participation of the divine causare. But it 
would be a mistake to treat causa as a master-concept to which both God and creature 
are its subjects. 26 Causa is not a genus of which both divine and creaturely causae 
are species. It must not be seen as a common denominator under which the two can 
be placed. When this is done, theology is turned into philosophy, with the theory of 
causality as the total scheme of things. The Christological control of the use of causa 
here is paramount - with the divine and human natures of Christ we are not dealing 
with two species in the one genus, nature. A Christology which argues for this and 
works from this premise is defective. This Christology legitimises the use of concepts 
like `being' and `nature' as master-concepts to articulate the relationship between God 
and the world. 
Indeed, it would be a mistake to try to compare them simply because 
they are both causa. In the same way it would be a mistake to argue 
as follows. The Creator exists and has being no less than the creature. 
Therefore although the being of the Creator and the creature is unlike, 
in some respects they are like and therefore similar. There is therefore 
an analogia entis between God and the creature. To that extent there 
is a master-concept, a common denominator, a genus (being) which 
comprises both God and the creature. And it would really be a serious 
mistake if we were to adopt this argument. Jesus Christ has a divine 
nature and human. Therefore, although the two natures are unlike, they 
are also alike and similar. There is therefore an analogia naturae 
between God and man. And to that extent we can speak of a master 
concept, a common denominator, a genus (nature) which comprises 
both God and man. This is the type of mistake which we have to avoid 
at this point. This is the deduction which we have to recognise as false 
26 CD I1/1,102. 
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and therefore illegitimate. 27 
Human and divine subjects are such that they are unlike. They are subjects which are 
antithetical to each other and in their antithesis they cannot be compared. Barth 
stresses again and again the qualitative difference between God and the world, which 
is relativised by the analogia entis. 2' Thus just as there cannot be for Barth an 
analogia entis because of the qualitative difference between God and the world, there 
can also be no analogia causae on the same ground and for the same reason. 29 
But there is still another angle to Barth's objection to the analogy of being 
which we must examine. The Vaticanum's concept of the knowledge of God has 
introduced, as it were, a partitioning of God. To be sure, the Vaticanum does not 
wish to speak about only a part of God - the partitioning of the knowledge of God in 
2' CD II/1,103. 
21 Consider the following passages: 
`To put it rather differently, it must be clearly understood that when the word causa 
is applied to God on the one side and the creature on the other, the concept does not 
describe both active subjects, and it does not signify subjects which are merely not 
alike, or not similar, but subjects which in their absolute antithesis cannot even be 
compared' (CD II/I, 102). 
`We cannot deduce from the fact that both subjects are causa the further fact that they 
fall under the one master-concept causa ... On the contrary, they cannot even be 
compared' (CD II/1,103). 
`The divine and creaturely subjects are not like or similar, but unlike. They are unlike 
because their basis and constitution as subjects are quite different and therefore 
absolutely unlike, that is, there is not even the slightest similarity between them' (CD 
111/1,103). 
29 Barth however does speak of a correspondence between the activity of the 
Creator and creature, a correspondence not on the basis of identity but similarity and 
comparableness, and therefore analogy. This likeness and unlikeness, however, is 
established on the basis of the analogia operationis or analogia relationis. 
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its procedure is, in the final analysis, provisional. Be that as it may, this partitioning 
with regard to the knowability of God has inevitably led, according to Barth, to the 
partitioning of the one God as well. God is first known as rerum oninium principium 
et finis before he is known as Creator. But God, the God of the Scriptures, is more 
than this. He is also God the Reconciler and Redeemer. The natural theology of the 
Vaticanum has undermined the unity of God. We have to take this unity very seriously 
not only in theory but in practice, says Barth. When we speak of God the creator we 
must keep in mind that he is Redeemer and Reconciler, and when we speak of him 
as Redeemer, we must bear in mind that he is Creator. This, Barth agues, is 
characteristic of the way the Bible speaks of God: `even when it speaks of God the 
Lord and of the Creator, it also speaks of the one God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, 
of the Yahweh of the history of Israel, of the God who forgives sins and is his 
people's salvation'. 30 In the light of this Barth questions the claim of the knowledge 
of God that is made in abstraction - `Are we really speaking of the one true God even 
if provisionally we think of only one side of God - in this instance God the Lord and 
Creator? '3' 
4. An Alternative Approach: The Analogy of Faith 
a. Origins of Barth's Concept of Analogy 
It is difficult to trace the various influences that resulted in Barth's analogical 
thinking. We have already noted two pivotal points in Barth's intellectual 
development: his abandonment of liberalism to embrace the dialectical method, which 
iD CD II/l, 80. 
31 Ibid. 
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resulted in the celebrated Römerbrief, and his discovery of Anselm, which 
revolutionised his understanding of theology. It is here, in the latter stage, that Barth 
moved beyond the dialectical method to analogy. Fides Quaerens Intellectunt, then, 
may be seen to represent the history of Barth's second decisive turning point - his 
shift from dialecticism to the analogia fidei. 32 Barth saw that analogy is the only 
method proper to the theologian if he wishes to come to an understanding of the 
relationship between God and the world, and the content of Revelation. 
Although it is difficult to trace the evolution of Barth's thought from liberalism 
to analogical thinking, several fundamental influences can be seen to be possible 
resources that might have shaped his thinking. We have already mentioned the fact 
that Barth's study of Anselm is the historical starting point of this movement towards 
analogical thinking. The doctrine of the Reformers, namely, `justification by faith 
alone', has no doubt a very important role in Barth's thinking. There is a sense in 
which this dialogue is the re-enactment of Luther's debate with the via moderna, 
except that the emphasis in this case is on epistemology instead of soteriology. The 
Kierkegaardian emphasis of the qualitative difference between time and eternity is also 
a key element in Barth's analogical thinking. Barth's Christocentric approach, which 
applies the Platonic concept of logos as the `a priori Uranalogans' resulting in the 
notion of Christ as the archetype of all analogies, makes his doctrine of analogy not 
just a new argument against the Catholic notion of the analogia entis, but a new 
creation in theology. 33 
'' See Battista Mondin, Principle, 148. 
' Hepce Pöhlmann could say, `Dies analogia frdei Bardis ist eine theologische 
Neuscltqfiurg'. Cf. Hans Georg Pöhlmann, Analogia entis oder Anralogia fidei?: Die 
Frage der Analogie bei Karl Barth (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1965); 
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b. Barth's Use of Analogy 
It is helpful, in attempting to understand Barth's use of analogy in theology to 
begin with his general position regarding the definition and purpose of theology. 
Theology (more precisely, dogmatic theology), Barth asserts again and again, is the 
`self-examination of the Christian Church in respect of the content of its distinctive 
talk about God'. ' As such, the criterion for dogmatics is the Word of God, since, 
only when and to the extent to which the Word of God is spoken by God himself to 
the Church can there be theological discourse, which is the task of theology. In this 
way, theology, for Barth, is always theologia crucis. That is to say, it is always an 
act of obedience which is certain in faith. It follows then, that the purpose of theology 
is to test `the coherence of present-day proclamation with the original and prevailing 
essence of the Church'. 35 
From the outset, Barth establishes very clearly the boundaries which define 
theology and theological discourse. In keeping with the older Protestant theology, 
Barth speaks about the centrality of the Word of God in his dogmatic prologomena. 
Barth's understanding of the authority of the Word of God is materially similar to the 
older Protestant Theology's assertion of the authority and normativeness of Holy 
Scripture as the presupposition of the Church's speech about God. Though Barth does 
not in fact deny that there can be a philosophical theory of theological language, his 
suspicion of natural theology in general led him to think that any philosophical 
Quoted by Jung Young Lee, `Karl Barth's Use of Analogy in His Church Dogmatics', 
SJT 22 (1969), 129-151. 
CD 1/1,11. 
j5 CD I/1,56. 
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solution to the problem of theological language is false. 36 Barth's discussion of the 
problem of theological language is consequently a theological and not philosophical 
discussion. 
From this premise, it is not difficult to see why Barth concludes that the 
concept of analogy that is capable of understanding God and his revelation is the 
analogia fidel which he defines as `the correspondence (in faith) of the thing with the 
knowing, of the object with the thought, of the word of God with the word of man 
in thought and speech'. 37 Here Barth finds a tool which enables him to communicate 
the dialectical relationship between God and the world which he tries in vain to 
articulate in his commentary on Romans. Barth's reflection on the use of analogy in 
theology is found in CD II/1. He begins by asking a basic question about the content 
and meaning of words that are used to describe the creature and God: `Does there 
exist a simple parity of content and meaning when we apply the same word to the 
creature on the one hand and to God's revelation and God on the other? '38 Barth 
replies in the negative. For to affirm that there is a parity in the content and meaning 
of words applied to God and the creature would mean a denial of the hiddenness of 
God and the necessity of his revelation. It would mean that God has ceased to be God 
or that man has become a God. But does this mean that we ought then to speak of a 
disparity of content and meaning when we apply a description to the creature and 
God? To affirm this would be equally wrong. It would lead to `an all too human 
36 See The Knowledge of God and the Service of God (Gifford Lectures 1938), 4- 
5. 
" CD 1/1,279. 
'" CD III 1,224. 
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exaggeration of that awe in the knowledge of God by which we do not praise God but 
deny Him'. 39 We see here Barth's opposition to the apophatism of mystical theology, 
which exaggerates the disparity to the point that all concepts and speech of God are 
denied. This kind of disparity, Barth points out, actually means that we do not know 
God. The middle way is the way of analogy. Again, we see Barth beginning here not 
with the possibility of theological knowledge, but with its actuality. In this Barth is 
always consistent. 
The fact that we know Him must mean that, with our views, concepts 
and words, we do not describe and express something quite different 
from Himself, but that in and by these means of ours - the only ones 
we have - we describe and express God himself ... In this perplexity 
the older theology accepted the concept of analogy to describe the 
fellowship [that is, the fellowship between the knower and the known] 
in question. By this term both the false thesis of parity and the equally 
false thesis of disparity were attacked and destroyed, but the elements 
of truth in both were revealed. 40 
Thus analogy, according to Barth, is necessary and unavoidable in theology. 
How does this analogy arise? Barth is careful to stress that it does not arise because 
of the imposition by man. Rather it arises out of God's choice, that is to say, from 
his revelation. Theological discourse is grounded in God's revelation, and because this 
is so, because God has in his revelation given us permission as the result of which our 
views, concepts and words can be legitimately and genuinely applied to him, 
theological discourse is possible and our work can be successful. Analogy is not the 
deification of man and his word. In using this mode of language we are not trusting 
in the intrinsic qualities in man or in his words, which gives him the power of 
apprehension and ensures the immanent correctness of his words when they are 
'v CD IM, 225. 
40 CD II/l, 225. 
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applied to God. According to Barth, theological discourse can only follow the 
encounter between God and man which is precipitated entirely by God. Our 
knowledge, and therefore our speech about God cannot precede this encounter. The 
analogy of faith is therefore based on the unilateral relationship between God and the 
creature. 
Now although Barth does not systematically deal with the various traditional 
uses of analogy, it is obvious that he is familiar with them and sometimes mentions 
them in the course of his discussion. Barth rejects the analogia inequalitatis, since it 
does not properly treat the transcendence of God and tends towards pantheism. The 
analogia proportionalitatis is also rejected. The analogy of proportionality is a mode 
of predication which signifies the quantitative correspondence between two beings. 
This correspondence is understood algebraically, so that there is a plus and minus on 
both sides, a correspondence which partially exists and partially does not exist. Barth 
1 
rejects this understanding of analogy as improper for theology: `... this kind of 
algebraic division - and any division that we know and can make is an algebraic 
division of this kind - is quite out of the question as between God and ourselves'. " 
The only form of analogy which he accepts and uses is the analogia a»ributionis. 
Now the analogy of attributions can be of two types. The first, which he rejects, is 
the analogia intrinsecae, which may be understood as a form of predication which 
signifies a similarity which belongs intrinsically to the analogans and the analogaturn, 
although to the latter only secondarily and per dependentiain. The second type is the 
analogia extrinsecae where the analogy of the creature `which is proper to the 
creature only externally in the existence and form of its relationship to the analogans, 
" CD 11/ 1,234. 
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that is, to God'. 42 The reason for this is clear: the attribution to a creature of a 
perfection which belongs primarily to God is made possible only by Revelation; the 
creature cannot be placed on the same level with God. In this sense Barth's analogy 
of faith is also sometimes called the analogia relatfonis. 
c. Analogy and the Problem of Language 
We turn now to the problem of theological semantics. The main problem of 
theological semantics is stated clearly by Battista Mondin: `Human language is drawn 
from the material world and is made to deal with material objects, with the world of 
phenomena. On what ground is the theologian justified to extend language to speak 
about God, who transcends the material world, and is not himself a phenomenon? "' 
Aquinas uses the theories of being and causality to deal with this problem. Barth, in 
opposition to the approaches of Aquinas, answers the question from the standpoint of 
God's revelation. Indeed, for Barth, the question can be answered only from that 
standpoint. There can be no knowledge of God or speech about God outside 
Revelation. Our views, concepts and words corresponds to God only on the basis of 
this revelation. Barth's concept of the analogy of faith is therefore firmly rooted in 
the superior principle of the sola fide. Thus, in order for this correspondence to be 
established, in order for there to be an analogy between our concepts, views and 
words and their object, `God has to make himself object to us in the grace of his 
revelation'. ' God bestows truth upon our knowing which is directed to creaturely 
'' CD 11/1,238. 
d3 Mondin, Principle, 155. 
"CDII/1,231. 
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objects, a truth that has similarity with him. 
The next thing that Barth says here is of great import: `Without this bestowal 
our words have truth in him but not in us. In our mouths they are words which denote 
the creatures but not God'. 45 It is here that the doctrine of analogy in natural 
theology has erred. It has misconceived the becoming as being, the actuality of God's 
revelation as something which exists and is capable of proof without revelation, the 
knowledge of faith as the knowledge of unaided reason. It is this static idea of the 
analogy between our word and God, which is derived from the Thomist theory of 
causality and from it the static notion of resemblance that we examined earlier, which 
Barth repudiates. This static and automatic correspondence between cause and effect 
so that the cause may be known by its effect, militates against the fact that God can 
only be known by God, that is, by his revelation. `We have no grounds for saying No 
where God has said Yes in his revelation. But it all depends upon our saying Yes 
where - and only where - God has first said Yes in his revelation'. " 
Let us return to the statement we cited at the beginning of the last paragraph. 
Barth said that without this special bestowal of God by grace our words have `truth 
in him but not in us'. In these words. we have before us the ontology and 
epistemology of Barth's concept of analogy. We will deal with these matters in detail 
in the next two sections. The point we wish to make at this juncture in reference to 
the above statement is that though man does not have the power to extend his 
language to God. God has given human language the power to talk about him. Barth 
has here combined the principle of man's omnicompetence to know God apart from 
's CD II/l, 231. 
" Ibid. 
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his revelation, and therefore the corresponding incapability to extend his language to 
God, and the fact that human language has been extended to talk about God. But this 
possibility comes from God alone. 
It is to be noted that the human word receives concrete content and 
concrete form from God, and becomes capable of saying, by the fact, 
and only by the fact, that it is spoken on the strength of God's 
permission and command, and by God's revelation, and is not 
arbitrarily discovered and affirmed. 47 
The fallacy fabricated by the doctrine of analogy in natural theology is the affirmation 
of all analogies, in the most arbitrary fashion, on the basis of God's omnipotence. 
True proclamation, for Barth, does not work on this false concept of freedom. True 
proclamation, and ipso facto scientific theology, must speak particularly and 
restrictedly. 
To understand this further, we shall examine Barth's theology of language. 
Here four cardinal points must be made. The first is that human language has its 
origin in God. God creates language for himself, and as such the human word is not 
the property of man but of God. Hence the words `father' and `son' do not first have 
their truth in our thought and language. Barth explains that `[t]hey have it first and 
properly at a point to which, as our words, they cannot refer at all, but to which, on 
the basis of the grace of the revelation of God, they may refer, and on the basis of 
the lawful claim of God the Creator they even must refer, and therefore, on the basis 
of this permission and compulsion, they can actually refer - in their application to 
God, in the doctrine of the Trinity'. " This means that God is the Father and the Son 
in a way incomprehensible and concealed from us. The words `Father' and `Son' have 
47 CD 11/1,32. 
;" CD II/1,229. 
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their origin and therefore their true meaning in God, which shows the incontestable 
priority of the Creator over the creature. This is the same for words like `patience' 
and `love'. The former does not have to do with the virtue that we practise or fail to 
practise. It is supremely the incomprehensible being and attitude of God which is 
shown in the fact that he allows us time to repent and believe in him. The latter, as 
desire which surpasses natural self-seeking of the one for the other, is rooted in the 
trinitarian perichoresis, of the ineffable love that the Father has for the Son, and the 
Son has for the Father in the Holy Spirit. 
Secondly, man can extend his language to God only because God has already 
used human language for himself. Again this application is not on account of man's 
own ingenuity or intrinsic qualities, but the fact that God has given him permission. 
That is to say, through his revelation, God has authorised and indeed commanded man 
to speak thus and so about him. Clarity in this can be obtained when we separate what 
seems to be an overlapping of two arguments. The first is that human language is 
analogous to God's language because it is an imitation of the latter; the other 
argument is God as Creator of human language is its Lord. God can, and in fact has 
commanded man to use his language for God. But the point to be made here is that 
in his revelation God restricts man's use of language. Man can neither take up the 
analogies by himself nor abandon them, for to do this is to take his stand elsewhere 
than where the Word of God is heard. 49 Thirdly, man can extend his language to 
God because the meanings of his words are first 
and 
fully realised only in God. The 
word `person' is a good example. The question is not whether God is a person but 
whether we are persons. And finally, man can extend his language to God because 
49 CD I/1,153. 
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it has been sanctified by Christ and the Church. Just as Christ sanctifies man and 
establishes his church, so also he sanctifies human language and transforms it into the 
language that is suitable for God. 
d. Analogy and the Problem of Knowledge 
The analogy of faith presupposes the inability of man to come to the 
knowledge of God by himself. Man cannot know God unless God has given himself 
to be known in his revelation. 50 Thus for Barth, we possess no analogies on the basis 
of which the nature and being of God as the Lord, Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer 
can be accessible to us. s' We know about God as Lord, Creator, Reconciler and 
Redeemer, `not because we also know other lords and lordships. It is not even partly 
because of this previous knowledge and partly because of God's revelation. It is 
because of God's revelation alone'. 52 Only revelation provides man with true 
concepts and speech about God. 
To the question how we come to know God by means of our thinking 
and language, we must give the answer that of ourselves we do not 
come to know him, that, on the contrary, this happens only as grace 
of revelation of God comes to us and therefore to the means of our 
thinking and language, adopting us and them, pardoning, saving, 
protecting and making good. We are permitted to make use, and a 
successful use at that, of the means given to us. We do not create this 
success. Nor do our means create it. But the grace of God's revelation 
creates it. To know this is the awe in which our knowledge of God 
becomes true. 53 
Sn CD I/1,153. 
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Through this relationship of divine encounter, God, through the grace of his 
revelation `lowers himself to be known by us according to the measure of our own 
human cognition'. -"4 In this process, our thinking and language becomes, as it were 
empty shells which God fills with his Word. In this way, through the analogy of faith, 
God as he is in himself is really known. At this juncture, we recall our discussion in 
chapter IV of the divine and human sides of the encounter. When God gives himself 
in his revelation, man becomes the object of God. The divine side of this encounter 
is that God, who is himself the truth, gives himself to be known as truth by his Word 
and through his Spirit. Man participates in God's truth through the divine good- 
pleasure. This participation cannot be based on man's independent nature and activity. 
His readiness for this encounter which corresponds with God's readiness for man 
cannot be grounded in itself - it is based on the prior and supreme readiness of God, 
beside which there can ultimately be no second. 
Finally, our language speaks about God analogously in the sense that it does 
not express God openly but hiddenly. This is because our human language will always 
retain its worldliness, even when God takes it to himself. Here, in agreement with 
Aquinas, Barth speaks of the disparity between form and content. The form of the 
analogy, which is the mode of signification, is human, and therefore defective and 
deficient; while the content of it is God himself. " 
Analogous concepts have a worldly form, the form of all sorts of 
human acts, and this form is the veiling of the divine content, the 
calling of it in question. There is no experience of the Word of God 
other than this problematic form so deeply grounded in the facts. As 
in analogous language, so too in analogous concepts, there is 
'1' CD 11/1,61. 
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contradiction and radical conflict between form and content. Because 
of this contradiction man can never arrive at a direct encounter with 
the content through the form of his concepts. ' 
There can be no direct communication between the two interiorities. God objectifies 
himself through the object of the world, which remain as worldly objects, and yet are 
set aside and therefore different from other worldly objects, graced by God's 
presence. It is in the worldliness of these concepts and forms that God objectifies 
himself and is therefore known. There is therefore a partial correspondence, but this 
correspondence is from God's side only, known by faith in his revelation. 
e. Analogy and the Problem of Ontology 
Does Barth's analogy of faith presuppose an analogy of being? Many are of 
the opinion that it does. Balthasar, as we have seen, has argued in this way. Barth's 
analogy of faith, when interpreted christologically presupposes the idea of analogia 
entis, since the centre must have a periphery. This same judgement is made by 
Mondin, Hamer and Van Til. 57 Barth does not deny the ontological presupposition 
of the analogy of faith, but locates this ontology, not in a general theory of being, but 
in the concrete being of the God-Man in Jesus Christ. For it is only in Jesus Christ 
that one can come to understand the correspondence between the being of God and 
man, a correspondence which takes place in the context of an infinite qualitative 
difference. `The humanity of Jesus, his fellow-humanity, his being for man as the 
direct correlative of his being for God, indicates, attests and reveals this 
Mondin, Principle, 163. 
" See Mondin, Principle, 172; Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth (London: Sand & Co. 
Ltd., 1962), 70; and Cornelius van Til, Christianity and Barthianism (New Jersey: 
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correspondence and similarity'. " 
The analogical relationship of Christology is the most important aspect of 
Barth's thinking. It is explored at three different levels. At the first level there is the 
analogous relation between Christ and God which is the very basis and prototype of 
God's relation to man. `[T]he fact that from all eternity God pitied and received man, 
the grounding of the fellow-humanity of Jesus in the eternal covenant executed in 
time in his being for man, rests on the freedom of God in which there is nothing 
arbitrary or accidental but in which God is true to himself . 59 The intra-trinitarian 
life points to a perichoretic relationship between the persons of the Father and Son, 
which constitutes the proto-type of the I-Thou relationship. In this way, the 
relationship which God through Christ establishes with humanity ad extra is not 
foreign but proper and natural to him: `He is the original source of every I and Thou, 
of the I which is eternally from and to the Thou and therefore supremely I'. 60 The 
I-Thou relationship in the inner-life of the Trinity, which is characterised by mutual 
love, is the final and decisive ground upon which the ontological character of the 
reality of the radicality of Jesus' being for man is founded: `The eternal love in which 
God as the Father is loved by the Son and as the Son by the Father, is also the love 
which is addressed by God to man'. 6' 
Secondly, there is a correspondence, and therefore analogy, between the 
divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ. The divinity means that he is from God and 
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goes to God, while his humanity means that he is from the cosmos and returns to the 
cosmos. But God is not the cosmos, and the cosmos is not God. Only in Jesus Christ, 
then, can the correspondence or similarity between God and the world be conceived, 
amidst a greater dissimilarity and dialecticism. This analogous relationship, Barth 
maintains, is essential, since Christ `could not be for God if he were not on that 
account for man'. 62 
Thirdly, there is an analogy between humanity in general and Christ's 
humanity. Notwithstanding all differences, the humanity of Jesus has some 
fundamental commonalities with humanity in general, since this is the inevitable 
presupposition when one nature is for another nature. Otherwise, it would be idle to 
speak of Jesus and man as `man'. 
If the humanity of Jesus consists in the fact that he is for other men, 
this means that for all the disparity between him and us he affirms 
these others as beings which are not merely unlike him in his 
creaturely existence and therefore his humanity, but also like him in 
some basic form. 63 
Furthermore, if the `man' Jesus is to be for, from and to other `men', that is to say, 
if he is to be the Saviour of `men' and their Representative, to speak otherwise about 
the humanity of Christ would be quite impossible. 
The analogia relationis is also connected to Barth's understanding of the Imago 
Dei as the relationship between man and woman which, by grace, mirrors divine 
relationality. We have discussed this in some detail in the last chapter, and there is 
no need to repeat it here. What is of moment for us at this point is the fact that for 
Barth, the image of God in man does not have to do with any qualities that are found 
6' CD I11/1,217. 
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in man; it is conceived purely in relational terms. In other words, with the Imago Dei, 
we are dealing not with an analogia 'entis but an analogia relationis, and hence an 
analogia gratia and an analogiafidei. The image of God in man, understood in this 
way shows that it is at the same time similar to and different from the prototype. It 
is similar in the sense that the I-Thou relationship of the Father and Son corresponds 
with the I-Thou relationship of man and woman. The dissimilarity lies in the fact that 
in the latter, this relationship takes place between different individuals, whereas in the 
former it takes place within the same unique individuum. 
From the above discussion, it should now become quite clear that Barth's 
analogiafidei is established on the basis of a dynamic relationship rather than on a 
static concept of being. Barth's rejection of the analogia entis then can be conceived 
as the rejection of a static ontology. Barth's radical ontology is founded on the 
theological conception that God's being is a becoming. Put differently, `God is who 
he is in his works'. ' To be sure, he is not bound to his works. Rather they are 
bound to him. But in and through his works, God is himself revealed as the One he 
is, so that in order for us to understand him, we must understand him only as the One 
he is in his works. Revelation therefore does not remain silent about the being of God. 
As God's particular act, revelation is an event and an actuality in which God truly 
presents himself to us. But because God's revelation is God's act, `[e]very statement 
of what God is, and explanation how God is, must always state and explain what and 
how he is in his act and decision. There is no moment in the ways of God which is over 
and above this decision'. " The implications of this for Barth's understanding of the 
ýCDII/1,260. 
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basis of theological language, and thus the ontology of the analogy of relations is 
expressed lucidly by Colin Gunton. 
Because revelation is God taking place, rational theology is forced to 
the conclusion that his being consists in his becoming ... [God] 
authenticates his existence in threefold revelation events, and thus 
imposes a certain kind of language upon the interpreter of those events. 
Once the revelatory character of the events is acknowledged, the 
interpreter has to speak of God in a certain way, though not with the 
rigidly prescribed linguistic circle of the rationalist. Theological 
language becomes open-textured, the limits of the openness being 
prescribed not by language but by the nature of the object of theology. 
Analogous predication is both made possible and given its limits by f 
revelation. ' 
The question that needs to be addressed here is whether Barth is right to 
replace the static ontology with his dynamic and actualistic understanding of God's 
relationship with the world. Barth has described God as event. Is it conceivable and 
correct that God should be so described? H. G. Pöhlmann objects to Barth's actualism 
for two fundamental reasons. The first is that there is, according to Pöhlmann, a static 
thread underlying the dynamism of the Bible's concept of God. The second is that 
Barth's actualism has endangered the ontological distinction between God and the 
world, and has resulted in an arbitrariness in God's activity. These objections must 
indeed be taken seriously, as they have to do with the basis of Barth's analogical 
thinking. We have found Gunton's response to these objections instructive. 
Three points are made in answer to this objection to Barth's actualism. The 
first deals with the question of whether there can be discerned in the Bible, a static 
thread which runs beneath its concept of God. Much depends on how one conceives 
of the creation, the Incarnation and the cross. Can they be seen as events, that is to 
say, as things that happen? The created order can certainly be understood this way - 
' Gunton, Becoming and Being, 152-153. 
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as that which happens as a result of God's will and word. Barth's actualism can 
compromise the ontological distinction between God and creation. Any such 
conception could. But when Barth's actualism is seen alongside his theology of 
creation, there can be no doubt that Barth is careful to avoid this danger. Secondly, 
concerning the charge that Barth's actualism results in arbitrariness in the being of 
God, it appears here that Pöhlmann has either misunderstood or missed the fact that 
Barth's doctrine of the Trinity relates the temporal divine reality to God's eternity. 
`In so doing', Gunton points out, `he makes precisely the same error as those who 
accuse Barth of failing to do his ontological homework'. 67 It does appear that 
Pöhlmann is attempting to reinstate an Aristotelian conceptuality of being. He opines 
that in it is to be found a middle way between what he calls the Parmenidean 
substantialism and Heraclatean actualism. But, as Gunton astutely points out, in the 
Aristotelian conceptuality of being, we do not have a mere static thread, but rather 
a `substantial' analogy which describes what God really is in himself. As such it is 
hardly the middle way at all. 
The third and final concern has to do with the argument that nothing can 
become without first being. This objection is perhaps seen as the Archilles heel of 
Barth's concept of analogy and hence his ontology. If Pöhimann holds this, Gunton 
asserts, he is a prisoner of the past and of language. Though God has in general been 
understood by analogy with substance, it does not necessarily mean that it has to be 
so. Pöhlmann is a prisoner of language because 
there is the nonsensical doctrine that any substance would be, or at 
least contain as its ontic core, a qualityless substratum - qualityless 
because it is what HAS the qualities. Again, people have held that in 
67 Ibid., 169. 
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any change there is `presupposed' some unchanging element, 
unchanging precisely because it is what is the subject of the change ... 
People are pretty clearly being held captive by a gross picture ... 
philosophers ask whether an individual is a bundle of qualities or 
whether there is `bare particular' (significant phrase! ) `under' the 
qualities. ' 
Now Gunton's criticisms of Pöhlmann may be valid. It may be argued that 
Pöhimann is here trying to reinstate an Aristotelian conceptuality of being which 
Barth's trinitarian doctrine seek to avoid. ' But his objections have failed to dispel 
the unease which Barth's ontology creates. There is a sense in which Pöhlmann is 
right: the event character of being does not a priori exclude its status of being nature. 
Might not one argue, as Hermann Schell does that this event character of being 
includes the concept of nature understood as `the condition for the possibility of being 
event'. In other words, `[A]ctuality includes substantiality; motion includes reality; 
and objectivity includes objective being within itself - but not the reverse'. 70 God is 
not only actus punts but also actio pura. There can be no seperation between being 
and doing; the two completely coincide. And it is precisely because this is so that the 
one cannot be neglected for the other, as Michael Schmaus has eloquently expressed 
it. 
God's Being is an active, doing Being, purest efficacy, acting by being 
and being by acting. There is no realm in God that is not loftiest 
activity, constant deed. Doing is not wrung out of God's supposedly 
more underlying Being. God's to-be is the form that is stamped in 
doing. And God's doing is the "movement" that expresses his Being. 
6R P. T. Geach, `Spinoza and the Divine Attributes', Reason and Reality (Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Lectures V, London, 1972), 20. Quoted by C. Gunton, 
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Being and Doing completely coincide. " 
Furthermore, can we not argue that this is intrinsically found in Barth own 
thinking, even though it is not expressed in so many words. We receive the strongest 
hint of this in Barth's welcoming attitude to the conception of the analogia entis of 
the Roman Catholic theologian Gottlieb Söhngen. According to Barth Söhngen's 
viewpoint deviates significantly from the traditional conception of the analogy of being 
that is found in Aquinas. According to Söhngen, theological knowledge, that is, the 
knowledge of God's being, is not superordinated to but subordinated to the knowledge 
of his activity. Consequently, the analogia entis is subordinated to the analogiafidei. 
If the proper and valid order of being is operari sequitue esse, action follows being, 
the proper epistemic order must proceed from the reverse, namely, esse sequitur 
operari, ontological knowledge follows from the knowledge of activity. There must 
be an assumptio of the analogia entis into the analogia frdei. Barth quotes Söhngen 
approvingly: `An analogia et participatio divine naturae is able neither to evolve nor 
to become accessible to us out of the analogia et participatio entis. And not even in 
the slighest degree can we men sense the existence and mode of being of a self- 
disclosed God. The self-disclosure of God can itself be known only in this divine self 
disclosure'. '' This view corresponds to the fundamental tenets of Barth's theological 
epistemology. Furthermore the participatio fidel, in the way it is conceived here, 
cannot be wiihoui the parficipatio entis, since it would be ludicrous to speak of the 
Word participating in our manhood on the one hand, and yet deny on the other that 
71 Michael Scmaus, Dogmatik I, 454. Quoted in KB, 342. 
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we have a real participation in him. If man does not participate in Christ, it follows 
that Christ has not really participated in our manhood. But the participatio fidel is not 
in opposition to the participatio entis: both are a participation not on the ground of 
man's ability, but a truly human participation on the ground of God's grace. Barth 
found this presentation of the analogia entis so correspondent to his own 
understanding of the God-world relationship that he is prepared to say: `If this is the 
Roman Catholic doctrine of analogia entis, then naturally I must withdraw my earlier 
statement that I regard the analogia entis as the "invention of the anti-Christ"'. 73 
Barth concludes however that this is not the traditional Catholic view. `But I 
am not aware that this particular doctrine of the analogia entis is to be found 
anywhere else in the Roman Catholic Church or that it has ever been adopted in this 
sense ... To me at any rate - seeing I can only assent to its main features - 
it is quite 
incomprehensible how, if we look at it from the historical and practical standpoint, 
this conception can be accepted as authentically Roman Catholic'. ' Be that as it 
may, what is of moment for us here is that implicit in Barth's agreement to the 
conceptuality of Söhngen is, also, by implication, his agreement to the ontology of the 
Roman Catholic theologian which is in essence similar to the one expressed by both 
Schell and Schmaus. 
5. Evaluation and Response 
a. Bank's Assessment of Thomas Aquinas 
Henry Chavannes has argued that Barth's understanding of Thomas Aquinas 
73 CD II/ 1,82. 
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did not come from his independent study of the texts of the great medieval theologian. 
Rather his appreciation of Aquinas came through his interaction with the Jesuit 
theologian Erich Przywara. 75 But Przywara's conception of the analogy of being, 
according to Chavannes, is idiosyncratic as the Jesuit thinker was attempting to 
synthesise the intellectualist approach of Aquinas with the voluntarist approach of 
Duns Scotus by using the tools found in modem philosophy. The end result is a kind 
of historical generalisation which reduces history to a purely Hegelian dialectic of 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Barth's view of the analogy of being was based 
primarily on the doctrine of Przywara and not on the doctrine of Aquinas. In a word, 
Barth has misunderstood Aquinas. 
Now, there can be no doubt that Barth had interacted with Przywara, and was 
in fact very impressed by him. But this does not mean that his understanding of 
Aquinas was so influenced by the Jesuit thinker as to be mistaken. Barth was already 
quite acquainted with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor even before he invited 
Przywara to give a lecture and offer seminars during the winter semester of 1928-29 
at Münster. 76 Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that while Przywara developed his 
concept of analogy from the perspective of salvation history, arguing that analogy 
must begin and end in the one concrete order of salvation, Aquinas developed his 
concept of analogy purely from a metaphysical standpoint. This Chavannes himself 
acknowledges. Przywara's analogy of being is both a metaphysical and theological 
notion while in Thomas Aquinas one finds only a metaphysical notion, the analogy 
's See Henry Chavannes, The Analogy betiveen God and the Word in Saint Thomas 
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of being being the cornerstone of his conception of being which is `not dependent in 
anyway on a supernatural revelation', and which makes `no appeal to a definition 
imposed by the Church'. " In the light of this fact, it is difficult to see how 
Chavannes can sustain the thesis that Barth has misunderstood Aquinas. 
A more tenable assessment is that of Balthasar's. He acknowledges the fact 
that the approaches of Barth and Aquinas are significantly different: Aquinas' style 
of thinking `with its predilection for induction (working from below, drawing 
examples from there for the realm above and finally explaining theology in 
philosophical terms) is obviously in sharp contrast to Barth's exclusively theological 
thinking'. " The contrast can be expressed differently, between the theological 
rationality of Anseim - with which Barth feels very much at home - and the 
philosophical rationality of Aquinas. In accordance with Aristotelianism, Aquinas' 
thought proceeds from below up, moving therefore from the world of `concrete 
experience and sensation, through abstraction, to universal concepts and a 
demontration of the principles in them'. This methodology, which can be described 
as predominantly philosophical (and this is by Balthasar's own admission), has only 
little utility in theology. Theology deals `primarily with God, the concretissinuun, 
from whom nothing can be abstracted'. 79 In other words, theology deals with 
singulars. The trouble with Aquinas' methodology is that it is not very inclined to let 
the singularia be the main focus of his theology. Balthasar draws to our attention the 
fact that Aquinas stood in the middle of the incipient development in Western 
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intellectual history during which there can still be found `elements of the old 
theological unity' but when `the profane sciences could first espy their growing 
autonomy'. In this context, Balthasar asserts, Aquinas' methodology, that is to say, 
the application of pretheological and philosophical concepts in the intratheological 
discourse, is justified, and one should, Balthasar urges, interpret Aquinas in the light 
of this transitional situation. " 
Open as he was to Barth's criticism, Balthasar would not take the proverbial 
final step with Barth to say that Thomist analogy is the philosophical Procrustean bed 
into which scholastic theology was forced. He categorically maintained that there 
should be no philosophical predeterminations that restrict theological thought, 
although, judging from the tone of the discussion he would admit that that tendency 
is very real in Aquinas. We agree with Barth, however, that this is more than just a 
tendency in Aquinas. Though, as Gunton points out very clearly, Barth's criticism that 
the analogy makes the supreme error of bracketing God and the creature into the same 
concept cannot stand by itself, since any attempt to express a concept analogously will 
result in this, this criticism is nevertheless true for the `form that Thomas' analogy 
tends to take'. 8' Aquinas' analogy of being is, as Gunton puts it, in agreement with 
Michael Buckley, the erection of `theological structures independently of christology 
and pneumatology'. The analogy of being, conceived in this way, is a system of 
transcendentality that is developed `independently of the historical becoming on the 
basis of which Christian theology is distinctively what it is'. ' In the case of 
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Aquinas, being is arbitrarily raised above becoming as a transcendent concept, without 
any considerations of the Trinity. Used in this way, analogy becomes the pre-existent 
Procrustean bed into which the data of revelation is forced. 
b. On Barth's Assessment of the Natural Theology of Vatican I 
We move on now to Barth's assessment of the natural theology of Vatican I. 
Before we examine Balthasar's response to one particular aspect of this criticism, let 
us, in summary form, delineate Barth's main objections. Barth launches two 
fundamental attacks on the Vaticanurn, both of which are inter-related. The first has 
to do with the Council's partitioning of God, an exercise which is theologically 
illegitimate for Barth. This objection has been reasonably answered by Battista 
Mondin. Different modes of knowledge, Mondin argues, do not necessarily sacrifice 
the unity of the object. Barth has failed to make the distinction between false 
knowledge of God and one which is incomplete. He simply associates the two, 
making the two different concepts synonymous. Mondin rightly argues that the two 
must be distinguished. This of course does not mean that Barth has to submit to 
natural theology. He could still argue that reason has no intrinsic powers to attain to 
theological knowledge. But the two kinds of knowledge must be distinguished since 
even in the event of Revelation man's knowledge of, God remains imperfect: we see 
dimly as in a mirror. `Only God knows God completely'. 83 This confusion by Barth 
can be traced back to the lack of distinction in Barth in what the older theologians call 
the theologia arrchetypa and the theologia eclypa. 
The second complaint has very much to do with his objection to the 
x' Mondin, Analogy, 160-1. 
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methodology of Aquinas to whom Vatican I was very much beholden. It has to do 
with the abstract way in which the knowledge of God is construed by the Council. 
Balthasar agrees that the approach of the Council on this question is abstract. He 
explains that the teaching of the Council concerning man's knowledge of God has to 
do not with the fact of a supernatural knowledge of God, but with its possibility. He 
agrees with the view of J. M. A. Vacant, whom he quotes extensively, that the 
teaching of the Council merely asserts that the revelation of God is suited to the 
constitution of human reason. This is because `[h]uman creatures possess the means 
to recognise God based on this revelation'. ' Baithasar was aware of the fact that this 
abstract and absolute way of stating the matter has caused considerable unease, even 
among the Fathers of the Council. However he agrees with Gasser's appreciation of 
the problem and why the Council has adopted this approach. For Gasser the Fathers 
who objected to the formula have confused the principia rationis with the exercitium 
rationis. The Council was concerned with the principle of reason. It simply states that 
God can be known by this principle; it does not concern itself with the de facto 
exercise of that faculty. Gasser also pointed out that this statement cannot be so 
abstract that it is completely inapplicable to any concrete human condition. 85 The 
caution exercised by the Council is such that it neither stated that people actually have 
found God in nature de facto, nor does it say explicitly how many people have 
attained theological knowledge outside biblical revelation. In other words, the Council 
has decided on the de jure question while leaving the de facto question open. 
The Council's reserve on this point reaches almost dialectical 
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proportions: on the one hand, it does not want to drop the certo [with 
firm certitude] of the possibility of knowing God (cognoscere posse) 
i pate of all objections against it. And so the Council maintains that 
'physical possibility' of the understanding to know God with certainty. 
On the other hand, however, it insists on the moral necessity of 
revelation so that human beings can attain to a knowledge of God in 
the fallen state expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixto errore 
[directly, with firm certainty and without any admixture of error]. The 
certo that stands over against the firma certitudine belongs to the side, 
of the posse and the de jure, while the firma certitudine that stands 
over against the posse belongs to the side of the actual cognoscere and 
of the de facto - based on revelation. ' 
The approach of the Council is inimical to that of Karl Barth. The Council 
proceeds from the standpoint of the possibility of theological knowledge before 
considering its actuality while Barth would only allow the reverse. Balthasar is aware 
of this point and admits that `Vatican I has in no way anticipated in its decisions the 
whole complex of questions we have described as the structure of Karl Barth's 
thought: thinking from the most concrete reality of being and history in order from 
this perspective to go on to describe the conditions for their possibility'. " Balthasar 
however goes on to maintain that there is no genuine contradictions between Barth's 
statement about man's capacity to know God within the concrete order of revelation 
and the statement of Vatican I. But this is the case only if the statements of the 
Council are re-interpreted in the light of Balthasar's theology of grace which he learnt 
from de Lubac, and even here, one should add that the fundamental objection of Barth 
in relation to the movement of thought of the Council is left unanswered. 
KB, 306. 
A' KB, 308. 
283 
CHAPTER VIII 
REVELATION AND THEOLOGY: CATALOGICAL ANALOGY 
1. Christ The Centre of Theology 
In his study on the theology of Karl Barth, Balthasar has maintained that 
Christocentrism is not exclusive to the approaches of specifically Protestant and 
Reformed theologies `but are views that today's Catholic authors (and not just a 
random sample of them, but the most important and representative) consider to be 
theirs too'. ' This however does not preclude the fact that the Christocentrism of Barth 
and Balthasar seem to be different in both its formal and material aspects. Balthasar 
has certainly not glossed over this difference, but has taken great pains to show 
exactly where the difference lies. However, it should be pointed out even at the outset 
that this difference should not cause us to marginalise the common ground between 
the two theologians. 
Balthasar appeals to the writings of several Catholic theologians to demonstrate 
the Christocentrism of Catholic thought. The first major figure he cited is his mentor, 
Erich Przywara. Przywara, who was an active dialogue partner of the Swiss Reformed 
theologian, attempts to surmount the Scotist-Thomist dichotomy regarding the 
Incarnation by leaving behind as it were the quest for speculative possibilities and by 
concentrating instead on discovering necessity within the de facto world order. His 
Christocentric starting point can be clearly appreciated from the following passage 
cited by Balthasar. 
The path to God and the image of God are but shadowy intimations 
' KB, 326. 
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whose corresponding visible form is revealed only in the one who is 
God's only `interpretation'. Indeed, he is God's pre-ceeding (ex- 
egesis), the one who makes God visible to us: Jesus Christ. According 
to his own eternal decree (Eph lff), God is revealed nowhere else but 
in Christ, and Christ's essence is in the last analysis nothing other than 
the revelation of this God. So he himself has said: `Whoever sees me 
sees the Father' ... Consequently, everything that might be a way to God or an image of God is only a dim reflection or a first intimation 
of what alone is revealed in Christ. All the traits in which God shines 
before the creature are themselves only drawn out and interpreted in 
Christ: the God who is only God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. There 
is no other God beside him, and thus all general traits of God are 
either prior or subsequent radiance of the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. 2 
In this passage, Przywara reduces everything to the one central focal point, namely, 
God in the crucified Christ. This same emphasis is made in his Deus semper major 
when he writes: `He (Christ) draws every direct statement about the relationship 
between God and man into his dialectic of intersecting cross-beams, where the 
"crossing" of a positive statement by a negative one imitates the true Cross (and as 
such is the only form of negative theology)'. ' Alongside his Ignatian spirituality, 
which emphasises the highest concreteness with its stress on the application of the 
senses, Przywara, according to Balthasar, `proceeds consistently, judging all logic, 
and thus ontology too, by his christological, historical and actualist standard'. ' 
Romano Guardini takes a similar standpoint when he maintains that everything 
refers `back to Christ in their essence and in him the quintessence of the world's 
meaning enters the stage of history in his nature'. ' It is not that Christ is in the 
Z Erich Przywara, Sui nutla (Glock und Lutz, 1946), 17-18. Cf. KB, 329. 
' KB, 329. 
KB, 329. 
S Michael Guardini, Wesen des Christentums (1940) II, 51-52. Cf. KB, 331. 
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world, Guardini argues. Rather, the world is in Christ. That is to say, the world is 
`spaced' in Christ, just as everything is `essenced' in him. 
Christi an_thinking in general and theology in particular must be Christological. 
That is to say, it must be shaped by Christ. In a passage from Der Herr (1949), 
Guardini gives us a clear explication of his conception of christocentrism. 
What does the formation of Christian thinking, for example, consists 
in? First, man lives with his thoughts in the general world. He 
measures these thoughts by the experience of things and by general 
rules of logic. After this, he judges what is and what can be. But as 
soon as he encounters Christ, he must make a decision: Will he judge 
Christ according to the perspective? At first he will try to do but will 
sense a demand at work: to invert the relationship and take Christ as 
his starting point: no longer thinking about Christ but from him. Now 
the demand will be to place Christ no longer among the laws of 
immediate thinking and experiencing but to recognise him as the 
highest standard of what is real and possible ... 
What had previously 
been certain is now called into question. The image of the real is 
overthrown. Again and again the question recurs of whether Christ is 
truly so great that he can be the standard of everything; of whether the 
world really returns to him ... But to the extent that thought 
perseveres, it experiences that he really is the category that is the 
foundation to everything, the system that coordinates to thought, in 
which everything contains his truth. For now the figure of Christ has 
grown beyond all other standards. For him there is no measuring rod. 
He himself is the standard. ' 
This notion of Christ as the norm, standard and measure for all things is consistent 
with Balthasar's understanding of the Incarnation as the Gestalt der Gestalten. ' 
We turn now to Michael Schmaus. For him, Christ is the essence of 
Christianity because he is the very image of God, the archetype after whose pattern 
Adam and indeed all of creation has been formed. As the ultimate and most radiant 
Word which God has spoken, Christ is the ultimate meaning of all existence and of 
6 KB, 330. 
' See Chapter 3. 
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all that happened in nature and history. This means that all `earlier words that the 
Father has spoken in the natural and supernatural revelations have been gathered up 
and transfigured in Christ'. Those words would indeed not have been spoken by God 
without this concluding Word which is Christ. Hence all things have their being in 
Christ. In his Katholische Dogmatik (1940), 8 Schmaus wrote: `The world 
accordingly, does not posesess a completely autonomous order that is ultimately self- 
subsistent and self-sufficient. Its order is in fact taken up into the order whose ground 
is Christ'. The eternal plan of salvation, according to Schmaus, is conceived and 
determined from all eternity on the Incarnation of the Logos: `It does not make much 
sense to mull over what God could have done or even would have to have done if he 
had not decided to redeem us. In fact that is what he has decided. And before that 
simple fact, all this talk of "what if" and "however" must be stunned into silence' 
(492-493). Not only that, the foundation of created order is also Christ. `God's design 
for creation is Christocentric'. And because of this, Christ is, for Schmaus, as he is 
for Guardini and Balthasar, the ground and measure of human existence. Schmaus 
points to the truncated and artificial attempt to synthesise the natural and supernatural. 
Christians, he argues, do not need to reconcile Christ and the world together: Christ 
himself is the mediation and the reconciliation. This reconciliation takes place at the 
Cross which is the permanent judgement of nature and culture. `All culture stands 
henceforth under the judgement and the blessing of the Cross of Christ' (225). 
Several others are brought into the discussion by Balthasar. Eucharius Berbuir 
argues that `everything pertaining to man can be accepted and assumed by the one 
man Jesus Christ in the mysterious unity with the Logos', again the notion that 
R See KB, 329. 
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creation is grounded in Christ. Emile Mersch also expounds this view with clarity and 
penetration. But his main contribution is to be found in his equally penetrating 
analysis that theologians have sought to induce a unity into theology from the outside. 
But these syntheses remain external to the content of revelation. `They write it on the 
level of history or of natural science or of ethics or philosophy, rather than placing 
that unity on its own level'. This kind of unity, Mersch asserts, would result only in 
the conception of the external understanding of the content of revelation. The true 
inner unity of theology is the whole Christ. Thus, for Mersch, `theology is truly 
theocentric only when it is christocentric'. 9 
2. Catalogical Analogy 
The christological focus of the theologians discussed above is in concord with 
the most fundamental theological intuition of Karl Barth: that christology must be 
accorded a central place in theology. Christology must determine theology `as a whole 
and in all parts' if it is not to succumb to some alien sway and thus lose its 
character. 1° This is certainly the very basis of Balthasar's entire vision: from the 
beginning to the end, Christ is the well-spring and ultimate horizon of his theological 
program. Yet, as Angelo Scola has rightly observed, it is in christology that the 
analogia entis, which because of its indispensability for Balthasar is a theme which 
runs through his entire work, finds its dizzying summit: `... the Verbum-caro runs its 
ineffable, undivided, and unconfused unity from one pole of the analogy to the other 
(God and man), remaining under the law of analogy itself, without ever annulling it 
Emile Mersch, Las Theologie du Corps mystique, I, 47-48. Cf., KB, 334. 
1D CD 1/1,123. 
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or passing beyond it into a blasphemous idealism that treats God as a moment in the 
triad of absolute being and thus introduces the historical process into God himself'. " 
In Christ Balthasar has found a solution to the very real danger which Karl 
Barth clearly saw, namely, the erection of a metaphysics and ontology which is not 
based on God's revelation in Jesus Christ. In Christ, Balthasar has found a way to 
surmount the unfruitful alternative between the analogia fidel and analogict entis 
suggested by Barth's theology. In Christ, too, Balthasar has found a theological 
method which is in essential agreement with Barth without having to go all the way 
with him to what Balthasar calls a dead end. 12 Balthasar works on the presupposition 
that form and content are inseparable. Everything in the realm of method stands or 
falls with this fundamental presupposition of the union of form and content. 
Balthasar's catalogical analogy, as a theological method, takes its form from the 
Incarnation. It has as its starting point and its forming principle (Forniprinzip) God's 
primal kenosis. At the same time it asserts that in order for one to approach the 
trinitarian event in God, one has to `feel' one's way back to God through what is 
disclosed in the divine kenosis within the theology of the covenant and the Cross. 
Thus for Balthasar, theology has the dual movement of condescensio (catalogically) 
and of co-rising (analogically). And since the Incarnate Word is the totality of the 
absolute analogy, theology is a form of catalogical/analogical integration. " This 
" Angelo Scolia, `Nature and Grace in Hans Urs von Balthasar', Conunusnio 
XVIII, 2, Summer 1991,215. 
12 KB, 362. 
" Wolfgang Treitler, `True Foundations of Authentic Theology', Hans Urs von 
Balthasar. His Life and Work. Edited by David L. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1991), 181. 
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integration, Balthasar argues, upholds the legitimate aspects of the analogia entis and 
the analogia fidei. On the one hand catalogical analogy avoids the danger of the 
formation of any analogy that has the power to sustain itself outside the historical 
becoming of God. Rather it locates itself within the event of the covenant in salvation 
history which culminates in Jesus Christ. In this regard the opening of the world's 
truths is based on the condescensio of God himself. On the other hand, this way of 
thinking helps us to understand the relationship between creation and salvation history, 
a relationship which is emphasised in Karl Barth's own theological thinking. Wolfgang 
Treitler captures the essence of this and expresses it with eloquence. 
... in this catalogical analogy, there occurs at the same time the disclosure of what lies in being as a creation from God (and thus again 
catalogically), namely, that it must have been able to be prepared for 
the new reality which could no longer be deduced from it and which 
can therefore be determined in its truth only by way of catalogy. The 
use of the perfect tense in this statement derives its logic immediately 
from the catalogy of analogy: it is and was impossible to know ahead 
of time that to which creation, if it was to be adequately at its creator's 
disposition, had to be further opened up in view of the history of 
salvation which occurs in creation and at the same time draws it into 
itself. 14 
Balthasar learnt this catalogical thinking from Bonaventure who among all the 
great scholastics is considered by the Jesuit theologian as offering the widest scope to 
the aesthetic in his theology. It has been rightly observed that all the main themes in 
Balthasar's theological aesthetics are found in Bonaventure, including the mysticism 
of the Cross through which one enters into the trinitarian mystery which is the glory 
of God. 15 Bonaventure's approach' is shaped by the theological presupposition that 
14 Ibid., 174. 
15 Breanddn Leahy, `Theological Aesthetics', Beauty of Christ. An Introduction to 
the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Edited by Bede McGregor, O. P. and 
Thomas Norris (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1994), 52-3. 
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man can only enter into God per Christum who is the absolute mediator. If this is 
true, then this entry which is tied to the God-man, must necessarily take on his form: 
Jesus Christ is the way and no one comes to the Father except through him (Jn 14: 6). 
Now if the Son sent into the world as man is the one who descended from the Father, 
then entry into God per Christum means that one is being drawn into this descent. In 
other words, entry into God per Christum is the condescensio of human beings with 
the Incarnate Son. Bonaventure identifies this as the positive form of all valid 
theology. Because the theological form must take its measure from this condescensio, 
it must therefore have the form of descent within itself. 16 
Balthasar's exposition of Bonaventure's understanding of the significance of 
the Incarnation is eloquent. `The Incarnation is the loving condescendere of God, who 
takes flesh and makes himself visible for sinners, because they cannot any longer 
grasp his divinity'. " This Word who took on flesh has already created man after his 
own image thereby making him imitable. But the Word as the light is inaccessible and 
must therefore become overshadowed by the flesh so that man could see and follow. 
It is only through the conde rscensio that true theology is possible. 
This means also that the eternal Word, the expression of the Godhead, 
when become audible and visible can be understood only as the 
expression of the Godhead: in Jesus Christ, the whole Trinity gives 
witness to itself. The Father gives witness to himself in the fact (of the 
Incarnation), for he is the power, the Son in the utterance, for he is the 
Word, the Holy Spirit in the intention for he is the love and bond. 
Without God's Trinity, the Incarnation of God cannot be understood, 
and the phenonmenon of Jesus Christ cannot be interpreted: Incarnatio 
non cognoscitur, nisi cognoscatur distinctio personarum. '$ 
16 Trietler, `Foundations', 170. 
11 GL 11: 327. 
'R GL 11: 328. 
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In the descent therefore Christ becomes our exit and entrance. He becomes our ascent 
to God and our descent to neighbour and our apprehension of spiritual truth. In this 
descent God sets himself at what Baithasar calls the midpoint of the world where the 
descent into the material nature and the ascent to God ensue: man. `In that this 
midpoint of the world is the expression of God's descent, the descent within this 
world must be emphasised in it: it becomes the midpoint of humility, of poverty, of 
the cross. And in that God's descent reveals his immeasurable loftiness, the humility 
of Christ becomes the fundamental mystery. "The depth of God-made-man, his 
humility, is so great that reason founders on it"'. 19 
Central to Balthasar's theological methodology then, is the concept of kenosis. 
Balthasar speaks of three forms of kenosis, the first and foundational being the 
intratrinitarian. This is the eternal generation of the Son by the Father, in equality of 
essence, in which the Father gives himself to this Son and forgoes the sole possession 
of the divine nature on his behalf. This is the primal kenosis which provides the 
fundamental possibility for God's other kenoses. It is the intradivine presupposition 
for the economic manifestations of the divine descent of God into the world. In this 
primal kenosis, the second kenosis, namely creation, is grounded. Here in creation 
God's descent is seen in his giving to another out of love the freedom of self- 
actualisation. But this giving reaches the point where human beings, in not wanting 
to owe themselves to God's kenosis, seek to actualise their autonomy. This unheard- 
of-opposition against God in sin is the basis for the theo-dramatic process of God's 
redemption, and, by implication, the process of God's contact with sin, `first in the 
covenant with Israel, the hard election of a people, in order to allow the power of sin 
14 GL 11: 329. 
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as well as the superabundant power of God to actualise themselves in it: Israel's pre- 
existence'. " Israel, however, violated the covenant by hardening their hearts and 
following after their own plans (Ps 81: 120. This has resulted in an `empty time' at 
the end of which God entered as the unique One in his final enagement with the 
world. This is the third ketosis in which the Son gives himself to the Cross (which 
is the peak of this kenosis) where he suffers unsurpassable abandonment and God- 
forsakenness. Here in the Cross is to be found the confrontation between the 
groundlessness of the love of God and the groundlessness of human sin. `Here he 
suffers the unsurpassable forsakenness by God in the descent of his mission ad 
in feros, and he thereby transverses pro nobis the infinite spaciousness which the 
trinitarian God is, in and for himself'. " The kenosis is therefore located within 
catalogy and its dialectical presupposition, dialectical precisely because there can be 
no access to the immanent Trinity except from its economic manifestation. 
Catalogical thinking then provides the framework for understanding analogy. 
Thus it is in the framework of his Christology that Balthasar's concept of the analogia 
entis must be understood. The Balthasarian analogia entis cannot be seen as a generic 
concept in which both God and man are placed under the abstract heading of 'being- 
as-such'. In its employment of philosophical terms and catagories the analogia entis 
must not step outside the parameters of Christology as is the danger of both Scotism 
and later Scholastic rationalism. This does not mean however that the concept of 
analogy does not have universal application, for `it must extend to the creature's 
supernatural elevation, through grace, to divine sonship; so too, we can conclude, it 
20 Treitler, `Foundations', 172. 
2' Ibid., 173. 
293 
must apply to that highest union between divine and created being, in the God-man 
himself'. 22 In Christ the hypostatic union of the human and divine must for Balthasar 
be `the final proportion [Mass] between the two and hence must be the "concrete 
analogia entis" itself. However, it must not in any way overstep this analogy in the 
direction of identity'. 23 
The question of the transcendence and immanence of God is given full 
consideration in Balthasar's conception of the analogia entis. Balthasar offers an 
interpretation of the teaching of the Fourth Lateran formula which reads: `however 
great the similarity between Creator and creature, the dissimilarity is always greater 
(quia inter creatoretn et creaturant non polest similitudo notari, quip inter eos maior 
sit dissiniiltudo notanda)' Balthasar recognises however the insufficiency of conciliar 
formulation and the fact that such formulations can be made complicated by a literal 
or figurative iconostasis. It should serve as a caution, however, against over 
rationalisation and must be seen in a dintcc cal fashion: God is in himself Wholly 
Other; in becoming man he became Not Other. 24 By giving this concept a catalogical 
foundation Balthasar has tried to remove the alternative between analogia entis and 
analogiafidei. In so doing Balthasar has also tried to avoid both the serious charge 
often made against those proponents of the analogia entis, that of establishing the 
indissoluble relation of the world to God through a general concept of being, and the 
equally serious charge made against those proponents of the analogiafidel or verbi, 
22 TD 111: 221. 
23 TD 111: 222. 
24 Deidere Carabine, `The Fathers: The Church's Intimate, Youthful Diary', The 
Beauty of Christ, 86. 
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that of negating creation as the ground of meaning. 
The formula therefore does not circumvent the abyss between divine and 
created natures, even when it is so grounded in the Christological and catalogical 
premise. Balthasar is unequivocally clear about this: `The fact that the person of Jesus 
Christ bridges this abyss without harm to his unity should render us speechless in the 
presence of the mystery of his person '. '15 Thus the com uunicatio idioinatum does not 
abolish the dissimilarity of created and uncreated nature. It is possible to speak of the 
of the interchangäbility (i. e., analogously) of the attributes only because they are 
united in the one person. There can be no interchange of attributes between the divine 
and human natures. Balthasar argues therefore that the analogia entis refers to the 
infinite and absolute God who cannot be compared with the finite creature who owes 
its existence to him. Here Baithasar is in full agreement with Barth that there can be 
no external vantage point from which the creature could compare itself with God. The 
creature can only look to God in total dependency. This, Balthasar pointed out, has 
been understood by the Fathers of the Church - Maximus, Bonaventure, Scotus, and 
even Thomas - suggesting, implicitly at least, that Barth's reading of Thomas may not 
be entirely accurate. 26 There can be no doubt that for Balthasar, the infinite and the 
finite are not related `aequivoce'. The analogy between God and the world must be 
understood in the sense that all created nature is, at a very fundamental and 
indestructible level, the image of the primal Image: God. `[T]hroughout the history 
of Christology, the purpose and meaning of the Incarnation of the Logos has been 
portrayed as the transcendent, inner elevation of the image: it is lifted up in the 
21 TD 111: 220. 
26 TD 111: 222-3. 
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primal, divine Image; or the latter is implanted into the former'. 27 From the aspect 
of being, the union, notwithstanding the abyss, between the divine and created natures 
can be conceived in the supposition that in every act of creation God communicates 
something of himself. `This brings us to the thesis that the ordinary act of creation is 
a partial or inchoate Christology and that Christology is the superabundant expression 
of anthropology'. 2' Alongside this, the trinitarian mission of Christ must also be 
brought into consideration. The analogia entis must not lead us to speak of a two-fold 
consciousness in the logos-made-man. Rather the Son takes up one unitary mission 
since, through his perfect obedience to the Father, he identifies fully with this 
mission. 
... there is an analogy between the Son's being begotten and the 
creature's being freely and sovereignly created by God. This analogy 
can form a bridge both to the Son's `becoming creature' and to our 
being `reborn' (Jn 3: 3,7). After all, the incommensurable distance 
does not mean that the created world is alienated from its origin; the 
gradations in the world's `imaging' of God (vestigium-imago similitudo) 
show that this is not so. Then the trinitarian analogy enables the Son 
too, without abolishing the analogia entis, simultaneously to do two 
things: he represents God to the world - but in the mode of the Son 
who regards the Father as `greater' and to whom he eternally owes all 
that he is - and he represents the world to God, by being, as man 
(rather, as the God-man), `humble, lowly, modest, docile [tapeinos] of 
heart' (Mt 11: 29). It is on the basis of these two aspects, united in an 
abiding analogy, that the Son can take up his one unitary mission. This 
mission is to represent the Father's authority vis-ä-vis men and to 
represent mankind's sin in the sight of God, the Judge, achieving its 
atonement, together with his `brothers', before the Father. 29 
The above discussion clearly shows Balthasar's attempt to combine the doctrine 
of analogy put forward by the Fourth Lateran Council and the Christology of 
27 TD 111: 223. 
'x TD 111: 234. 
29 7D 111: 230. 
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Chalcedon. More precisely, Balthasar seeks to re-interpret the Council's doctrine of 
analogy in the light of Chalcedonian Christology. The result is a concept of analogy 
that is materially and formally quite similar to that of Karl Barth. Wolfgang Treitler's 
explication of Balthasar's use of Chalcedonian Christology in his conception of 
catalogical analogy is incisive. 
In terms of analogy: in this determinate man, Jesus of Nazereth, in 
whom God is present in unsurpassable and unique manner as himself 
(similitudo; indivise, inseparabiliter - similarity; undividedly, 
inseparably) God is revealed as the Deus semper nzaior, God who is 
ever greater (nzaior dissimilitudo; inconfuse, inunutabiliter - greater 
dissimilitude; unconfused, unalterably). 
In terms of catalogy; in the Son of God sent from God (true God from 
true God) the truth of free sinful humanity before God becomes 
completely manifest (similitudo; indivise, inseparabiliter), but in such 
a way that God has nothing in common with sin but, as the one who 
infinitely towers over sin, he brings sin into an annihilating and saving 
judgement (nmaior dissimilitudo; in confuse imrnutabiliter). 
Since, however, the definiteness of the catalogical analogy is in the 
Son who descended, it remains clear that analogy is really founded in 
catalogy even here. Analogy, understood in these terms, goes 
completely through Jesus, the Christ, according to von Balthasar, and 
thus Christ himself is analogy in a catalogically discernible specificity: 
absolute analogy, thus analogia entis, but also analogia libertatis and 
analogia salulis, the absolute catalogical analogy. 3o 
The place of the Spirit in all this has already been discussed in Chapters 2& 
3. We have only to emphasise here some salient points that are relevant to the present 
discussion. The first is that the Holy Spirit is the interpretative agent who testifies to 
the Incarnate Word. The Holy Spirit, who knows the voice of God in the Word of the 
Son, gives the human voice which responds to this Word its correct meaning. The 
implication of this is that theology can only be done in the Holy Spirit. Secondly the 
Holy Spirit gives man the ability to perceive the form (Gestalt) of the Incarnate Word, 
i0 Treitler, `Foundations', 176. 
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creating within him the sensorium (faith) for this, so that alongside the ontic order 
which orientates man to the objective form of God's revelation in the Gestalt of Christ 
is the noetic faculty with which he can apprehend the form. Faith is the only organ 
through which man can recognise the absolute form of God's revelation. Both the 
objective and subjective aspects of theological epistemology are given their proper 
place in the catalogical analogy. `This objectivity consists in this: that its truth occurs 
in the communication of truth to the believing theologian - there is no other theologian 
- by the Holy Spirit, which is the one Spirit'. " The pneumatology of Balthasar is 
built on two key texts in the Gospel. of John. The first is John 16: 13: `The Spirit will 
lead you into all truth', and the second, John 16: 14: `The Spirit will take what is mine 
and will declare it to you'. The first text shows that the fundamental mission of the 
Holy Spirit is to lead the Christian community into the truth, that is, into Christ. And 
the second is to show the link between the Spirit and the Son which is emphasised by 
John: the Holy Spirit is and always will be the Spirit of the Son. 3- 
It must be appreciated that Balthasar's catalogical analogy is a very serious and 
tenable response to Barth's concerns. Balthasar has taken the objections of Barth with 
utmost seriousness. He has developed his understanding of analogy from the 
standpoint of Christology. Furthermore, by insisting on the glorious form of Christ 
as the measure of all things, Balthasar's theological aesthetics is transposed from a 
Christocentrism to a trinitarian theocentrism. 33 
This transparency realises itself both in his (Christ's) claim and in his 
31 Ibid., 176. 
12 John O'Donnell, `The Logic of Divine Glory', The Beauty of Christ, 167. 
11 Breandän Leahy, `Theological Aesthetics', The Beauty of Christ, 29. 
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authority, which are the authorised representation of the Father, and 
in his whole poverty and in his self-abandonment, which free the whole 
space for the Father to act in him. Both are one: but only the second 
can show that the first is genuine, as love. The glory of the Father can 
make itself `substantially' present through both in the incarnate Son. In 
this way the theological aesthetics is transposed from Christcentrism 
into a final (trinitarian) theocentrism, in which the Holy Spirit too 
receives a central place as the one who effects the neutral indwelling 
in love between Christ and the Father: the Holy Spirit is the personal 
identity of the personal distinction in the Godhead' 
Balthasar thus works with a trinitarian ontology, and his concept of analogy must be 
understood from this perspective. Whatever one may say then about the validity of 
Barth's objections of Aquinas' conception of the analogia entis, these objections do 
not apply to Balthasar. 
3. Nature and Grace 
The problem of theological epistemology and the relationship between the 
analogia entis and analogiafidei, can be examined from the standpoint of the broader 
theme of the nature-grace relationship. Catholic theology has been struggling with this 
problem ever since the ground breaking proposal by Blondel in the 19th century 
brought the neo-scholastic doctrine of pure nature into question. 35 In contemporary 
Catholic theology, Balthasar and Rahner represent the two opposite poles of the 
debate. This has resulted in two very different theologies of religion, around which 
" GL VII: 262-3. 
% See Hendrikus Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology. Report of A Personal 
Journey (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1989), especially chapter XV, 229-255; 
Stephen Duffy, The Graced Horizon. Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought 
(Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1992), Chapters 1&2,7-65; The Dynamics of 
Grace. Perspectives in Theological Anthropology (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 
1993), Chapters 6&7; Medard Kehl, `Introduction', The von Balthasar Reader 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 17ff; and Chapter 1 of this work. 
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nearly all other Catholic thinkers can be broadly grouped. ' 
Balthasar's theology of grace has been largely shaped by his teacher Henry de 
Lubac. Arguably, de Lubac has done more than any other. Catholic theologian in 
bringing about the re-examination of the problem of grace and nature. 37 Dissatisfied 
with the extrincism of the neo-scholastic theology of grace, de Lubac, who was 
influenced by Blondel, argued for notion of grace which can be described as a 
transcendence that is immanent. God's gift' of grace is not something extrinsic to 
human nature. It is not that the human pre-exists his own coming into being, waiting 
to receive being from the Creator. Rather God's gift is intrinsic to man. This, de 
Lubac argues, is clear from the doctrine of creation. The endowment of a supernatural 
finality cannot find its analogue in the human gift of a human donor. To exist in the 
present order is to be directed towards the supernatural finality. Hence, to say `I' or 
`I exist' or `I have a finality' is to affirm implicitly the same reality. In creation God 
has willed us into existence because he has also willed us to be with himself. The 
finality of man is therefore an ontological reality. The radical extrincism of the pure 
nature hypothesis has simply missed this point. This has resulted in the conclusion that 
there are two finalities for man. It thus labours under a false premise which must be 
rejected. The implications of this to our present concern is obvious. Man is confronted 
with a paradox. On the one hand he has a `natural' desire for God. This desire, if we 
are to understand it aright, must be seen as a desire for the God who is freely making 
a gift of himself in love. In this way this desire is the most absolute of all desires. But 
" Bede McGregor, O. P. `The Wider Ecumenism: Christian Prayer and Other 
Religions', The Beauty of Christ, 195. 
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humans are themselves unable to bring this desire to fulfillment. This can only be 
achieved in grace. `Humanity hungers for God; but for God as God can only be, i. e. 
as love, freely giving Godself . 38 
Balthasar picked up this important insight of de Lubac. Grace and nature 
should not be conceived as extrinsic to one another. Supernature enfolds nature; 
nature is embedded in grace, the analogia entis in the analogia fidel. Balthasar 
formulates this Christologically as follows. 
Human nature and its mental faculties are given their true centre in 
Christ; in him they obtain their final truth, for such was the will of 
God, the Creator of nature, from eternity. Man, therefore, in 
investigating the relationship between nature and supernature, has no 
need to abandon the standpoint of faith, to set himself up as the 
mediator between God and the world, between revelation and reason, 
or to cast himself in the role of judge over that relationship. All that 
is necessary is for him to understand `the one mediator between God 
and man, the man Jesus Christ' (1 Tim. 2: 5), and to believe him in 
whom `were all things created in heaven and on earth ... all by him 
and in him' (Col. 1: 16). Christ did not leave the Father when he 
became man to bring all creation to fulfillment; and neither does the 
Christian need to leave his center in Christ in order to mediate him to 
the world, to understand his relation to the world, to build a bridge 
between revelation and nature, philosophy and theology. 39 
Two important points emerge from this. Firstly, from the Christological perspective, 
nature cannot be seen merely as the extrinsic presupposition of grace. Nature must be 
considered as `an ingredient of the christic whole which is grace'. 4° Secondly, nature 
derives its meaning from grace without losing its autonomy. This is important for 
Balthasar's revelation theology. Nature is that minimum `which must be present in 
every possible situation where God wants to reveal himself. This minimum is the 
11 Duffy, Horizon, 68. 
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analogia entis. `If there is to be a revelation, then it can only proceed from God to 
the creature - to a creature that precisely as a creature does not include revelation in 
its conceptual image. The "nature" that grace presupposes is createdness as such'. 4' 
These two considerations are important in Balthasar's understanding of general 
revelation and the natural knowledge of God. But before we turn to them it is 
important that we pause here to see if there are similarities between Balthasar's 
theology of grace and the Barthian perception. On the one hand Barth would not 
speak of a prevenient grace in the way Balthasar has done. Though he conceives of 
the relationship between creation and redemption in the context of the covenant, Barth 
could not (perhaps he would not) envisage a common, universal grace which makes 
the knowledge of God both a possibility and an actuality, even if this knowledge has 
only resulted in idolatry and superstition. For him there can be only one grace of God 
which, through the aid of the Holy Spirit, enables man to apprehend God's revelation 
in Christ by faith. And yet, on the other hand, Barth could say that Jesus Christ is the 
one grace of God42 through whom God's eternal gracious plan for mankind, both in 
creation and redemption, is effected and accomplished. 43 God's grace therefore 
encompasses creation and providence' man's reconciliation and redemption, " 
human faith, hope and love. The God who is `wholly grace' is in Jesus Christ God 
41 KB, 285. 
42 CD IV/1: 86. 
43 DO, 3. 
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`for us' and `with us'. As such, man's entire existence is an existence in grace - he 
is utterly dependent on God's grace in every sphere of his life. ` Can we not argue 
that this line of thought cannot but acknowledge, implicitly at least, the concept of 
prevenient grace or universal, common grace? Barth cannot avoid this concept 
altogether. In his moving exposition of `Given Time', Barth writes: `The time given 
to man tells him that he is not only the creature of God, but his covenant partner'. 
`Given time' speaks of the faithfulness of God to himself and to the creature. `In all 
its hiddenness', Barth, continues, `it is the rustling of the Holy Spirit by which, 
however deaf to it we may be, we are surrounded in virtue of the fact that we are in 
the movement of time and are obliged to make this movement in and with our life, 
so long as we have it'. In this given time, Barth explains, we are confronted with the 
presence and gift of God's grace. `If we are to speak of prevenient grace it is difficult 
to see in what better form it may be better perceived and grasped than in the simple 
fact that time is given to us men'. 47 This can be set in Barth's relational ontology. 
The `God who created us and is in the process of resuing and preserving us; God who 
is not dismayed at our sin, and does not cease to be for us, nor reverse his 
determination to be for him and in mutual fellowship; God in all the defiance of our 
unfaithfulness by his own faithfulness'. 48 Here then we find an argument for 
continuity not dissimilar to Balthasar's theology of grace, that despite the ontological 
remoteness between man and God that is caused by sin, there is a closeness on the 
part of God in so far as he is God `for us'. This faithfulness of the Creator to the 
I CD 1/2,157 - 393; 11/2,575; 111/1,363 ff., 111/2,164 ff., IV/1,83. 
47 CD 111/2,526. 
'R CD 111/2,529. 
303 
creature constitutes also his readiness for man. This readiness must also mean that the 
world, regardless of how perverted it is by sin, cannot be meaningless. And because 
God has not only given us time, but has actually entered it, human history likewise 
cannot be an empty process. For both theologians, it must be remembered that the 
positivity of the world and of history is not due to some abstract goodness intrinsic 
to the world and the historical process but to the fact that God in Christ is the creator 
of the world and Lord of history. However reluctant Barth is in taking the proverbial 
next step, it must nonetheless be taken, for surely all this must have some bearing into 
the whole area of God's revelation in creation and man's capacity to know him, 
however inadequately, in that revelation. 
4. General Revelation 
Karl Barth's rejection of natural theology, as we have seen, has also resulted 
in his denial of general revelation. Because of his claim that there can be no 
knowledge of God apart from his revelation in Jesus Christ, Barth has rejected the 
approach of the Vaticanum which posits a knowledge of God the Creator. This would, 
according to Barth, destroy the unity of God. Furthermore, Barth holds that revelation 
is redemptive. In his debate with Brunner, he writes: `How can Brunner maintain that 
a real knowledge of the true God, however imperfect it may be (and what knowledge 
of God is not imperfect? ) does not bring salvation? '49 Barth's concern is clear: `If 
man could achieve some knowledge of God outside of his revelation, which is in Jesus 
Christ, man would have contributed at least in some measure to his salvation, his 
" Karl Barth, "'No! "' in Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1985), 164. 
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spiritual standing with God. The principle of grace alone would be compromised'. S0 
We believe that Barth's position regarding general revelation here is untenable for two 
reasons. Firstly, he has wrongly associated theologia naturalis with the revelation of 
God in creation thinking that the latter implies the former. Brunner is right when he 
argues that the two cannot be so associated, and that it is possible to affirm God's 
revelation in creation without subscribing to natural theology. 5' Secondly, he has 
wrongly conceived of revelation as redemptive. The older theology has made the 
distinction between historical faith and justifying faith, pointing to the actuality and 
possibility of rejecting God's offer of salvation which he makes in his revelation. 
Barth is rightly concerned to maintain the solo Christus and solo gratia. He 
is also right in insisting that there can be only one revelation. But this does not mean 
that the notion of general revelation must be denied or that it cannot find a place in 
his Christocentrism. Balthasar has sought to show how this can be achieved without 
compromise. What follows is a brief examination of his attempt. 52 
As we have already noted, there cannot be, for Balthasar, a disjunction 
between natural and special revelation. Natural revelation is a free act of God. This 
revelation is `natural' because it occurs in the medium of the created order. But in 
relation to its object, it is anything but natural. Although revelation is an act of God, 
`0 Millard Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1985), 
164. 
51 Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God. Dogmatics Vol. 1 (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1949), 132ff. 
'We have already discussed Balthasar's understanding of the relationship between 
the revelation of God in creation and in Jesus Christ in chapter two. Without repeating 
what we have already said there, we now pick this matter up once again to see how 
Balthasar answers Barth's objections, and to show more clearly how he brings general 
and special revelation into his Christological schema. 
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natural revelation must be seen in the closest possible way with creation. Balthasar 
could therefore say that God's will to reveal himself in creation is materially identical 
with the act of creation itself. But the Acta of revelation must be distinguished from 
its mere end result: created nature. 53 Balthasar's understanding of God's revelation, 
even his revelation in creation is dynamic, not static. And yet, revelation is so closely 
associated with creation that the latter is said to be the reflection of the glory of God. 
Balthasar uses the term image to bring this point accross. The world, as the theatre 
of God's glory, is the image which reflects the Primal Image: Christ. The relation 
with this image and Christ who is the Image of the invisible God is understood in the 
light of Christ being the ground and goal of creation. Thus God's revelation in 
creation must be placed within the Christological bracket. It is in this context that the 
continuum between general and special revelation must be seen. The implications of 
this is clearly spelt out in the following passage. 
If one inserts this thought into the Christological bracket - that is, if 
one keeps in mind that the meaning and movement of God's revelation 
in creation is his will finally to reveal himself in the Incarnation of 
Christ - then this first `natural' revelation (which, as it were opens up 
the antechamber) will seem to be like a preparation, foundation and 
onset of God's intimate revelation of his Word opening up the deepest 
regions of his being. And, accordingly, the capacity inherent in the 
human being to touch God as his Alpha and Omega will seem to be the 
preparation, foundation and onset of a higher capacity given to him in 
grace also to grasp God through faith in his personal Word' 
Seen within this christological bracket, natural revelation cannot be either 
denied or understood to be self contained and sufficient. To do the latter would be to 
11 KB, 309. 
KB, 310. 
306 
make grace the epiphenomenon of nature. 55 The relationship between natural and 
special revelation can perhaps be best understood from the standpoint of eschatology. 
From this standpoint, the total revelation of God to the world is homogenous from 
beginning to end; despite all its modal changes it remains the same revelation. The 
revelation in creation is not surpassed or made superfluous by the revelation of grace 
and glory. `To think otherwise would be to adopt a gnostic and Marcionite cast of 
mind: God then would contradict himself and as Redeemer would destroy what he has 
set up as Creator'. S6 Furthermore, the revelatio specialis is not an addition to the 
revelatio genere. `It would be much more true to say that, if God's revelation of 
himself in his effects and works proceed from the supernatural will and act implicit 
in his revelation, and if spiritual nature is already bound to "the perfect submission 
to divine truths" that moves outward from this act, then this revelation in works, in 
its ultimate, decisive intention, is still the beginning and outbreak of God's 
supernatural revelation in his Word in which that divine act now emerges in view'. " 
5. Theological A Priori 
But what about the general knowledge of God based on the natural revelation 
of God? Balthasar's Christology and theology of grace has opened the way for him 
to speak of a theological a priori. Erich Przywara has interpreted the analogia entis 
in the light of the Thomist doctrine of potentia - the creature's potentiality for God. 58 
11 Word and Revelation, 74-76. 
11 GL 1: 303. 
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The analogia entis is characterised as the `creaturely principle and thus internal to the 
limitless openness of the movement of becoming'; it is the restless potentiality of the 
creature for the divine - the potentia oboedientialis, the totally objective availability 
of the creature for God. 59 Balthasar brings analogy more deeply into the event of 
revelation by setting it within the context of catalogy, thereby interpreting the 
analogia entis in more theological terms. 60 The potentia is now conceived as the 
theological a priori, which is different from the religious a priori of liberalism. 
In the camp of liberal theology, and of the psychology and philosophy 
of religion, the theology of lumen frdei confronts the concept of the 
religious a priori. This concept need not be rejected: it must only be 
understood correctly. There is a natural religious a priori, given with 
the essence of the creature as such, which coincides with its ability to 
understand all existents in the light of Being, which is analogous to and 
points to God. Provided it does not get caught up in detailed analysis 
of partial aspects of Being, natural ontology is very largely always also 
a form of natural theology. When we spoke of a theological a priori, 
however, we did not mean this, but rather the ontological and 
epistemological elevation and illumination of this a priori by the light 
of the interior fullness of God's life as he reveals himself. But this 
manifestation of God does not only dawn on those who expressly call 
themselves Christians, but basically to all men. This is so because all 
are called to a vision of God in eternal life and, therefore, however 
secretly, all are placed in God's grace in an interior relationship to this 
light of revelation. Therefore many aspects of what the non-Christian 
sphere called the `religious a priori' and is described in religious 
experience must, in fact, be shot through with elements of grace. b' 
Thus there is in man a dynamism (desideruni naturale intellectus) for God compelled 
by grace. This theological a priori serves as the foundation for all instruction from 
outside. It is the sensorum which enables man to perceive the meaning of the 
revelation. `In the theological a priori, knowledge about the quality of the divine is 
" KB, 255. 
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found imbedded in the attitude of faith towards the sovereign Light'. Through this a 
priori the receiver is `ready to consider and recognise that every command issuing 
from the light in its incomprehensible freedom is an expression of the deepest 
necessity on the part of the light'. ' 
Now though the theological a priori for Balthasar involves aesthetically the 
whole person, the relationship between reason and faith must nevertheless be 
addressed. In the light of his theology of grace Balthasar argues that because natural 
reason is found in the concrete supernatural order, it must correspondingly possess 
a de facto link with supernatural faith. The unity of the world order makes this 
conclusion inevitable. 63 Reason is thus fructified by faith just as the prearnbula fidel 
are drawn into faith. `The light of grace works upon the reasoning subject bringing 
the person to suddenly see and believe. There is a moment when the interior light of 
the eyes of faith becomes one with the exterior light of the form perceived and the 
beholder cries out: "We have found ... " (John 1: 
45). God is known in God'. ' Thus 
when one speaks of faith, even in the specific (Christian) sense, human reason, while 
being challenged to its very roots, is required nothing which is unnatural to it. `On 
the contrary, grace calls on reason to fulfill the most natural aspects of its identity', " 
which is not only to know God but to acknowledge him in all its logical thinking. " 
For Balthasar, then, the circle between revelation and faith is not as closed as Barth 
62 GL I: 163. 
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would have it. 
Is there a difference between Balthasar's theological a priori and Rahner's 
potentia oboedientalis? Rahner postulates that the universal human experience would 
be intelligible without the transcendent (numinous) which Christians call God. This 
experience is located within the historical environment that people experience in their 
ordinary lives so that the transcendence of God is given its due . emphasis without 
ousting his imminent involvement in the world. 67 Rahner argues that humans 
transcend nature in their every questioning and thinking. That is to say, humans are 
not closed in on themselves. Rather there is an openness of being, an orientation and 
receptivity to the divine revelation. Transcendental reflection in philosophy has as its 
goal the discovery of the preconditions of human knowledge and experience, `the a 
priori transcendental condition for the possibility of [human] subjectivity'. 68 
Accordingly, Rahner argues that the transcendental experience of man substantiates 
the fact that humans are generally predisposed towards the divine, which is not alien 
to nature but the intrinsic condition of human subjectivity. He spoke of this capacity 
as the polentia obeodentialis, the obedential potency or openness for the revelation of 
God. 
[It is] a capacity of dynamic self-movement of the spirit, given a priori 
with human nature directed towards all possible objects. It is a 
movement in which the particular object is, as it were, grasped as an 
individual factor of this movement towards a goal, and so consciously 
grasped in a pre-view of this absolute breadth of the knowable. ' 
man is that existent thing who stands before the free God who may 
67 Karl Rahner, Foundations of the Christian Faith, 87. 
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possibly reveal himself. 7° 
For Rahner, this potency is embedded in human nature itself. There is a sense 
in which this potency has a noetic aspect, although this knowledge is "thematic and 
nonreflexive. This means that it is latent, preconscious and dormant, but nonetheless 
embedded in human nature. Hence the Raherian notion of potentia obeodentialis, 
notwithstanding its noetic structure, is more correctly an innate moral consciousness 
that bespeaks of the divine. This is not entirely surprising, given Rahner's 
indebtedness to Kant. 
Notwithstanding the family resemblances between the two, certain crucial 
differences must be noted. Fir 
Ä1y, Rahner begins with the subjectivity of the human 
person while Balthasar starts with God and his concrete revelation in history. 
Although he maintains that revelation is a transcendent gift from God, Rahner seems 
to accentuate the continuity between the human spirit and this gift in a way that is not 
at all acceptable to Balthasar. Furthermore, Balthasar is highly suspicious of Rahner's 
transcendental anthropology. To him Rahner's methodology not only subsumes the 
truths of faith under a philosophical system, it also fails to do justice to the Cross and 
resurrection. Balthasar's critique of Rahner's Anonymous Christianity is well known 
and crucial here. For him Rahner is guilty of relativising the Cross of Christ and the 
Church. 
Secondly, Balthasar's approach is thoroughly Christocentric. As such it is 
radically different from Rahner's Vo of For Rahner, this pre-comprehension in man 
which gives him access to transcendence is understood in the context of the 
supernatural existential. For Balthasar, however, everything revolves around the 
70 Ibid., 101. 
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mystery of Christ, the unique and ultimate form of the revelation of God. In other 
words, Rahner's Vorgriff speaks of the pre-apprehension of limitlessness while 
Balthasar speaks of the Gestalthafrigkeit des Wesen, the potential orientation of being 
towards concrete form. " 
The problems of sin and idolatry must now be discussed. What does sin do to 
the noetic capabilities of man, and how does Balthasar understand idolatry in relation 
to the general knowledge of God that we have been discussing? Following the 
declaration of Vatican I, Balthasar argues that the sinner continues to have a true 
capacity for theological knowledge: `For if man does not have the capacity as man for 
contacting God, if he is not relating to the real God in each of his conditions, then, 
there is neither responsibility in the true sense nor sin nor redemption. Otherwise man 
could by nature be an atheist and the fact of faith could in itself be neither reasonable 
nor shown to be reasonable'. 7z Balthasar however agrees with Aquinas that due to 
human finitude and sin, `[t]he natural investigation of reason does not suffice for the 
human race in knowing divine things, even those things that can be shown to be 
reasonable'. " In Barthian language, man's noctic capacity is limited because of the 
ontological abyss between God and creature and the abyss caused by the sin of the 
creature. For Balthasar, the `darkening' caused by original and actual sin has `the 
same range in the soul of the sinner as does God's inherent openness in his 
knowledge. Or, in the words of Paul's letter to the Romans: the refusal to 
acknowledge God extends as far as the knowledge of him does'. Again: `The false 
" Rowan Williams, `Balthasar and Rahner', Analogy of Beauty, 20. 
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image of the idols that the sinner forms for himself cover up the very place that has 
been reserved in his spirit for the true God'. 74 But this can only be so because `men 
have from time immemorial been in touch with the sphere and quality of the 
divine'. 'SThe sinful pagan cannot not know God by nature. To be sure his rejection 
of God's supernatural grace has resulted in the creation of a concept of God that is 
not `error-free'. Here Balthasar uses the Augustinian notion of being `off target' 
(peccatum) to his theological epistemology. Idolatry then is conceived as the pagan's 
`miscarried knowledge' of the divine `inspite of all its correct moments'. 76 
6. Balthasar and Reformed Theology 
How does Baithasar's theological epistemology compare with that of Reformed 
theology in general, and Calvin in particular? There are grounds to believe that there 
are many areas of agreement between the two. Calvin argues that through the Fall, 
the whole nature of man is corrupt and perverted. " Because sin is nothing short of 
rebellion against God, man is justly condemned. " For Calvin, fallen man is 
spiritually dead, not just sick. The Reformed tradition in teaching that sin effects the 
whole person because it is the rebellion of the whole man, torus ego, against God, is 
concerned, rightly, to correct the teaching in Scholasticism that sin affects only the 
lower gifts of man, that is, the sensual part of his nature corrupted while his reason 
'° KB, 321-2. 
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remained unimpaired. 79 Calvin argues that the whole man, including his mind, SOis 
perverted so that through the fall man has degenerated from nature to de-nature; he 
is not simply wounded in nature. " Accordingly, he taught that in Christ we are to 
become wholly new; in him we receive a new nature. ' We have therefore to do 
here not with the reparation of man, but an entirely new creation. 83 
But there is another side to this, for the theological anthropology of the 
Reformer is more dialectical than is usually noticed. The Imago Dei is all but effaced 
in man, so that there can be found in fallen man a remnant of it. This apparent 
contradiction in Calvin's thought can be clarified when the Reformer's perspectival 
anthropology is appreciated as a whole. To frame the matter in the light of our 
present discussion we could say that Calvin teaches that fallen man still has a dim 
awareness of God, but this is perverted because of sin and rebellion. This knowledge 
then becomes the fountainhead of superstition and irreligion. TM Both Barth and 
Balthasar would agree to this. " Calvin goes on to say that though this light in man 
'9 Instit. II. 2.4; see also Serm. on Eph. 2: 3f., and 4: 17f; Comm. on Ezek. 11: 19, 
20. 
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the divine, speculation about the absolute in the manner of Hegel - anything that pre- 
empts the place where God plans to raise the figure in a shape that is unguessable'. 
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has turned to darkness, it is not wholly extinguished. The light consists of two parts: 
the seed of religion and conscience. Calvin is of course careful to add that this light 
is of no advantage to man as far as his salvation is concerned, for in seeing he does 
not see. Natural reason will not direct man to Christ. 86 Still, Calvin does not deny 
the existence of this knowledge. 
This brings us then to Calvin's doctrine of the sensus divinitatis. The sensus 
divinitatis must not be confused with two other concepts of Calvin found in Instit. 
I. 5.4-5, that of the semen divinitatis and the insignia divinitatis in homine. The latter 
two refer to the evidences within man, that is, in the functioning of his body and soul, 
that points to the fact that he is made by God. They refer to those aspects of humanity 
which points to its Source or Creator. The sensus divinitatis, and the related 
metaphor, semen religionis, refers to actual religious knowledge (notitia). It is the 
noetic openness of the human mind to God given by God himself. " Calvin therefore 
is in agreement with Justi n Martyr who asserts that the unity of God is engraved in 
the hearts of all men. 83 The sensus is therefore the knowledge of the existence of 
God. 89 Because of sin, the universality of religion means the universality of 
idolatry. 90 This means that true knowledge of God is the presupposition of idolatry. 
Several important conclusions can be made at this point. The first is that 
`Theology and Aesthetic', 68-69. 
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Calvin's concept of the `seed of religion' is closer to Balthasar's theological a priori 
than the religious a priori of liberal Protestantism, or even Rahner's potentia 
obcodientialis. The latter two present a formal possibility, a precondition to 
knowledge, while Calvin's notion of the sensus divinitatis is a material and existential 
concept which refers to actual knowledge or notitia. Calvin is however more guarded 
in his language. He would not, for instance, define idolatry in the way Balthasar did. 
For him the whole movement of natural theology is perverted by the fall. And yet, 
Calvin speaks of a shadow of religion, and the tension in man even in his idolatry. 
`So impossible it is to blot this from man's mind that natural disposition would be 
more easily altered, as altered indeed it is when man voluntarily sinks from his natural 
haughtiness to the very depths in order to honour God'. 9' 
Instit. 1.6.14 has been understood by several Calvin scholars as the locus 
classicus of his discussion on natural theology. `Here I do not yet touch upon the sort 
of knowledge to which every order of nature would have led us if Adam had 
remained upright (Si integer stestisset Adam)' "92 Natural theology, Calvin seems to 
be saying here, is possible before the fall but not after. But this does not mean that 
man after the fall is exonerated, for he is not so blind that he can plead ignorance. 93 
Commenting on Romans 1: 19, Calvin writes: `And where Paul teaches that what is 
to be known of God is made plain from the creation of the universe (Rom. 1: 19) he 
does not signify such a manifestation as man's discernment can comprehend; but, 
91 Instit. 1.3.1. 
'I' Instit. I. 2.1. 
93 Comm. on Rout. 1.20. 
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rather, shows it not to go further than render them inexcusable'. 94 Calvin has insisted 
also that one can come to the knowledge of God and his revelation only through the 
Word. Nevertheless he does make reference to man's perception of the divine in the 
created order by using metaphors which suggests that man is suffering not from 
blindness but from a weak vision. 95 
Broadly speaking, Balthasar's understanding of natural revelation, the general 
knowledge of God, and the relationship between general and special revelation have 
much in common with that of the Reformer. For Balthasar, the Word (Christ) is the 
Gestalt of Christianity, the one and only exposition of God (John 1: 18). The task of 
theology is to `read' the figure of Christ, who is the cornerstone of the theological 
edifice, the norm for theology and theological knowledge. 96 In his revelation, 
Balthasar argues, God performs a symphony. The Son directs this symphony, and 
through him the meaning of the variety in the symphony becomes clear. 97 But, like 
Calvin, Balthasar would maintain that the `world is a stage which has been set up for 
the encounter of the whole God with the whole man'. 93 
7. Philosophy and Theology 
We come finally to Balthasar's understanding of the relationship between 
" Instit. 1.6.14. 
91 Instil. I. 6.1. 
See `Theology and Aesthetics', 64-65; GL 1: 463-525; `God is his own Exegete', 
Co»tmunio 4 (1986), 280 -286; GL I: 429-684. 
" Truth is Symphonic, 8. 
11 GL 1: 220f.; 303. 
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philosophy and theology. How does Balthasar see the relationship between the two in 
the context of his christocentric vision and his theology of grace? Balthasar warns of 
two extreme ways in which this relationship can be conceived. The first is Christian 
positivism which posits the dissolution of philosophy into theology in such a way that 
the old term philosophy loses all meaning and intelligibility. The second is that of 
bringing the formal object of theology so near to that of philosophy as to create a 
false identity. This would result in the absorption of Christian contemplation by the 
contemplation of being. Through his christocentric perspective, Balthasar hopes to 
avoid these dangers by according due respect to the integral dignity of reason and 
philosophy, holding them within the horizon opened by revelation on the one hand, 
and, freeing theology, as it were, from the notion that it could develop as a science 
only through the mediation of philosophy on the other. ' 
For Balthasar, then, the seperation of philosophy from theology is 
inconceivable. Since all men are called to the vision of God in eternal life, all are also 
placed in an interior relationship to the light of revelation by God's grace which is 
secretly at work in the `whole sphere of history and thus all myths, philosophies, and 
poetic creations' which are capable of `housing within themselves an intimation of 
divine glory'»°° The philosophising mind, however, needs revelation, since, while 
`the heathen can possess fragments of revelation, the Biblical revelation', Balthasar 
maintains, `contains the logos in its entirety'. 1°' As soon as philosophy has acquired 
for itself a method which denies the reliance of any sources outside the philosophising 
' Scola, `Nature', 226. 
lw Leahy, `Aesthetics', 44. 
I'll GL 1: 71. 
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mind, `speculation about God soon lost its cosmic character, and is reduced to a 
purely a priori form of ratiocination only to reveal in the end (late eighteenth century) 
what it had been all along: a titanic human construction'. 1 ' Balthasar therefore 
insists that philosophy must be seen in the light of revelation. Revelation challenges 
`man essentially in his act of faith and brings philosophical knowledge, along with its 
eros, to its interior goal'. 103 Together with Origen, Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, 
then, Balthasar understands the intellectusftdei as `including this interior completion 
of the philosophical act in theology - then we may indeed make a clear distinction 
methodologically between the field of what man can attain on the basis of the light of 
his own reason and what he has become accessible to him on the basis of revelation 
alone'. "°' 
But this continuity can only be understood in the light of the more radical 
discontinuity. Balthasar's Christology and theology of the Cross demand this. Hence 
Balthasar could say that `Christianity is destroyed if it lets itself be reduced to 
transcendental presuppositions of man's self-understanding, whether in thought or 
life'. 105 The trinitarian God who is manifested in the Gestalt of Christ is not only 
the answer to the cosmological search for completion and man's quest for answers. 
He who is the Way, Truth and Life is the answer that questions all answers. The 
Biblical revelation, which leads to the unmeasurable measure of love that is in the 
formed formlessness of the obedience of Christ radically destroys all worldly 
Dupre, `Glory', 393. 
103 GL 1: 46. 
Ibid. 
"'s Love Alone, 43. 
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aesthetics, including all classical notions of beauty, harmony and proportions. This 
end signals the emergence of the divine aesthetics. 106 The radiance of the Triune 
God provides a new harmony, proportion and beauty in the Incarnation and the Cross 
- the cruciform love of God. Theological aesthetics is based on the perfect proportion 
of the form of Christ in his obedience to the Father. 1°7 Nevertheless the form which 
`gives expression to the meaning of a radically sinful existence' is in some way related 
beyond itself to the form of the Redeemer which in turn `takes the modalities of fallen 
existence upon itself so as to transvalue them by redemptive suffering'. 1 ' One 
commentator puts it like this. 
The cross is the place of the nuptial encounter where everything 
creaturely is reduced to silence only to be glorified in obedience. The 
human cry reaching up to heaven for glory is sheltered within the 
divine glory hidden in the cry which lies at the heart of the Triduunz 
mortis. Jesus' cry, `My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? ', 
encloses both the basic philosophical question at the human centre: 
`why is there something at all and not nothing? ' and the cruciformed 
why-lessness of Christ's love reaching to us from the divine 
centre. 109 
From the standpoint of the Cross then, philosophy either knows too much or 
too little. Too much because it attempts to speak boldly at the point where the Word 
of God is silent, suffers and dies. And this in order to show that which is beyond the 
grasp of philosophy, and which could only be available through faith in the ever 
greater trinitarian love of God. The Word also reveals that which philosophy can form 
no conclusion about - that the death of one man can restore all men to God. Too little 
" GL 1: 460. 
"° GL VII: 262. 
'°x GL 1: 461. 
" Leahy, `Aesthetics', 28. 
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because philosophy cannot measure - indeed, it has no inkling of - the abyss into 
which the Word descends. Consequently it could only close the haitus or else disguise 
it with garlands. So, philosophy either misconceives the nature of man and fails to 
take seriously his earthly existence, as in Platonism and Gnosticism. Or it elevates 
him in such as way as to make him the exact image and likeness of God; so exact that 
in actuality God is brought down and formed in man's image. Thus Balthasar 
concludes: 
If philosophy is not willing to content itself with either, speaking 
abstractly of being, or with thinking concretely of the earthly and 
worldly (and no further), then it must at once empty itself in order to 
`know nothing ... except Jesus Christ and him crucified' (1 
Corinthians 
2: 2). Then it may, starting out from this source, go on to `impart a 
secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages 
for our glorification' (Ibid., 2: 7). This proclamation, however, rises up 
over a deeper silence and a darker abyss than pure philosophy can 
know. "0 
8. Conclusion 
That Balthasar's theology is deeply influenced by Karl Barth is evident 
throughout his work on theological aesthetics. The Glory of the Lord can be said to 
be an interaction with, and in a sense, a development of Barth's theological 
epistemology. To be sure Balthasar is uneasy with Barth's `revelatory positivism', to 
use the term coined by Bonhoeffer. And though the thought of Barth does play an 
important part in his theology, Balthasar was nonetheless also influenced by other 
`figures' in the history of Western thought. His theological aesthetics is the meeting 
point of complementarity of past, present and future. This has to be so, since for 
Balthasar it is the whole form of Christ that must be kept in view. The methodologies 
l' MP, 66. 
321 
of Irenaeus, Augustine, Anselm and Pascal, different though they are, complement 
each other"' and provide leaven for all ages, since they are interpretations of God's 
glory. 112 It is true to say that as one of Barth's most penetrating critics and 
admirers, Balthasar was willing to go a long way with Barth. "' Both were alive to 
the dangers of the control of natural theology over revelation in modern theology. 
Barth's anxiety is all too clear when one observes his battles with theologians like 
Brunner and Althaus. Although not willing to go as far as Barth in ousting natural 
theology, Balthasar is also acutely aware of the dangers of the immanentalism that 
pervades the modern understanding of the God-world relationship and has led to the 
erosion of Christian distinctiveness. This concern comes to clear expression in his 
deep suspicion of the approach of Rahner who has gone so far as to speak of the 
`anonymous Christian', a term which is self-contradictory for Baithasar. Finally, both 
theologians see the revelation of God as centred in Jesus Christ and fulfilled in the 
Cross. The incarnation, then, has profound significance for both theologians. 
Incarnation moves inexorably to the Cross. This means that the Cross is the place 
where the God-world relationship must be understood. Hence both theologians are 
worthy to be named as theologians of the Cross. 
But against the Luther-Kierkegaard-Barth theology of discontinuity, Balthasar 
wants to argue for a continuity. Better still, he wishes to argue for a continuity within 
a radical discontinuity, to see incarnation and Cross in terms of transformation and 
"' GL 11: 11-17. 
112 GL IV: 21. 
"' John Thompson, `Barth and Balthasar: An ecumenical Dialogue', Beauty of 
Grist. An Introduction to the Theology of Hans Urs von Baithasar. Edited by Bede 
McGregor, O. P. and Thomas Norris (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 175. 
322 
fulfillment. This continuity is demanded by the incarnation "itself since the Word 1 
becoming flesh presupposes `that there must be a relatively solid content of meaning 
that cannot be totally robbed of its substance when we provisionally abstract from our 
supernatural goal'. "' Even the Cross does not totally obliterate this continuity. For 
if the analogia cnucis is truly to penetrate our entire vision of reality, it must be 
linked at some point with an idea of God that is based on the analogia entis. Balthasar 
therefore sees the importance, indeed the indispensability, of the analogiafidei; but 
this does not mean that one can do away with the analogia entis. He does not believe 
that one is here faced with an either/or situation. Louis Dupre writes: `Von Balthasar 
agrees with Barth that a Christian aesthetic must start from the Cross. He differs from 
him, however, in not admitting any definitive caesura between this theology of form 
and a philosophical aesthetic'. 15 Balthasar seeks to overcome what he sees to be the 
fruitless alternative between the analogy of faith and the analogy of being by 
developing what is called a `catalogical analogy' based on the kenosis, Incarnation and 
Cross. By so doing he tries to avoid the danger of formulating a concept of analogy 
capable of sustaining itself -a concept of analogy based on a metaphysics independent 
of revelation and based on the abstract notion of nature. Thus Balthasar seeks to bring 
the analogia frdei and analogia entis into a christological and trinitarian framework 
in which one can speak about the assumption of the latter into the former without 
endangering the integrity of the created order. 
114 KB, 362. 
"s Louis Dupre, `The Glory of the Lord: Hans Urs von Baithasar's Theological 
Aesthetics', Comnurnio, Vol 16 (1989), 389. 
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